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Abstract  
Developing countries have signed over a thousand tax treaties, at a cost of millions of 
pounds a year, based on a myth. The predominant legal rationale for so-called ‘double 
taxation’ treaties is outdated, while the evidence that they attract investment into developing 
countries is inconclusive. Although the financial gains from tax treaties are split between the 
treasuries of capital exporting countries and their multinational companies, most of the costs 
are incurred by the fiscs of capital importing countries. Rational actor models alone cannot 
explain the diffusion of tax treaties to the global South. 
The missing piece of the picture is ideas. As developing countries have formed their 
identities as fiscal states, a century-old narrative describing the deleterious effects of double 
taxation resulting from international fiscal anarchy has shaped different actors’ preferences. 
From the perspective of those focused on investment promotion, tax treaties are part of what 
a state does when it wants to compete for investment, regardless of the evidence about their 
actual effects. Meanwhile, officials developing the tax system have looked to the OECD as 
the source of sophisticated technical knowledge, and learned to regard tax treaties as the way 
to ensure ‘acceptable standards’ for taxing multinational companies. 
This thesis uses interviews with treaty negotiators, observations of international meetings, 
and archival research, including case studies from the UK, Zambia, Vietnam and Cambodia 
selected through a mixed methods strategy. It identifies three diffusion mechanisms: 
competition by developed countries for outward investment opportunities, ‘boundedly 
rational’ competition by developing countries for inward investment, and efforts by tax 
specialists to disseminate fiscal standards. It also highlights two scope conditions. First, 
competition for inward investment can be blocked if political actors are concerned about 
raising corporate tax revenue. Second, where the preferences of specialists and non-
specialists in a country do not align, control over veto points is a prerequisite to diffusion. 
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Preface 
In January 1972, a British tax treaty negotiator in Nairobi sent a telegram to his superiors at 
Somerset House, the headquarters of the Board of Inland Revenue across the road from the 
London School of Economics. “Talks with Kenya have broken down over treatment of 
management fees and royalties,” he wrote. “The Keanyans [sic] have pressed me to obtain 
confirmation from the Board that the UK cannot agree to a 20% withholding tax.”1 Kenya 
wanted to replace a tax treaty with the UK that it inherited at independence with a new one 
that would give it the right to tax gross fees paid by Kenyan companies to British managers 
and consultants at a rate of up to 20 percent. The UK had never agreed to this before, taking 
the view that such payments should be taxable only in the UK. Kenya eventually terminated 
the colonial agreement in an impressive act of brinksmanship, and the UK relented on its 
point of principle. In subsequent talks at Somerset House, Kenyan and British officials 
initialled a treaty permitting Kenya to tax management and consultancy fees paid to the UK, 
but only at rates up to 12.5 percent.2 This is the lowest cap in any Kenyan treaty currently in 
force. 
The notes of the UK-Kenya negotiations indicate that tax avoidance by unscrupulous British 
multinational companies was the developing country’s concern about this clause. Pressed for 
an example, Kenyan negotiators explained that a British firm had posted handwritten letters 
back to the UK, where they were typed up and posted back to Nairobi, with the extortionate 
fee charged for this secretarial service shifting profits from Kenya to the UK before the 
former could tax them.3 The British were sceptical, and in a tense exchange during the 
Nairobi talks, a Kenyan negotiator asserted that “the UK wanted to make UK management 
cheaper in the Kenyan market than Swedish management.”4 Sweden, along with Norway 
and Denmark, had already agreed to the 20 percent rate, which meant that Nordic firms 
would have needed to charge 20 percent more than their British counterparts for the same 
post-tax return, had the UK got the zero rate that it sought.  
It seems unlikely that either side would have been thinking of a British PhD student, forty 
years in the future, arranging a contract using email, Whatsapp and Skype. Yet in 2013, 
across the road from the building where the treaty was initialled, it saved me (and cost the 
Kenyan treasury) several hundred pounds. A Kenyan organisation, Tax Justice Network-
Africa (TJN-A), had agreed to pay some of the costs of the fieldwork for this thesis, through 
                                                     
1 Telegram from D Hopkins, Inland Revenue, 27 January 1972. File ref IR 40/17623 
2 United Kingdom-Kenya double taxation agreement, 1973 
3 Minutes of UK-Kenya tax treaty negotiation meeting, London, 9-11 November 1971. File ref IR 40/17623 
4 Minutes of UK-Kenya tax treaty negotiation meeting, Nairobi, 25-29 January 1972. File ref IR 40/17623 
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a consultancy fee. TJN-A’s standard contract stated that it was legally obliged to deduct a 20 
percent withholding tax from my fee, but in my case the rate was reduced to 12.5 percent, on 
the basis of the 1973 agreement.  
The final sentence of the January 1972 telegram illustrates how times have changed between 
the negotiation of the treaty and its impact on my own tax liability. “I would be grateful if 
you could get a message to my wife that I will probably not be home until Wednesday,” 
wrote the British negotiator, giving a home telephone number.5 In contrast, thanks to the 
excellent mobile internet coverage across east Africa today, my wife had no such uncertainty 
to endure when I conducted fieldwork. 
While Kenyan negotiators in 1973 obtained a good result in comparison to other countries 
negotiating with the UK, the treaty still has significant costs, which can only be reduced 
through a new intergovernmental negotiation or by abrogating the treaty altogether. By 
2013, British multinationals had over £2 billion invested in Kenya, remitting £150 million to 
the UK in dividends and fees, on which the treaty caps tax rates at either 12.5 or 15 percent.6 
In any event, it is unlikely that a renegotiation would improve Kenya’s lot, as most of its 
recent negotiations, while resembling its past treaties in form and content, prevent it from 
taxing consultancy fee payments at all. 
Just as neither TJN-A nor I considered the tax treaty until after we had decided to work 
together, evidence suggests that tax treaties may only rarely influence multinational 
companies’ investment decisions, and so developing countries have little to show for these 
revenue sacrifices. As a result, some have recently started to reconsider individual tax 
treaties or even their whole networks, and organisations as diverse as African civil society 
groups and the IMF have adopted an increasingly critical stance. In 2012, Mongolia, 
Argentina and Rwanda between them repudiated a total of eight tax treaties, apparently due 
to fears that they were open to abuse or overly generous.7  
The rate at which developing countries are signing new tax treaties, however, shows no sign 
of declining. This thesis is an attempt to understand the inconsistency between 50 years of 
negotiations that have resulted in over a thousand tax treaties signed by developing 
countries, and the evidence that these treaties cost developing countries more than they gain.
                                                     
5 Telegram from D Hopkins, Inland Revenue, 27 January 1972. File ref IR 40/17623 
6 Irungu, “UK Firms Ship out Sh20bn in Dividends and Fees from Kenya”; Kenya High Commission, “Kenya - 
United Kingdom Relations.” 
7 Godfrey, “Argentina Cancels Double Tax Pact With Spain”; Ernst & Young, “Draft Law to Cancel Mongolia’s 
Double Tax Treaties”; Ernst & Young, “Argentina Unilaterally Terminates Tax Treaty with Switzerland.” 
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1 Introduction 
A treaty means giving some rights to others. Why would 
you do that to someone who is coming to invest? 
- Tanzanian tax treaty negotiator1 
 
Developing countries do not get a fair share of the global multinational corporate income tax 
base. Long the contention of critical legal scholars, this view is now increasingly shared by 
vocal political actors.2 Yet the key mechanism depriving developing countries of a larger 
share of tax revenues is something they have signed up to – and continue to do – entirely 
voluntarily: a network of bilateral treaties, and the international norms that those treaties 
encode into hard law. According to Tsilly Dagan, the main effect of these tax treaties is 
“regressive redistribution – to the benefit of the developed countries at the expense of the 
developing ones.”3 Kim Brooks and Richard Krever agree that “the success of the high-
income states in negotiating ever more treaties has come at the expense of the tax revenue 
bases of low-income countries.”4 If this is the case, why are most of the 3000 tax treaties in 
existence signed by developing countries? 
The conventional answer to this question rests on a fiscal anarchy problematique. States are 
defined in part by their claim to fiscal sovereignty, a monopoly over the right to raise tax 
within their borders. Because economic factors can cross those borders, however, states’ 
attempts to exercise their fiscal sovereignty in conditions of anarchy may be self-defeating. 
Without cooperation, overlapping claims to tax the same income will create onerous double 
taxation that deters trade and investment. Worse still, taxpayers may respond to a high tax 
burden in one country by moving to another, or by placing their wealth in another 
jurisdiction, beyond the reach of their home state’s administrative capacity. Fiscal states’ 
relationships with each other and with their corporate taxpayers have developed within the 
constraints of this socially constructed notion of international anarchy. 
The modern corporate income tax, introduced among ‘developed’ countries in the early 20th 
century, had always to be designed bearing in mind the effects of its interaction with other 
states’ tax systems, and so states worked simultaneously through the League of Nations to 
                                                     
1 Interview 20 
2 Irish, “International Double Taxation Agreements and Income Taxation At Source:”; Dagan, “The Tax Treaties 
Myth”; Thuronyi, “Tax Treaties and Developing Countries”; ActionAid, Mistreated: The Tax Treaties That Are 
Depriving the World’s Poorest Countries of Vital Revenue. 
3 Dagan, “The Tax Treaties Myth,” 941. 
4 Brooks and Krever, “The Troubling Role of Tax Treaties,” 160. 
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construct a set of international norms that brought order to this emerging anarchy.5 As 
globalisation has intensified these conflicts, developed countries, acting primarily through 
the OECD, have elaborated an increasingly detailed global tax regime. Their tax systems 
have converged on a common approach to international tax formulated over decades of 
experimentation and negotiation, which combines multilateral ‘soft law’ in the form of a set 
of core principles and thousands of pages of detailed technical standards with the hard law of 
bilateral treaties.6 Nonetheless, disagreements among states over international corporate 
taxation have recently been elevated to the highest levels of international politics through the 
G-20.7 
For developing countries, coming much later into the international tax regime and with 
much less mature tax systems, the traffic has been one-way. Whole chapters of tax codes 
have been developed on the basis of OECD tax concepts and standards, some of which they 
have adopted wholesale.8 Their very identities as fiscal states – from the purpose and 
definition of corporate tax, to the fiscal state’s responsibilities towards its taxpayers – have 
not formed in isolation, but as participants in this regime. The double taxation problem, 
which expresses one of the negative consequences of international fiscal anarchy, is 
pervasive in the design of their laws governing international tax. 
At the heart of this process are thousands of bilateral tax treaties, every one of them derived 
from a model formulated and promoted by the OECD. This multilateral foundation of the tax 
treaty regime, as well as the bilateral treaties built on those foundations, has distributional 
consequences. By design, tax treaties between developed and developing countries constrain 
the latter’s ability to raise tax revenue from foreign investors.9 Put simply, developing 
countries have given up large chunks of their tax base by signing these treaties, with few 
certain gains to show as a result: their incorporation into the international tax regime is more 
akin to a process of dependency than of modernisation.10 
                                                     
5 Graetz and O’Hear, “The ‘Original Intent’ of U.S. International Taxation”; Picciotto, International Business 
Taxation : A Study in the Internationalization of Business Regulation. 
6 Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law. 
7 Houlder, “Special Tax Rules for Internet Companies ‘not Viable’”; Dyer, “China Greets G20 Results with 
Caution.” 
8 Stewart, “Global Trajectories of Tax Reform: The Discourse of Tax Reform in Developing and Transition 
Countries”; Christians, “Global Trends and Constraints on Tax Policy in the Least Developed Countries”; 
Genschel and Seelkopf, “Did They Learn to Tax? Taxation Trends Outside the OECD,” 2016. 
9 In this thesis, the distinction between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries is treated as interchangeable with 
that between ‘capital-exporting’ and ‘capital-importing’ countries, and the ‘home’ and ‘host’ country of a 
multinational company. In reality, this equivalence is increasingly breaking down, in particular as middle-income 
countries act simultaneously as capital importers and capital exporters. For my purposes, the categorisation is a 
relative one referring to a country’s position in the individual dyadic relationship, rather than its relationship to 
all countries. The case studies, in particular, focus on a developed country in negotiations where its role is that of 
a capital exporter, and developing countries that are overwhelmingly capital importers. 
10 Brooks and Krever, “The Troubling Role of Tax Treaties”; Thuronyi, “Tax Treaties and Developing 
Countries.” 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
13 
 
1.1 The role of ideas 
Existing literature that tries to explain the development of the tax treaty regime, and in 
particular the diffusion of tax treaties to developing countries, takes a rationalist approach. 
The double taxation problem is treated as fact, as is states’ pre-existing, first order 
preference for resolving it while – as a second-order preference – maximising their share of 
the tax base.11 Negotiations can then be modelled using game theory, as a ‘battle of the 
sexes’ through which states reach a coordinated solution.12 Some studies modify this by 
taking into account competition between capital importing states, which may alter their 
preferences, creating a more intense preference for resolving double taxation despite the loss 
of the tax base that this entails.13 
As constructivist international relations scholarship reminds us, however, international 
anarchy is a socially constructed concept,14 and rationalist assumptions about state 
preferences in international tax are indeed difficult to sustain. Tsilly Dagan turns the model 
of tax treaty negotiations as a ‘battle of the sexes’ on its head, demonstrating that, absent an 
agreement, capital exporting states will always have an incentive to move unilaterally to 
resolve double taxation, bearing all the costs of doing so themselves.15 True to Dagan’s 
prediction, developed countries’ tax systems already resolve most instances of double 
taxation faced by their outward investors. Unsurprisingly, therefore, there is little evidence 
to support the contention that developing countries gain inward investment as a result of 
signing tax treaties.16 The voluminous critical legal literature that is sceptical of tax treaties 
from a developing country perspective is less vocal about why, given the certain costs and 
uncertain benefits, they should have proceeded to sign tax treaties.17 Those authors that do 
venture suggestions point to the role of ideas: Dagan suggested that the ‘myth’ of the double 
taxation problem concealed “much more cynical goals, particularly redistributing tax 
revenues from the poorer to the richer signatory countries”; Charles Irish, writing as early as 
                                                     
11 Rixen and Schwarz, “Bargaining over the Avoidance of Double Taxation: Evidence from German Tax 
Treaties”; Radaelli, “Game Theory and Institutional Entrepreneurship: Transfer Pricing and the Search for 
Coordination International Tax Policy”; Becker and Fuest, “The Nexus of Corporate Income Taxation and 
Multinational Activity”; Chisik and Davies, “Asymmetric FDI and Tax-Treaty Bargaining: Theory and 
Evidence.” 
12 Rixen, The Political Economy of International Tax Governance. 
13 Baistrocchi, “The Use and Interpretation of Tax Treaties in the Emerging World: Theory and Implications”; 
Barthel and Neumayer, “Competing for Scarce Foreign Capital: Spatial Dependence in the Diffusion of Double 
Taxation Treaties”; Rixen, The Political Economy of International Tax Governance. 
14 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. 
15 Dagan, “The Tax Treaties Myth.” 
16 See, for example, Sauvant and Sachs, The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment. More recent 
examples include Davies, Norbäck, and Tekin-Koru, “The Effect of Tax Treaties on Multinational Firms: New 
Evidence from Microdata”; Blonigen, Oldenski, and Sly, “The Differential Effects of Bilateral Tax Treaties.” 
17 For example, Brooks and Krever, “The Troubling Role of Tax Treaties”; Christians, “Tax Treaties for 
Investment and Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa: A Case Study”; Dagan, “The Tax Treaties Myth”; Irish, 
“International Double Taxation Agreements and Income Taxation At Source:” 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
14 
 
1974, bemoaned developing countries’ “unawareness of the adverse nature of double 
taxation agreements” and “unquestioned acceptance of the status quo.”18 
Elsewhere in the political economy literature on international tax, the causal role and 
constitutive nature of ideas is widely accepted. Jason Sharman, in seeking to explain why 
large developed countries should have been unable to curb the harmful tax practices of small 
island states, concludes that the OECD lost, “a rhetorical conflict, that is, one centred on the 
public used of language to achieve political ends,” despite its overwhelming dominance of 
material capabilities.19 For Ronen Palan, tax havens’ use of the ‘commercialisation of state 
sovereignty’ to undermine other states’ tax systems has been insulated from the ability that 
developed countries undoubtedly possess to legislate it away, because it is a by-product of a 
principled idea, the Westphalian concept of sovereignty.20 Leonard Seabrooke and Duncan 
Wigan portray the standard-setting process for financial reporting related to corporate 
taxation as a conflict between groups of professionals that was resolved through their claims 
to technical and moral authority.21 
Two empirical aspects of international tax make it essential that the role of ideas is 
considered when policy processes are analysed, whether they relate to tax avoidance and 
evasion, as these constructivist accounts do, or to bargaining over double taxation, which has 
until now been addressed in political science solely by scholars working in a rationalist 
tradition. First, as chapter 2 of this thesis will discuss, tax is intimately connected to state-
citizen relations and hence to ideologies, so that state preferences cannot be derived simply 
from an aggregate assessment of the welfare losses and gains of different options. Second, as 
chapters 4 and 5 argue, international tax is characterised by technical complexity, meaning 
that many participants in policy debates must necessarily act without a comprehensive 
understanding of the available information, and that actors with authoritative command of 
technical knowledge have considerable power to shape others’ preferences. 
The aim of thesis is therefore to extend the study of the role of ideas in international tax 
relations to the double taxation problem. Its starting point is that the ‘tax treaties myth’ is 
socially constructed, bound up in the idea of international fiscal anarchy. Detailed country 
case studies and interviews with treaty negotiators will show how this and other socially 
constructed ideas are transmitted through international mechanisms of diffusion. Those ideas 
support an agenda in the interests of developed countries, although not, in general, one of 
                                                     
18 Dagan, “The Tax Treaties Myth,” 939; Irish, “International Double Taxation Agreements and Income Taxation 
At Source:,” 300–301. 
19 Sharman, Havens in a Storm: The Global Struggle for Tax Regulation, 75. 
20 Palan, “Tax Havens and the Commercialization of State Sovereignty,” 172. 
21 Seabrooke and Wigan, “Powering Ideas through Expertise: Professionals in Global Tax Battles.” 
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‘regressive redistribution’ of tax revenue as posited by Dagan. Instead, since the benefits 
accrue primarily to multinational firms resident in developed countries, the narrative of this 
thesis is more consistent with a business power perspective.22 
1.2 Policy diffusion 
The main theoretical goal of this thesis is to develop and refine literature on the diffusion of 
economic policies, and in particular intergovernmental agreements between developed and 
developing countries.23  Policy diffusion, defined as when “the policy choices of one country 
are shaped by the choices of others,”24 refers to the underlying mechanism driving an 
observed convergence in policy.25 While the policy diffusion literature has largely used 
quantitative methodologies to identify broad cross-country mechanisms driving diffusion at 
global level, far less is understood about the national and regional scope conditions that may 
enhance or undermine their effectiveness, especially in the case of developing countries.26 
According to Fabrizio Gilardi, “[t]he nature of diffusion processes cannot be elucidated 
satisfactorily unless broad patterns can be supported by detailed information on the 
underlying dynamics.”27 Similarly, the literature on epistemic communities is able to 
identify the characteristics of international expert networks who cause convergence around a 
policy in multiple countries, but much weaker when it comes to demonstrating how and in 
what circumstances these experts create changes in specific countries’ policies.28 
The departure point for this thesis is the literature on bilateral investment treaties (BITs), 
which has recently taken a turn towards explaining diffusion to developing countries through 
‘bounded rationality’, the notion that policymakers do not give equal weight to all the 
available information, but instead rely on cognitive shortcuts when evaluating it.29 BITs, it is 
argued, were perceived by developing countries as cost-free, which they were, until years 
                                                     
22 Fuchs, Business Power in Global Governance. 
23 Poulsen, “Bounded Rationality and the Diffusion of Modern Investment Treaties”; Elkins, Guzman, and 
Simmons, “Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000”; Jandhyala, 
Henisz, and Mansfield, “Three Waves of BITs: The Global Diffusion of Foreign Investment Policy”; Barthel and 
Neumayer, “Competing for Scarce Foreign Capital: Spatial Dependence in the Diffusion of Double Taxation 
Treaties.” 
24 Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett, “The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion, 
Competition, or Learning?,” 450. 
25 Gilardi, “Transnational Diffusion: Norms, Ideas, and Policies.” 
26 Marsh and Sharman, “Policy Diffusion and Policy Transfer”; Meseguer and Gilardi, “What Is New in the 
Study of Policy Diffusion?”; Solingen, “Of Dominoes and Firewalls: The Domestic, Regional, and Global 
Politics of International Diffusion.” 
27 Gilardi, “Transnational Diffusion: Norms, Ideas, and Policies,” 471. 
28 Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination”; Davis Cross, 
“Rethinking Epistemic Communities Twenty Years Later”; Antoniades, “Epistemic Communities, Epistemes and 
the Construction of (World) Politics.” 
29 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk”; Weyland, Bounded 
Rationality and Policy Diffusion: Social Sector Reform in Latin America; Poulsen, “Bounded Rationality and the 
Diffusion of Modern Investment Treaties.” 
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later investors began to use their dispute settlement clauses.30 Tax treaties are a more 
difficult case to explain using ‘bounded rationality’, because their costs to signatory 
governments are immediate, predictable, and significant. Despite this difference, the 
evidence in this thesis supports the contention that policymakers in developing countries 
with limited understanding of the likely costs and benefits of tax treaties pushed forward 
with negotiation, based on the idea that treaties would attract investment. They did this 
without evaluating all the available information equally and sometimes against the advice of 
specialists who were more familiar with the likely impacts. Not only did this result in tax 
treaties signed in instances where any impact on investment was uncertain, but it also 
resulted in greater concessions than would have been necessary to secure an agreement with 
negotiating partners. A negative scope condition for this mechanism concerns the attention 
paid by policymakers to information about the fiscal costs of tax treaties. I argue that such 
costs are more salient to actors when there is concern about a country’s low tax effort, or 
when corporate taxation is politically controversial. 
The thesis identifies a second mechanism that is largely missing from the diffusion 
literature. Capital exporting countries stood to gain from tax treaties, not usually through 
increased revenue, as discussed in the critical tax literature,31 but by giving their 
multinational investors a competitive edge in signatory countries. There is substantial 
evidence that lobbying by multinational companies guides capital exporting countries’ 
negotiating priorities, and that tax treaties form a part of these countries’ outward 
investment-promoting strategies. In general, such lobbying has followed the decision to 
invest in a country, rather than preceded it, so there is little support for the suggestion that 
tax treaties positively influence investors’ decisions. For this mechanism to work, of course, 
developing countries must be willing to sign, and so it is likely that the first two mechanisms 
work hand-in-hand to drive diffusion. 
A third and final mechanism identified in this thesis is the agency of an epistemic 
community of tax technocrats based in national civil services, the private sector, academia 
and international organisations. Members of this community can be shown to hold a specific 
set of ideas about tax treaties that are different to those of non-specialists. They regard 
treaties as means of disseminating international tax norms and standards that members of 
their community have developed within the OECD’s technical bodies, and which they 
consider preferable to tax rules developed through national processes involving political 
                                                     
30 Poulsen and Aisbett, “When the Claim Hits: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bounded Rational Learning”; 
Jandhyala, Henisz, and Mansfield, “Three Waves of BITs: The Global Diffusion of Foreign Investment Policy.” 
31 Dagan, “The Tax Treaties Myth”; Irish, “International Double Taxation Agreements and Income Taxation At 
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actors. This community claims an authoritative position in the formulation of tax policy on 
the basis of multiple professional competencies, and the mastery of a complex and precise 
technical language.32 
The thesis does not claim to show evidence of a socialisation mechanism through which 
developing countries’ officials may have internalised these ideas, since it is difficult to 
demonstrate that an individual’s underlying beliefs have changed.33 It does show, however, 
that civil servants who have learnt specialist technical knowledge about tax treaties also hold 
ideas prevalent in the international tax community. These ideas can create differing 
preferences from other actors at national level who do not have the same specialist training. 
The technical learning can produce two outcomes. In one scenario, as they understand the 
technical detail of tax treaties better, officials become increasingly aware of their costs, and 
of the limited evidence that they will attract inward investment. In another, as they learn how 
the international tax community conceptualises tax treaties, they regard tax treaties’ true 
function as lying outside any immediate investment-promoting effects, and their preferences 
for treaty partners and treaty content shift. The nature and extent of officials’ learning is thus 
a variable that can cause them to support or oppose particular treaties. 
The effectiveness of the dissemination of technical standards as a diffusion mechanism 
depends, however, on a second scope condition, which is the power that specialists and non-
specialists have at veto points in the treaty making process. This power may result from 
formal bureaucratic and political responsibilities, but technical specialists may also hold a de 
facto veto created by the complex technical content and obscure terminology associated with 
tax treaties, which forces non-specialist actors to defer to them.34 
1.3 Methodology and case selection 
The thesis is structured along the inductive-deductive process I used for my research. In the 
theory-generating stage, interviews were conducted with 47 stakeholders in tax treaty 
negotiations, most of them tax treaty negotiators. Several meetings of the international tax 
community – at the United Nations and OECD – were also observed. This anecdotal 
evidence is presented in the first half of this thesis as proof-of-concept, demonstrating the 
existence, but not the relative importance, of the diffusion mechanisms identified above. 
                                                     
32 Picciotto, “Indeterminacy, Complexity, Technocracy and the Reform of International Corporate Taxation”; 
Snape, “Tax Law : Complexity , Politics and Policymaking.” 
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The theory testing phase uses the mixed methods approach of ‘nested analysis’, whereby 
case studies for detailed examination are selected on the basis of the predictions of a 
quantitative model.35 In a nested analysis, cases that conform to the model’s statistical 
predictions are selected to test the underlying causal hypothesis, while cases with large 
residual variation are selected to develop new hypotheses that improve explanatory power. 
In this case, an existing diffusion study that is interpreted as showing support for tax treaty 
diffusion through rational competition by developing countries for inward investment is used 
as the starting point.36 Cases are selected as follows (Table 1.1): 
• The UK in the 1970s is first selected for its good fit with the quantitative model. 
This case study tests between two causal hypotheses that explain the results: was 
competition driven by developing countries seeking inward investment, or 
developed countries seeking outward investment opportunities? The case study is 
developed using fine-grained archival records showing the process of individual 
negotiations, and a broader view of London-based policymaking. 
• Moderate outliers in the quantitative results are used for developing country cases: 
Zambia in both the 1970s and 2003-12, and Vietnam and Cambodia from 2003-12 
(hereafter ‘the 2000s’). Vietnam and 1970s Zambia are positive outliers, with more 
treaty signatures than predicted, and are used to identify alternative diffusion 
mechanisms. Cambodia and 2000s Zambia are negative outliers, with fewer treaty 
signatures than predicted, and are used to identify scope conditions that act as 
‘firewalls’ to diffusion.37 The more recent years are studied using interview-based 
fieldwork conducted in 2014 and 2015, comprising a further 28 interviews on top of 
those used for theory generation. 
Within-case comparison is the most effective way of holding control variables constant, and 
so the cases have been selected to enable this wherever possible.38 Individual UK 
negotiations can be compared with each other thanks to the granularity of the data. For 
Zambia, the two different time periods can be compared with each other. For Vietnam and 
Cambodia, similar attitudes to other aspects of international economic cooperation establish 
the validity of the case comparison. 
                                                     
35 Lieberman, “Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research.” 
36 Barthel and Neumayer, “Competing for Scarce Foreign Capital: Spatial Dependence in the Diffusion of Double 
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Table 1.1: Outline of the mechanisms, conditions and cases 
Diffusion mechanism Scope condition Main case 
Case 
chapter 
1. Competition for outward 
investment 
  UK 1970s 7 
2. Competition for inward 
investment 
Fiscal costs not 
salient 
Present Zambia 1970s 8 
Absent Cambodia 2000s 9 
3. Dissemination of 
standards 
Specialist control 
of veto points 
Present Vietnam 2000s 9 
Absent Zambia 2000s 8 
Source: Author’s own 
1.4 Outline 
Chapters 2 to 5 outline a theory of tax treaty diffusion, based on secondary literature and the 
interview and observation data mentioned above. Chapter 2 sets the stage by describing the 
origins of the fiscal anarchy problematique in the notion of fiscal sovereignty, a long-
recognised but underemphasised characteristic of the nation state. It highlights three 
dimensions of the idea of international fiscal anarchy, and the main ways in which this idea 
has conditioned interactions between states: tax competition for mobile factors of 
production, conflicting claims to tax cross-border economic activity, and the challenge of 
enforcing tax laws in a world of mobile capital. This chapter emphasises that fiscal states’ 
tax systems, and their identities and interests as taxing entities, have not developed in 
isolation, but have been constructed intersubjectively on the basis of this notion of fiscal 
anarchy. It also argues that measures to resolve each one of these three difficulties are 
naturally influenced by state-state interactions in the other two areas, and by non-state 
actors. 
Chapter 3 elaborates the core puzzle of the thesis, the diffusion of tax treaties to developing 
counties. A widespread discourse around tax treaties in the developing country context 
emphasises that it is essential to resolve the double taxation problem through tax treaties, 
otherwise foreign investors will be deterred by conflicting claims to tax cross-border 
investment. Yet the home countries of these investors have generally taken unilateral steps 
to prevent their outward investors facing double taxation, which fundamentally undermines 
this case. Furthermore, the economic evidence to date suggests a very mixed case for the 
effect of tax treaties on investment into developing countries. Finally, when signing tax 
treaties, developing countries have generally given away more of the tax base than would 
have been necessary in order to reach agreement. 
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Chapters 4 and 5 then present the theoretical and empirical basis for the diffusion 
mechanisms and scope conditions proposed in this thesis. Chapter 4 discusses the notion of 
bounded rationality in policy diffusion. While it has largely been applied to learning by 
developing countries, it is applied here to competition. Interview and documentary evidence 
in this chapter show that decisions by developing countries to open tax treaty negotiations 
have at times been motivated by competition for inward investment, but that this is often 
hard to explain based on a model of purely rational legal and economic analysis of their 
likely impact. The chapter then ‘turns the tables’, demonstrating a strong evidence base that 
it is often developed countries that seek tax treaties with developing countries, in order to 
enhance the competitive position of their own multinationals. 
While chapter 4 focuses on mechanisms acting on policymakers who are not familiar with 
the detail of tax treaties, in chapter 5 the emphasis is on the epistemic community of 
international tax professionals who are at the heart of the international tax regime and of 
bilateral tax treaty negotiations. Through interviews and participant observation at 
international meetings, it demonstrates that community members share a set of ideas about 
tax treaties that differ from those held by non-specialist actors. They favour tax treaties not 
because of any immediate impact on investment flows, but because they disseminate a set of 
standards that embody an acceptable and responsible way to tax multinational companies. 
The chapter argues that community influence can happen through ‘teaching’ civil servants 
and through the influential position acquired by community members through their mastery 
of complex, interdisciplinary technical knowledge. 
Part two of the thesis then tests for the influence of these mechanisms using a mixed 
methods approach to case selection, which is set out in chapter 6. Four countries are 
discussed, beginning in chapter 7 with the UK during the 1970s. It signed a large number of 
treaties in instances where it was a capital exporter, which were generally well-predicted by 
a quantitative model of competition. More usually interpreted as showing competition 
among capital importing countries, the evidence in this chapter supports a reinterpretation in 
terms of competition among capital exporters.  
Zambia is the focus of chapter 8. It had a much greater propensity to conclude tax treaties 
during the 1970s than predicted by the quantitative model, negotiating comparatively 
unfavourable agreements that undermined its other policy goals. Archival and interview 
evidence suggest that this resulted from the pursuit of inward investment by civil servants 
and political appointees with little capacity to understand the nature of what they were 
signing up to. In contrast, by the 2000s Zambia had a lower-than-expected propensity to sign 
treaties. While at this point it had developed a tax specialist bureaucracy who understood in 
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detail the impact of tax treaties and sought to make them consistent with international 
standards, these officials were blocked by veto players in the treaty making process who 
were concerned about the fiscal costs of tax treaties. 
Finally, chapter 9 compares Vietnam, which signed many more treaties during the 2000s 
than predicted on the basis of competitive pressure, and Cambodia, which signed none at all. 
A key difference between the two countries was the importance of corporate tax revenue for 
future government income. In Vietnam, revenue from the very large state-owned enterprise 
sector dwarfed tax receipts, meaning that the tax costs of treaties were not considered until 
businesses began to challenge the tax administration’s implementation of its treaties. The 
investment promotion drive of the 1990s gave way at the turn of the century to the priorities 
of a specialist bureaucracy keen to ensure that even the smallest investor was covered by a 
tax treaty, but unwilling to apply the treaties in ways that would be most beneficial to 
investors. In contrast, in Cambodia, a comparatively low level of tax revenue as a share of 
GDP and an absence of state-owned enterprises meant that the potential costs of concluding 
treaties deterred the country from signing them, despite significant pressure from other 
countries. 
Chapter 10 then offers some conclusions from this evidence. As well as examining the 
implications for literature on tax, diffusion and epistemic communities, it reflects on the 
lessons the governments of developing countries and other stakeholders might draw as tax 
treaties come increasingly under scrutiny.
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2 International fiscal relations 
International tax policy, like any aspect of tax policy, lies close to the 
beating heart of national sovereignty. 
- David Rosenbloom, former United States treaty negotiator1 
 
With a few notable exceptions, taxation has rarely been treated in its own right as an 
empirical subject of international relations, or of the subfield of international political 
economy.2 Yet ‘fiscal sociologists’, among them Joseph Schumpeter and Charles Tilly, have 
recognised for a century that tax is an important part of any country’s political and social 
characteristics, and hence that it has the power to help explain the development of those 
characteristics.3 Tax is an enabling condition for the modern state to exist, not merely to 
fund it, but also to cement its relationship with its citizens. Furthermore, the power to tax, 
and the exercise of that power, are defining characteristics of the modern state. A group of 
‘new fiscal sociologists’ posit “a new theory of taxation as a social contract that multiplies a 
society’s infrastructural power.”4 
If taxation is so fundamental to understanding the state, it follows that it is also fundamental 
to understanding the relations between states. We need look no further than one of the 
foundational texts of realist international relations, Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan, which 
ascribes to the sovereign: 
the Right of making Warre, and Peace with other Nations, and Common-wealths; that 
is to say, of Judging when it is for the publique good, and how great forces are to be 
assembled, armed, and payd for that end; and to levy mony upon the Subjects, to defray 
the expenses thereof.5 
The state must be able to tax if it is to perform its main function, safeguarding the security of 
its citizens. It is no coincidence that the introduction of the corporate income tax, the main 
subject of this thesis, is intimately linked with war in many countries.6 
                                                     
1 Rosenbloom, “Where’s the Pony? Reflections on the Making of International Tax Policy,” 491. 
2 The exceptions include Palan, The Offshore World : Sovereign Markets, Virtual Places, and Nomad 
Millionaires; Sharman, Havens in a Storm: The Global Struggle for Tax Regulation; Eccleston, The Dynamics of 
Global Economic Governance: The OECD, the Financial Crisis and the Politics of International Tax 
Cooperation; Rixen, The Political Economy of International Tax Governance; Dietsch and Rixen, Global Tax 
Governance : What Is Wrong with It and How to Fix It. 
3 Schumpeter, “The Crisis of the Tax State”; Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D.990-1990. 
4 Martin, Mehrotra, and Prasad, “The Thunder of History: The Origins and Development of the New Fiscal 
Sociology,” 14. 
5 Hobbes, Leviathan, 134. Emphasis added. 
6 Seligman, The Income Tax: A Study of the History, Theory, and Practice of Income Taxation at Home and 
Abroad. 
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Beyond financing, tax is also about sovereignty. The lines of the anarchy problematique are 
often drawn from Max Weber’s definition of the state as the authority claiming “the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”7 But the state also 
claims a monopoly on taxation. As Douglass North suggests, the state may be better defined 
as, “an organization with a comparative advantage in violence, extending over a geographic 
area whose boundaries are determined by its power to tax constituents.”8 The struggle to 
retain and even define this ‘fiscal sovereignty’ in a world of mobile and transnational 
taxpayers is what motivates this thesis. 
This chapter aims to take a broad view that sketches out the empirical area of international 
tax relations. The next two sections build up a picture of the subject matter of such a study, 
beginning by tracing the national origins of fiscal sovereignty, and a corresponding 
international fiscal anarchy problematique. Three dimensions of international fiscal anarchy 
are highlighted: tax competition between states to attract investment, conflicting claims to 
the right to tax the multinational tax base, and commercialisation of sovereignty by tax 
havens, which prevents other states from enforcing their tax laws. The chapter then 
introduces three types of non-state actor into the analysis: multinational companies, 
international institutions, and civil society. Finally, the North-South relations of international 
taxation are briefly discussed. 
2.1 The sociology of fiscal sovereignty  
The term ‘fiscal sociology’ originates with Rudolf Goldsheid, who asserted that “the origin 
of the state lies in association for the purposes of defence and to meet common fiscal 
needs.”9 The first manifesto on the subject is his contemporary Joseph Schumpeter’s Crisis 
of the Tax State. According to Schumpeter, “the fiscal history of a people is above all an 
essential part of its general history.” Taxation is not only a useful lens through which to view 
political and social events, but also plays a causal role in those events.10 While Schumpeter 
and Goldsheid may have been the first to explicitly emphasise the fiscal part of their story, 
others before them had recognised the importance of taxation for any understanding of the 
state. According to Edmund Burke, writing about post-revolutionary France, “[t]he revenue 
of the state is the state. In effect all depends upon it, whether for support or for 
reformation.”11 
                                                     
7 Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” 310–311. 
8 North, Structure and Change in Economic History, 21. 
9 Goldscheid, “A Sociological Approach to Problems of Public Finance,” 202. 
10 Schumpeter, “The Crisis of the Tax State,” 100. 
11 Burke, Reflections on the French Revolution, 105. 
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Schumpeter’s argument ran as follows. As warfare between princedoms led more and more 
European princes to face financial difficulties in the 14th and 15th centuries, they turned to 
the estates they governed to finance the war effort, and in doing so a public financial realm 
came into being, separate from the prince’s private finances: the ‘tax state’. Writing at the 
end of the first world war, Schumpeter traced the development of the Austrian tax state, but 
argued that it faced a crisis, burdened by war debts and reaching the limit of its taxing 
capacity as it struggled to repay them.12 Others, writing subsequently, have characterised the 
tax state’s evolution into the ‘fiscal state’, which is distinguished by its ability to borrow 
sustainably on the strength of its reliable revenue stream, and hence its greater financial 
capacity to react to wars and other emergencies.13 
The ‘militarist’ fiscal sociology account is found across many descriptions of state 
development. In Norbert Elias’ history of state formation, the modern state is characterised 
by two mutually reinforcing monopolies: military force coerces the payment of taxation, 
which in turn funds military force.14 Charles Tilly expanded on Elias’ ideas in his famous 
account of how ‘war made the state’: 
Where did the money [for warfare] come from? In the short run, typically from loans 
by capitalists and levies on local populations unlucky enough to have troops in their 
vicinity. In the long run, from one form of taxation or another.15 
Income tax, the focus of this thesis, was introduced in the UK in 1799 to fund the war with 
Napoleonic France, and continued to be tied explicitly to war efforts right through to the 
First World War.16  In the United States, too, federal income tax was first levied by Congress 
in 1861 to fund its efforts in the civil war.17 Wars also played a role in the income tax’s 
introduction into France and Austria.18 
The next stage of the account runs as follows. Extending the revenue base to more powerful, 
wealthy citizens who may up to that point have been insulated from the burden of coercive 
taxation created two imperatives: the establishment of administrative institutions to collect 
and manage the revenue separately from the prince’s private household, and the formation of 
a social contract with these new taxpayers.19 To collect taxes from these groups, the ruler 
relied on their consent, a shift characterised by Mick Moore as being from ‘coercive’ to 
                                                     
12 Schumpeter, “The Crisis of the Tax State,” 116. 
13 Moore, “Between Coercion and Contract: Competing Narratives on Taxation and Governance.” 
14 Elias, The Civilizing Process. 
15 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D.990-1990, 85. 
16 HMRC, “Taxation: A Brief History”; Seligman, The Income Tax: A Study of the History, Theory, and Practice 
of Income Taxation at Home and Abroad. 
17 Library of Congress, “History of the US Income Tax”; Seligman, The Income Tax: A Study of the History, 
Theory, and Practice of Income Taxation at Home and Abroad. 
18 Seligman, The Income Tax: A Study of the History, Theory, and Practice of Income Taxation at Home and 
Abroad. 
19 Bräutigam, “Introduction: Taxation and State-Building in Developing Countries.” 
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‘contractual’ taxation.20 In 16th century Austria, for example, Schumpeter describes how the 
estates’ contributions to the defence of the princedoms came with an expectation of some 
capacity to influence both the distribution of the tax liability and the use to which the tax 
revenue was put.21 Evidence shows that a higher tax burden on an elite leads to policies that 
favour it, and a higher tax burden in general leads to a more democratic or liberal polity: “in 
the long run, democratisation only occurs when rulers come to rely on citizen compliance for 
their means of rule,” according to Tilly.22 
The militarist account is only one lens through which to view the development of the fiscal 
state. Others have situated it within the deterministic sweep of economic and social 
modernisation, the path dependent emphasis of institutionalist theory, or have emphasised 
the role of elite and, later, popular consent.23 The ‘new fiscal sociologists’ argue that 
“taxation is central not only to the state’s capacity in war, but in fact to all social life.”24 The 
point to emphasise here is that, because taxation is integral to the development of state-
citizen relations, the fiscal component of sovereignty is an essential part of any story of the 
development of international relations, especially one that recognises that both “war made 
the state, and the state made war.”25  The state needs tax revenue to safeguard the security of 
its citizens, but the act of taxation is also part of the social construction of what the state is, 
of its sovereignty within a given area. The next section further considers the implications of 
this perspective. 
2.2 Describing the fiscal anarchy problematique 
As the previous section outlined, the fiscal motor of the modern state’s development can be 
characterised through two interrelated dynamics: the relationship between the state’s 
objectives and its financial capability, and the construction of a state-citizen social contract 
founded on the state’s sovereign right to levy tax. For both reasons, states effectively levy 
tax according to their raison d’etat, which, in a global economy creates a kind of fiscal 
anarchy problematique. Peggy Musgrave, author of several works in the tax literature 
interrogating this question: 
                                                     
20 Moore, “Between Coercion and Contract: Competing Narratives on Taxation and Governance”; Levi, Of Rule 
and Revenue. 
21 Schumpeter, “The Crisis of the Tax State.” 
22 Tilly, “Extraction and Democracy,” 174. 
23 Martin, Mehrotra, and Prasad, “The Thunder of History: The Origins and Development of the New Fiscal 
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25 Tilly, The Formation of National States in Western Europe, 42. 
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it is likely that in the absence of cooperative agreements...countries will exercise their 
entitlements in a way to serve their national interests and that these interests may 
conflict with each other and with standards of inter-nation equity and allocative 
efficiency.26 
Musgrave forms part of a long tradition of advocates for a formal international tax authority, 
whose proposals have failed to gain traction because of the strength of feeling about fiscal 
sovereignty.27 Yet there is a substantial amount of cooperation between states, justified on 
the grounds of the fiscal anarchy problematique. This section considers three aspects: inter-
state competition for mobile factors of production, inter-state conflict over the tax base of 
transnational taxpayers, and the international constraints on tax administration in the light of 
the commercialisation of sovereignty by tax havens. In each case, states have chosen to 
establish some degree of cooperation in response to the negative impacts of the ‘state of 
nature’ on their ability to exercise their own fiscal sovereignty. 
One way to construct the role of taxation in international relations would be to begin at the 
national level, examining the domestic pressures that, combined with the intimate role of tax 
in state-citizen relations, create states’ interests in international tax relations. But this thesis 
takes a structural perspective, recognising that national preferences develop within an 
international system.28 Indeed, if economic factors can cross borders, it is hard to think of 
fiscal sovereignty as absolute.29 As Alison Christians writes, 
[I]f tax sovereignty means anything, perhaps it is the idea that governments have a 
non-exclusive right to decide through political means whether and how to tax 
whatever activity occurs within their territories and whomever can be considered to 
be their “people,” and that they recognize a reciprocal right in all other states.30 
When developing their own international tax systems (that is, their domestic law as it 
pertains to multinational taxpayers) in the interwar years, states were already constrained by 
the way in which their laws might interact with those of other countries, and this was one of 
the main motivating factors behind their first steps at international tax cooperation.31 
Western states made explicit efforts to copy each other’s laws, while many developing 
countries emerged from colonialism with a facsimile of the coloniser’s tax system.32 
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The international environment in which states’ tax systems have formed cannot be reduced 
to a purely legal and economic one, because it is also composed of ideas. Indeed, these ideas 
incorporate beliefs about the legal and economic constraints of anarchy, formed 
intersubjectively in an international environment, which in turn construct state interests.33 
The notion that ideas about the economic world are a part of the causal story of international 
economic relations has become a central tenet of international political economy 
scholarship, where constructivist accounts include work on how changing ideas about 
monetary policy, capital account liberalisation, the ‘race to the bottom’ between states, and 
indeed international cooperation in the fight against tax havens, have led to changes in 
policy that cannot be explained by material factors alone.34 This chapter will largely consider 
such matters from the perspective of the state as a unitary actor, while chapters 4 and 5 will 
return to the question of individual actors’ ideas and preferences. 
2.2.1 Tax competition between states 
Governments need revenue. On average, OECD member states collect taxes amounting to 
34 percent of gross domestic product, while in developing countries the equivalent figure is 
half that amount, reflecting a lower level of taxable capacity within their economies, and the 
availability of ‘rent’ income from natural resource extraction and overseas aid; on the other 
hand, what tax they do raise tends to come disproportionately from multinational investors.35 
But governments have other priorities that may conflict with the taxing imperative. This may 
include making side payments in the form of tax reductions to constituencies on whose 
support they depend: there is evidence of an association between corporate political 
contributions and tax reductions.36 Some governments may also be ideologically committed 
to a smaller state.37 
One of the most important concerns that may conflict with the imperative to tax is the desire 
to stimulate investment and growth in the national economy. Tax need not necessarily have a 
negative effect on either, but governments must take into account the behavioural effects 
                                                     
33 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”; Wendt, “Anarchy Is What 
States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics.” For a critique of Wendt’s ‘idealism’, see Palan, “A 
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Norms How the Search for a Technical Fix Undermined the Bretton Woods Regime”; Chwieroth, Capital Ideas : 
The IMF and the Rise of Financial Liberalization; McNamara, The Currency of Ideas : Monetary Politics in the 
European Union; Mosley, “Globalisation and the State: Still Room to Move?”; Sharman, Havens in a Storm: The 
Global Struggle for Tax Regulation. 
35 Prichard, Cobham, and Goodall, The ICTD Government Revenue Dataset; Fenochietto and Pessino, 
Understanding Countries’ Tax Effort; Moore, “Between Coercion and Contract: Competing Narratives on 
Taxation and Governance”; OECD, Revenue Statistics 2015. 
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resulting from the impact of taxation on taxpayers’ economic incentives. They may reduce 
the incentive to work and invest, increase the incentive to avoid or evade taxes altogether, or 
encourage mobile economic actors to seek out less onerous tax regimes. These effects are 
captured in what is widely known as the ‘Laffer curve’, the idea that above a certain level, 
raising the tax rate further can actually reduce the total revenue raised, because these 
behavioural effects reduce the level of economic activity to be taxed.38 
While some of these incentive effects occur within each state regardless of the conditions 
outside, the effect of taxation on mobile taxpayers is to create strategic interactions between 
states, known as ‘tax competition’. A large number of studies have attempted to model how 
corporate income taxation in the host state affects inflows of foreign direct investment 
(FDI). Meta-analyses of these studies find that a one-point increase in the corporate tax rate 
reduces FDI inflows by either three percent or 1.7 percent.39 For developing countries, 
however, there is some econometric evidence that long-term investment may not be 
responsive to taxation, and especially to tax incentives.40 In surveys, too, international 
investors in developing countries tend to cite other, more fundamental factors such as 
infrastructure and education above taxation.41 Where investment into developing countries is 
sensitive to tax competition, it may crowd out domestic investment, and may be of a 
‘transitory’, footloose kind that does not bring with it long term benefits such as skills and 
technology transfer, or forward and backward linkages.42 
Despite these limitations, tax competition is not merely a descriptive theory: it is a powerful 
idea that influences policy. There is an influential view in public choice economics, 
originating with Charles Tiebout, that competition between states for mobile factors of 
production is desirable because it will lead to the optimal balance between the provision of 
public services benefiting those factors of production, and levels of taxation levied on 
them.43 Conversely, others argue that states should cooperate to limit tax competition, which 
if unmitigated leads to inefficient outcomes.44  
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There is, consequently, a broad consensus in the literature confirming strategic tax 
competition between governments.45 Corporation tax rates, for example, have fallen 
consistently since the 1960s, while burgeoning tax incentive regimes can be seen both in 
developing and developed countries, in spite of consistent advice from international 
organisations that such competition is unlikely to bring investment gains.46 Chapter 4 will 
consider in more detail the nature of this strategic interaction, and the determinants of 
countries’ responses to each other’s decision to reduce corporation tax. 
In sum, states can choose to exercise their sovereign right to tax as much as they like in 
principle, but in practice the logic of tax competition suggests that they must engage in a 
strategic interaction, enforced by mobile corporate capital and high-income labour.47 As 
capital has become more mobile over time, states have come to take this much more into 
account, engaging in what some have described as a ‘race to the bottom’.48 The idea of tax 
competition, potent in political debates as well as economic decision-making, is sustained 
regardless of the shaky evidence that it brings welfare gains, especially to developing 
countries. 
2.2.2 Conflicting claims to the tax base 
When a taxpayer has a potential tax liability in more than one state, what happens if they all 
claim the right to tax it? This is not an abstract proposition, but one that supports the 
livelihoods of thousands of tax professionals in governments and the private sector. Later in 
this thesis I discuss the autonomous logic of this problem; here I describe it. States have 
several options to mitigate the ‘double taxation’ problem, the first of which is to leave the 
conflict unresolved. ‘Juridical’ double taxation occurs when the same taxpayer is taxed twice 
on the same income by different states, while ‘economic’ double taxation means that the 
same income is taxed twice in the hands of different taxpayers.  
Because they incur all the costs when they act unilaterally to relieve double taxation, capital 
exporting states have naturally preferred a more coordinated approach, based on bilateral 
treaties and multilateral guidelines and norms.49 From their perspective, this achieves a 
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number of benefits over the unilateral methods. It more comprehensively eliminates double 
taxation, because states can negotiate consistent rules and definitions, and put in place 
dispute settlement procedures where there are outstanding differences of interpretation. 
More importantly, it shares the cost of double taxation relief between states as a result of a 
negotiated outcome: if one country (most likely the net capital exporter) considers the 
revenue it has sacrificed through unilateral relief to be too great, it can negotiate with other 
countries to have them take on some of these costs, by accepting curbs on the extent to 
which they can tax investors from the first country. This may be the real function of 
international double taxation negotiations.50 
If states have a prior preference for relieving double taxation in a coordinated way, the result 
would be a distributional conflict, of the type referred to by game theorists as ‘battle of the 
sexes’. In this game, multiple stable equilibria exist, with different distributional outcomes, 
because participants prefer to reach a cooperative outcome even if it is not the agreement 
from which they would benefit the most.51 According to this analysis, states will accept a 
given settlement if the anticipated absolute welfare gains from increased investment and 
trade exceed the fiscal cost.52 This presumes that states have a prior preference for relieving 
double taxation through a treaty, an assumption that should logically break down in the case 
of a country that is overwhelmingly a capital importer, negotiating with a capital exporter 
that relieves double taxation unilaterally. 
Two conceptual dichotomies are commonly invoked when analysing this situation. The first 
is what tax professionals call ‘source’ and ‘residence’ taxation. States may claim the right to 
tax income earned by foreign-resident taxpayers if its source is within their borders, and 
conversely they may claim the right to tax the foreign-source income earned by their own 
residents. When exporting capital, countries gain revenue from taxing their outward 
investors on a residence basis, while capital importing countries gain revenue from taxing 
inward investors on a source basis. In the absence of international agreement, the ‘residence’ 
state bears the cost of relieving double taxation, and international double tax negotiations 
shift revenue from ‘source’ to ‘residence’ countries. 
The second dichotomy is between two conflicting economic principles. ‘Capital export 
neutrality’ means that an international investor’s return on a given investment will be taxed 
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the same whether it is made in the domestic market or any given overseas market.53 To 
achieve this form of neutrality, the country of residence must levy a worldwide tax on all a 
multinational company’s (or an individual’s) income, while source countries must keep the 
effective tax rate they levy below that of the residence country. The latter then grants 
outward investors a deduction from their tax liability, or a credit against it, for the taxes paid 
abroad, so that in effect they pay the same amount as if they had earned their income at 
home. In contrast, under ‘capital import neutrality’, returns on all investments in the host 
market are taxed equally regardless of their origin. This requires taxation by the country of 
source, and a corresponding exemption by the country of residence of investors’ foreign-
source income (a ‘territorial’ tax system). The residence country must tax only the income 
generated within its own territory. Economists have generally arrived at the view that capital 
export neutrality produces the greatest total net welfare gains, while worldwide taxation also 
creates a more equitable outcome for taxpayers.54 As we will see when we turn to 
developing countries, it does not perform so well in terms of ‘inter-nation equity’. 
In the prevailing analysis of international cooperation to resolve the double taxation 
problem, the distributional politics of international tax rules are too complex to resolve at 
multilateral level. The system allows states to resolve the conflict between capital importers 
and exporters at bilateral level, with agreement reached more easily at multilateral level on 
other aspects that are not characterised by such a strong distributional conflict.55 As Nancy 
Kaufman argues: 
What is it that has kept us from achieving greater international cooperation in 
substantive tax matters? A good bet is that the stumbling blocks have somewhat less 
to do with economic analysis and more to do with various sovereign actors' 
perceptions of the fairness of the distribution of the tax base internationally.56 
The intensity of the conflict between states is reflected in the growing number of disputes 
that take place within the framework of bilateral tax treaties’ mutual agreement procedures, 
through which states negotiate on issues not clarified when the treaty itself was negotiated.57 
There were over 2,500 open disputes between states at the end of 2014.58 
The nature of distributional conflicts in international tax is also evolving, a product of 
shifting economic power and of changes in the nature of the global economy. The 
agreements at multilateral level do also have distributional implications (a point I will revisit 
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when I consider the North-South politics of international tax institutions below) and have 
been reached largely among OECD member states. While some OECD states are 
predominantly capital exporters within the OECD, and others predominantly capital 
importers, all are capital exporters with respect to the rest of the world. Some emerging 
economies have begun to argue that their large, dynamic and relatively untapped markets 
place them in a distributional conflict with countries that export products and services to 
those markets.59 They consider that current multilateral rules undervalue the contribution of 
their markets to value creation, and hence deprive them of tax revenue. Furthermore, 
international tax rules that originated in the 1920s do not deal well with economic activity 
that is based on trade in services and intangible goods, and countries with service-based 
economies have different interests to those that are commodity-based. The current rules’ 
emphasis on physical presence as the yardstick of taxing rights tends to disadvantage service 
importers, who have begun to agitate for a change in multilateral rules.60 Neither of these 
distinctions is identical to the traditional capital importer/exporter axis that is the theoretical 
and practical foundation of international tax rules. 
States are therefore in conflict with each other over the multinational tax base. If each state, 
acting in isolation, were to tax cross-border economic activity at its preferred rate, multiple 
taxes imposed by multiple states on the same income might become too onerous, stifling 
trade and investment. If states act in isolation to alleviate it, the burden falls on net capital 
exporting countries. It is more difficult to see the incentive for net capital importing 
countries to agree to take on some of the burden. Yet their tax systems, and their identities as 
tax states, have developed in an international system where cooperation over double taxation 
is a normative imperative. Cooperating to alleviate double taxation is what a modern fiscal 
state does.  
2.2.3 The interaction between tax competition and distributional conflict 
Models of bargaining between capital exporting and importing countries tend to assume that 
each state’s aim is to maximise its share of the tax base of cross-border investors so as to 
raise more tax revenue while preventing double taxation.61 Literature on tax competition 
focuses on strategic interaction between countries in capital importing mode.62 There is little 
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consideration of how bargaining and competition interact. In particular, because there is also 
strong pressure for competition among capital exporting countries, their motivation for 
engaging in tax bargaining may not primarily be to maximise their own tax revenue, but 
rather to minimise the taxes that can be levied on their multinational investors abroad. This 
reduces those firms’ global effective tax rate beyond just the taxes that they themselves levy. 
Because the tax costs for investors in a worldwide tax system are determined by the home 
state, such systems create tax competition between home states: when a country’s investors 
are competing in foreign markets with firms from other countries, they will be at a 
disadvantage if those competitor firms have lower overall effective tax rates. This 
competition between home states has further intensified as capital becomes more mobile, 
and entire multinational companies can now move between headquarters countries, seeking 
out more favourable tax treatment of their worldwide income.63 The result has been to place 
capital exporting countries in competition on the basis of the worldwide effective tax rate 
that their resident firms incur, which is a function of three things: first, their corporate tax 
rate; second, the tax base on which that rate is applied, which most countries have reduced 
by replacing their worldwide tax systems with territorial ones in which foreign-source 
income is not taxed at all;64 third, their bilateral tax treaty networks, which reduce the 
effective tax rate on multinationals’ foreign operations. 
The UK, for example, has fundamentally restructured its approach to taxing UK-
headquartered companies’ overseas profits over the past decade, not only by reducing its 
corporate tax rate, but by shrinking the tax base, by largely exempting foreign-source profits 
from tax in the UK.65 This policy was explicitly justified by the government as a move to 
attract and retain headquarters, with firms such as WPP relocating on paper to Ireland, and a 
number of US firms relocating their registered headquarters to the UK.66 The US 
international tax system is one of the few that still taxes firms on a worldwide basis, but it 
allows firms to stockpile profits offshore, rather than repatriating them to the US, where they 
will be taxed. The US has struggled to prevent its own firms from performing corporate 
inversions, which are tax-motivated mergers with foreign firms in order to claim residency 
in another country, so that those stockpiled profits can be returned to shareholders without 
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paying the 35 percent US tax rate on them.67 There has, for some time, been a debate over 
whether the US should move to a territorial tax system to resolve this impasse.68 
Because of this interaction, neither the ‘battle of the sexes’ model of tax bargaining, nor the 
‘prisoner’s dilemma’ of tax competition, are adequate. When both the capital importing and 
capital exporting states in a tax negotiation are also in strategic interaction with other states, 
the aim of alleviating double taxation blurs into the aim of reducing single taxation 
altogether. This is particularly the case when the capital exporting state has a territorial tax 
system that exempts overseas profits from further taxation, because in that situation, any 
gains from a lower effective tax rate in the host country accrue directly to multinational 
investors. Firms that are not taxed by their home state on their worldwide income are 
demonstrably more responsive to tax changes in host states than those under worldwide 
taxation.69 In that situation, for the capital exporter the tax treaty becomes a means of 
reducing the worldwide effective tax rate of their resident multinationals, while for the 
capital importer it becomes a geographically-specific tax incentive for inward investors from 
the treaty partner. The ‘tax treaties myth’ already obscured the impact of tax treaties on the 
distribution of the revenue base between source and revenue countries. That debate may turn 
out to be a further distraction from yet another role of tax treaties, which is as tools of tax 
competition, the benefits of which accrue to multinational investors who largely did not face 
double taxation in the first place. 
2.2.4 The limits of administrative power 
A state may claim the right to tax a person in principle, either because they are one of its 
residents, or because they earn income within its borders. But there are practical constraints 
that may prevent it from exercising that right, and these constraints have shaped the 
development of international tax norms to date.70 The two biggest are these: first, how can a 
state tax an entity with sources of income in multiple countries, if it cannot know whether or 
not the entity has given an honest account of its global financial position? Second, how can a 
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state force a foreign resident to pay tax on income it has earned within the state’s borders, if 
the foreign resident no longer has any income or assets in that state? In a condition of pure 
anarchy, states would be powerless to surmount these difficulties. 
The solution has been to develop a set of international instruments through which states 
share information with each other and cooperate to collect revenue from cross-border 
taxpayers.71 Based on these standards, states now share bulk data on each other’s taxpayers’ 
affairs, make requests from each other for more detailed information as part of tax 
investigations, and even collect tax revenue on each other’s behalf.  This system 
demonstrates that states need to cooperate with each other in order to tax according to their 
sovereign rights. 
Such cooperation naturally creates an incentive to defect, since in refusing to cooperate, 
jurisdictions can attract business from citizens who stand to lose from such cooperation. 
Ronen Palan describes such actions as the ‘commercialisation of state sovereignty’, by 
which a jurisdiction offers residents of other countries the opportunity to adopt its 
nationality, attracting them with the benefits of an attractive tax regime, without actually 
moving physically to that state.72 By becoming, on paper, a resident of this new jurisdiction, 
companies and wealthy individuals can exploit the international tax rules put in place by the 
states in which they operate, by which their taxing rights are curbed. In other instances, 
companies and individuals use the commercialised sovereignty of tax havens to conceal their 
wealth behind a veil of secrecy that cannot be penetrated by the tax authorities of the 
countries where they are really present.  
When powerful states choose to challenge such behaviour, they use the rhetorical threat of 
brute force to pressure jurisdictions to change their tax rules against their will, focused on 
reputational damage as well as the threat of retaliation.73 For example, in 2009, G-20 
members threatened countermeasures against states that did not comply with certain tax 
standards.74 A number of individual states, including France and Brazil, maintain blacklists 
of tax havens, users of which are penalised.75 In 2012, the United States went one step 
further, unilaterally forcing foreign banks to disclose information on any US citizens among 
their clients, again with the threat of sanctions against those banks.76 All of these measures 
require some transgression of fiscal sovereignty, by interfering in the sovereign right of 
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other states to determine how people within their borders are taxed. They interfere directly in 
the fiscal contract between state and citizen. For this reason, they are hard to maintain 
without the cover of a normative authority such as the ‘apolitical’ OECD, and past efforts 
have often failed because they lacked this perceived legitimacy.77 
2.2.5 The interaction between administrative and other challenges to 
sovereignty 
On the face of it, these challenges to tax administration are qualitatively different to the 
policy challenges of double taxation and tax competition. In practice, however, this 
distinction is far from clear cut. Writers on tax and development are fond of the quoting the 
assertion from an old World Bank book that, “in developing countries, tax administration is 
tax policy.”78 Administrative decisions, such as to focus resources on increasing tax 
compliance by a particular group of taxpayers, will have distributional consequences; policy 
decisions must take into account the realities of administrative capacity. These constraints 
apply internationally as much as they do at national level.79 
Let us begin with the relationship between tax competition and tax administration. While, 
for a large economy, the costs of tax competition may be finely balanced with the 
investment gains, for small open economies the benefits from the potential increase in 
inward investment through tax competition far exceed the costs.80 This leads to a form of 
mercantilism, in which a small state seeks to boost its own balance of trade at the expense of 
others’, by lowering the tax rate on foreign capital. ‘Commercialised sovereignty’ is an 
extreme form of tax competition, in which mobile taxpayers are not just offered a low or 
zero rate on their income earned inside a jurisdiction, but also the chance to lower their 
effective tax rate on income earned outside it, essentially by establishing a fictitious tax 
residency.81  
For many tax havens, the provision of secrecy, by deliberately withholding information from 
the tax authorities of other jurisdictions, is part and parcel of their competitive strategy.82 In 
recognition of this, the OECD originally used the term ‘harmful tax competition’ as an 
umbrella term for its work challenging tax havens.83 This proved to be a linguistic own-goal, 
since tax competition itself is widely endorsed by OECD members, and because it is not 
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easy to define a boundary between harmful and legitimate tax competition without placing 
some OECD members themselves on the ‘harmful’ side.84 Tax havens deployed the concept 
of fiscal sovereignty to fend off the OECD attack, an effective weapon because, as Palan 
argues, the offshore industry is bound up in the Westphalian notion of sovereignty.85 
International administrative challenges, tax competition and conflict over the tax base all 
converge in one particular area: international tax avoidance. Here multinational taxpayers 
circumvent the intention of one country’s tax laws by exploiting the differences between 
countries’ tax systems, some of which may exist deliberately as a result of aggressive tax 
competition by other states, or loopholes in international tax rules.86 Tax treaty shopping, for 
example, uses the terms of tax treaties that divide up the tax base, combined with the 
advantageous laws of low-tax conduit jurisdictions such as the Netherlands and Mauritius, to 
obtain advantages not intended by (at least one of) the treaty signatories.87 Eduardo 
Baistrocchi has suggested that developing countries may deliberately avoid enforcing 
international tax rules as a form of tax competition.88 Recent controversies in the European 
Union surround the combination of aggressively competitive tax laws with preferential 
administrative rulings.89 
2.2.6 Conclusion 
As this section has illustrated, fiscal sovereignty may be a defining characteristic of the state, 
but to exercise it, the corresponding doctrine of fiscal anarchy requires that states cooperate. 
They would be unable to tax mobile factors of production because of a race to the bottom 
driven by intense tax competition; cross-border trade and investment would be deterred by 
multiple claims to tax the same income (although, as noted, capital exporting states tend to 
act unilaterally to prevent this); states would be unable to enforce their own tax laws because 
tax evaders could spirit their income offshore without any way for the tax authority to detect 
it. But analysis of any one of these three problems must consider the interactions between 
them, otherwise the problem structure may be mis-specified. In particular, the case for 
cooperation to relieve double taxation, already flawed on its own terms, may obscure tax 
competition between states.  
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2.3 Beyond the state 
As the previous section explained, international tax relations need to be understood as a web 
of strategic interactions between states of different types whose actions may place de facto 
constraints on each other’s fiscal sovereignty. In addition, non-state actors shape 
international tax relations in important ways. This section outlines the role of three: 
multinational companies, international organisations, and civil society.  
2.3.1 Multinational companies and corporate income tax 
Incorporation confers a legal personhood on companies. It does not confer citizenship, 
however. So the fiscal contract between the state and the company is somewhat different to 
that between the state and natural people. Put simply, firms are subject to taxation without 
representation – although of course they have considerable power within the political 
process.90 Nonetheless, there is a clear public and political expectation that companies have a 
moral responsibility, as corporate citizens, to pay taxes.91 
In most countries, businesses pay a large number of different taxes, including for example 
income tax on their profits, local-imposed business rates, employer’s national insurance 
contributions, customs duties, and capital gains tax. They also collect other taxes on behalf 
of government, the two main instances of this being the employees’ income tax that they 
withhold from wages (pay-as-you-earn) and sales taxes added to the price paid by consumers 
(VAT and excise duties). The distinction between taxes borne and collected by companies is 
conceptually important, but in economic terms it is not clear, since the incidence of all taxes 
paid by businesses will ultimately fall on natural people, through lower dividends, lower 
wages, or higher prices. Although a lot of energy has been expended on assessing where the 
ultimate incidence of corporate tax falls in an open economy, whether on labour or capital, 
the results are inconclusive, beyond a general view that it falls to some extent on both.92 
Corporate income tax is probably the most contentious tax on companies, seen by the public 
as the yardstick of corporate tax contributions, and by governments as the most important 
item in the tax competition toolbox. It is also the main tax regulated by bilateral tax treaties, 
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hence our interest here. Corporation tax is regarded by many economists as an inefficient 
tax, in comparison to taxes levied directly on the natural people who will ultimately bear its 
incidence.93 The difficulties of framing a corporate income tax code that minimises 
distortions and opportunities for avoidance are equally highlighted by tax lawyers.94 Much 
of this difficulty originates from the fact that corporate income tax is levied on an accounting 
concept, profit, which has no corresponding tangible basis. The profit figure can be 
manipulated with little real world impact. This matter becomes all the more confusing in a 
world of multinational companies, which add an additional geographic dimension to the 
accounting concept of profit. In theory, a multinational company is a collection of entities 
under common ownership, which trade with each other and achieve synergies because they 
operate in a coordinated manner. In practice, evaluating the contribution of each entity to 
generating the group’s collective income requires an abstraction of one kind or another.95 
The decision taken by states in the 1920s, and still applied today, is to allocate taxable 
profits across countries by treating each entity in the multinational group as an independent 
company, investing and trading with other group companies as if in a free market.96 This 
requires disregarding the synergies within the group that might, for example, mean that a 
product can be supplied for a lower price by a wholly-owned manufacturer than by an 
independent one. It leads to a situation in which a large proportion of cross-border dividend, 
interest, royalty and fee payments take place between companies under common control, and 
means that a group can have multiple operations in a single country that are treaties 
separately for tax purposes. Estimates of the share of international trade that takes place 
between companies under common control vary from 40 to 60 percent.97 The alternative 
approach, evaluated by the League of Nations in the 1920s and still advocated by many tax 
law commentators, is to abandon the separate entity principle altogether.98 Companies would 
be taxed on their global income, which would be allocated between countries using a 
formula that would typically take into account the distribution of a firm’s workforce, 
physical assets and sales. 
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The first consequence of the ‘absurd’ decision to use the separate entity approach is that it 
specifies the form of conflict and cooperation between countries.99 Common agreement on 
how multinational firms’ profits are to be attributed between entities focuses competition on 
the rate at which they are taxed, since companies cannot compete over the method.100 The 
primary distributional conflict under a separate entity approach becomes that between home 
and host states, rather than between host states. We can consider the counterfactual scenario 
in which firms were taxed on their global profits, because this system is applied in a number 
of federal countries, most importantly the United States. In the US, the complex 
distributional impact of the formula for allocating profits means that there is no multilateral 
agreement on the content of the formula. Instead, each state adopts its own formula, and tax 
competition has been most manifested through the choice of factors in the formula: many 
states have moved towards a formula that uses sales only, to incentivise firms to locate 
physical assets and jobs within their territory.101 With legal structures and cross-border 
payments disregarded from tax assessments, distributional conflict follows the lines of how 
rich a state is in the three components of the formula: there is no distinction between capital 
exporter and importer in this world. 
In addition to specifying the form of conflict between states, the separate entity principle 
also specifies the role of multinational firms. By concentrating rule-making processes about 
the attribution of taxable profits, supposedly the neutral part of the process, within 
international organisations, multinational firms can concentrate their influence here. They 
may be more able to exercise instrumental power because of their international form, which 
brings greater knowledge and more coherent positions than individual states, and because 
international organisations are less open to domestic democratic scrutiny and more 
vulnerable to business influence through ‘quiet politics’.102 
In effect, multinationals also have some power to determine where they pay their taxes. The 
rules in place confer a degree of room to manoeuvre on multinational taxpayers, which is the 
reason they are able to work within the law to minimise their tax payments by shifting 
profits.103 This has two significant implications for international tax relations, on the 
distributional conflict and on sovereignty. First, multinational firms, as well as governments, 
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determine the outcome of the distributional conflict between states. They respond to 
flexibilities in the rules by deciding where they would prefer to be liable for tax, largely 
based on their effective tax rate in each jurisdiction. For example, Google prefers its sales 
activities in the UK to be taxable in Ireland, which has a lower corporate tax rate, and is able 
to structure its operations to achieve this result, thus determining which of these two 
countries is entitled to tax these profits.104 Second, because multinational firms have some 
choice over whether and how much they are taxed by particular states, those states’ ability to 
enforce their tax policy preferences legally is curtailed. This is an erosion of de jure 
sovereignty, to the extent that multinational companies can use legal and quasi-legal 
processes to enforce their own interpretations of international tax rules.105 It also restricts de 
facto sovereignty insofar as states’ administrative capacity may be inadequate completely to 
enforce their policy preferences as expressed through tax laws. 
Multinational companies are thus important actors in their own rights in the international 
relations of taxation. Corporation tax is the single biggest area of international tax 
cooperation and conflict, the lines of which run not only among states, but also between 
states and corporations.  At times, it is multinational firms who determine the outcome of 
state-state strategic interactions, either through their structural power that constrains states’ 
autonomy to act, or through their ability to structure operations in a way that determines 
where their tax liability is incurred. 
2.3.2 International institutions  
Institutions “involve persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that 
prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations.”106 There are 
international tax institutions that tackle all three of the problems described earlier: tax 
competition, distributional conflict, and administrative cooperation. Each is designed with 
sensitivity around national sovereignty in mind. Because fiscal sovereignty is of such 
fundamental importance to states, international tax institutions are often described as 
‘sovereignty-preserving’.107  
Tax competition is perhaps the most challenging of the three dimensions of international tax 
relations to address through institutions. The game being played here is a prisoner’s 
dilemma, which means it needs enforcement; because such enforcement comes into direct 
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conflict with most states’ claims to fiscal sovereignty, these initiatives have never been very 
successful. Both the OECD and the European Union have attempted to stymie tax 
competition among their members through the formulation of a code of conduct that focuses 
on harmful tax competition, but in both cases these initiatives have been products of a 
particular era and have not led to durable institutions that prevent defection. The OECD 
formally endorses tax competition, such as over rates, as a positive thing, focusing only on 
‘harmful’ tax competition, which deals with practices of its members states that are more 
consistent with the category of commercialised sovereignty.108 The EU’s own code of 
conduct on harmful tax competition has similar limitations, hampered by its members’ 
insistence on maintaining vetoes on tax rules.109 
The central institution of the international tax regime is the OECD Model Tax Convention 
on Income and Capital.110 Most importantly, the OECD model treaty is the basis of over 
3000 bilateral tax treaties negotiated between states. It sets out the areas in which states will 
negotiate, and articulates an ideal type negotiated outcome, although in areas such as the 
particular maximum tax rates specified, bilateral negotiations may vary from this outcome. 
The OECD model also incorporates various explicit and implicit principles of the 
international tax regime. Two sets of standards are incorporated into the model treaty but 
also have a life outside it: these are the OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines, and its 
information exchange standard. It is through the constant updating of the model and its 
associated guidance that the foundations of the international tax system evolve. 
Some states use alternative model treaties as their negotiating position or as a reference point 
in negotiations. In particular, a United Nations committee of experts, reporting to ECOSOC, 
maintains the United Nations Model Double Taxation Treaty between Developed and 
Developing Countries.111 Regional groupings such as the Common Market of Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA) and Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) have 
formulated their own models. Many countries have their own national models, only one of 
which – for the United States – is published. Each of these model conventions takes the 
OECD model as its starting point, and follows it closely in form and content, down to the 
numbering of articles and the majority of wording; they are usually reviewed in the light of 
updates to the OECD model. 
The OECD model and its associated standards do not have a ‘hard law’ status unless states 
commit to be bound by them through an actual treaty based on the OECD model. The 
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number of such commitments is growing, but even beyond that, the reach of OECD soft law 
is becoming broader and deeper over time.112 Many countries, not only OECD members, use 
OECD model treaty provisions and transfer pricing standards as the basis of their domestic 
law. Texts such as the commentary to the OECD model treaty and the Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines have been referred to by courts as a source of authority even where they do not 
form part of the law. The application of the OECD’s peer review mechanism to taxation has 
also gradually expanded over the past ten years, to cover compliance with information 
exchange standards and new rules on corporate taxation.113 Each of these trends has 
increased the constraints on the fiscal sovereignty of countries inside and outside the OECD. 
Or, as Allison Christians argues, it “appears to shift the focus on tax sovereignty toward 
identifying affirmative duty in tax system design as a necessary element of respect for 
sovereignty itself.”114 
A conventional narrative suggests that, because states cannot reach agreements on 
distributional questions in a multilateral setting, they use the multilateral setting to develop 
tools that will act as focal points for bilateral negotiations on distributional questions.115 
Such a view implies that these multilateral tools, such as the OECD model and transfer 
pricing guidelines, are neutral with respect to distributional questions, but a brief review of 
the history of international tax institutions reflects that this has never been the case. In the 
1920s, when the first model treaties were developed, business organisations and 
governments struggled to reach agreement as to whether the host country of a multinational 
company should have any right to tax at all, eventually reaching a compromise that 
introduced qualitative concepts that sharply curbed the host country’s taxing rights, concepts 
that now underpin the OECD and UN model treaties.116 
By the 1940s, a difference of opinion had opened up between the Latin American countries 
and the Europeans, with the former preferring a model with very few limits on the host 
country’s capacity to tax.117 The result was two model treaties, the Mexico Draft and the 
London Draft, which differed primarily in the balance of taxing rights that they allocated, 
with the former more advantageous to net capital importing countries. With the founding of 
the United Nations, there was an attempt to unite the drafts, but agreement could not be 
reached between developed and developing countries. Instead, the Organisation for 
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European Economic Cooperation, which subsequently became the OECD, took forward 
work to develop a model treaty for use by its members, based solely on the London Draft, 
based on more capital exporter-friendly concepts.118 Meanwhile, some Latin American 
countries formulated the Andean Model treaty, which allocated all taxing rights to the 
capital importing country, but which was never used outside of treaties signed among the 
Andean community, because OECD members refused to use it as a starting point for 
negotiations 119 
In the 1970s, the United Nations took up the tax treaty work again, with the creation of an 
expert committee with members from developed and developing countries, to review the 
issue of tax treaties and developing countries. This committee formulated its own model, but 
this was now closely based on the OECD model, accepting the core concepts on which it 
was based. By 2013, a third iteration of the UN model had been published, with a growing 
number of divergences from the OECD model.120  Some of these amendments explicitly 
reflect the committee’s opinion regarding the appropriate balance between source and 
residence taxation.121 In 2012, the UN committee also published a document in which large 
developing countries set out their view on a ‘fair’ distribution of the corporate tax base 
through transfer pricing.122 
To further underline that the development of multilateral institutions also reflects a 
distributional negotiation, developing and developed countries have disagreed over the status 
of the UN committee and its model treaties, with developing countries seeking to upgrade it 
to an intergovernmental body and agreement, and OECD members consistently opposing 
this.123 We can see, therefore, that states themselves believe the model treaties to be more 
than neutral points of departure for bilateral negotiations over the distribution of taxing 
rights: the content of multilateral tax institutions influences the distribution of the 
multinational tax base. 
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2.3.3 Civil society organisations 
Civil society participation has come rather late to international tax politics, which until the 
last decade have interested only businesses and governments. In his account of the OECD’s 
1998-2003 Harmful Tax Practices initiative, Jason Sharman describes how one civil society 
organisation, the Washington DC-based Center for Freedom and Prosperity (CFP), was able 
to shape the position of an incoming US government administration. The CFP, importantly, 
was not a business lobby organisation, but rather one motivated by libertarian ideology.124  
During the 2000s, civil society organisations engaged increasingly with international tax 
debates, with the Tax Justice Network (TJN), founded in 2003, initially leading such efforts. 
Founded by former tax professionals with decades’ combined experience in law, economics 
and accounting, TJN was able to overcome the expertise gap that had acted as a barrier to 
civil society engagement, using the epistemic community’s technical language to enter the 
space previously dominated by tax professionals in businesses and government.125 TJN was 
a membership organisation, and over the subsequent years it catalysed participation in 
international tax debates by a growing number of civil society organisations that were not 
themselves tax specialists, in particular development NGOs.126 
Increasingly, civil society organisations participate directly in international tax political 
processes. The expanded role of the UN tax committee after 2002 created opportunities for 
civil society organisations to participate as observers in what were, effectively, international 
tax negotiations; the committee’s status was reviewed during United Nations Financing for 
Development negotiations in 2008 and 2015, processes in which civil society organisations 
were already heavily engaged, and at which the politics between developed and developing 
countries were thrown into sharp relief.127 Meanwhile, civil society organisations have an 
institutionalised role in the OECD’s outreach work with developing countries, and 
participate in its mainstream work, often engaging in matters of deep technical detail, and 
directly shaping outcomes in certain areas.128 
It is in the area of agenda-setting that civil society interest in international tax has had the 
most visible impact. In developed countries, civil society organisations ranging from the 
radical ‘Uncut’ and ‘Occupy’ movements to the more established development agencies and 
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trade unions have seized on the issue of corporate tax avoidance in an era of fiscal austerity, 
putting pressure on governments to be seen to act.129 In developing countries, the focus has 
been on taxation of multinational investors, especially mining companies, in a context of 
declining aid flows, increasing capacity building efforts, and increases in ‘regressive’ taxes 
such as VAT.130 There can be no doubt that such efforts have brought previously obscure tax 
policymaking into the public domain, but the barrier to participation created by technical 
knowledge inhibits the effective scrutiny of governments’ actions, and the somewhat 
begrudging response of tax professionals, governments and international organisations often 
highlights a perceived lack of understanding on the part of civil society.131 
2.4 Developing countries  
The North-South contours of international tax relations have been thrown into much sharper 
relief during the last few years, both as a product of increasing tensions between emerging 
powers and the OECD states, and as aid donors and non-governmental organisations have 
begun to focus on ‘domestic resource mobilisation’ as a part of the international 
development agenda. The development of the tax state in post-independence developing 
countries is somewhat different to the Eurocentric model elaborated by Schumpeter and his 
colleagues. On one hand, the financing of a war effort against an external aggressor is not 
generally available as a pretext for asking citizens to make a greater tax contribution.132 On 
the other hand, most developing states’ fiscal situations are heavily influenced by external 
actors: tax systems are inherited from colonial governments, and further influenced by 
donors, lenders and technical assistance providers; overseas aid provides an additional 
source of revenue that changes leaders’ incentives to raise and spend revenue in particular 
ways; tax levied on (and collected by) multinational investors, especially in those countries 
with extractive industries, makes up a much larger share of tax revenue than in developed 
countries.133 For these reasons, it makes sense to consider international tax relations from 
this different point of view. 
Consider tax competition between states. Capital-poor developing countries rely much more 
on foreign investment to enable them to exploit their abundant labour and land, which one 
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would expect would lead to much more intense tax competition among them. Indeed, the 
proliferation of tax incentives and the drop in tax rates over time illustrates that developing 
countries have been engaged in a race to the bottom since soon after independence, 
encouraged by technical advisers.134 As discussed earlier, competition among developing 
countries is also a function of competition among developed countries, because 
characteristics of capital exporters’ tax systems influence the form of strategic interaction 
between capital importers.135 
Turning to distributional conflict, the North-South axis throws this aspect of international tax 
relations into sharpest relief. To the extent that the division of tax revenue between states is 
considered through a normative lens within this economic debate, this is through the concept 
of inter-nation equity, a term championed by Peggy Musgrave.136 The essence of 
Musgrave’s conceptualisation of inter-nation equity is the gains and losses in welfare in the 
home (‘residence’) and host (‘source’) countries of a multinational economic actor, 
incorporating both the tax effects and the welfare effects in the economy at large.  
Within the OECD, there are different preferences about the balance of taxing rights, which 
emerge principally from the pattern of trade and investment flows between member states. 
But all OECD member states are net capital and service exporters relative to the rest of the 
world, and so their interests are relatively homogenous in comparison to those of developing 
countries, which are net capital and service importers relative to the OECD. In the 
terminology used by the international tax community, developing countries are source 
countries, and OECD members are residence countries. 
Given this global asymmetry between North and South, the dominant role played by the 
OECD in the design of international tax institutions is something of a puzzle. It is evidently 
the case that the design of its institutions reflects the ‘predilection for residence taxation’ of 
OECD member states,137 and yet those institutions appear to have hegemonic status.138 One 
possible explanation for the OECD’s position is path dependence, since in the post-war era it 
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was members of what became the OECD that invested first in developing international tax 
institutions, which became a focal point for subsequent negotiations.139 A variation on this 
explanation is that the policy leadership of the OECD countries has shaped incentives for 
non-members, forcing them to comply with OECD standards if they want to access any 
benefits derived from the international tax regime. 
It is notable that proposals for a more ‘ethical’ international tax system generally place the 
issue of source and residence tax balance to one side. Peter Diestch’s design for a more 
philosophically sound international tax institution, for example, leaves out the question on 
the grounds that it would make it too hard to reach consensus among states.140 The popular 
proposal among critics to replace the existing system of transfer pricing with ‘unitary 
taxation’, where a globally agreed formula would allocate the tax base between states, leaves 
unanswered the distributional implications of such an agreed formula.141 
Finally, administrative cooperation between states is largely an area in which developed and 
developing countries’ interests are aligned, since the winners from improved administrative 
cooperation are states in which real economic activity takes place, while the ‘losers’ from 
cooperation are tax havens and their users. Nonetheless, there are two differences. First, the 
asymmetrical nature of economic flows and enforcement capacities means that developing 
countries need a different form of cooperation to developed countries. For example, complex 
corporate tax structuring is a problem for developed countries, while developing countries 
suffer from ‘plain vanilla’ structures that developed countries can often prevent quite 
easily.142 In contrast, as capital importers, developing countries need access to information 
on multinational investors that may be more readily available to the developed countries in 
which they are headquartered.143 The international tools of administrative cooperation 
formulated by developed countries may therefore not always meet the needs of developing 
countries. A second difference is that, while developed countries have the economic power 
to coerce tax havens into cooperating, developing countries who lack this coercive power 
must piggy-back on initiatives designed by others. To obtain information from less-
cooperative tax havens, for example, they may need to participate in OECD exchange of 
information initiatives that are backed by the threat of G-20 countermeasures. 
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2.5 Alternative theories of policy formation in developing 
countries 
This section considers how theories focused on domestic interests and institutions may apply 
in the area of tax treaties. Three possibilities are considered: democratic politics, special 
interest group preferences, and bureaucratic capacity. To begin with, much work on the 
political economy of governments’ participation in international agreements, particularly 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs), has incorporated interests and institutions through the 
lens of ‘Open Economy Politics’ (OEP).144 If governments’ interest in bilateral tax treaties 
relates primarily to trade and investment promotion, then the same theoretical framework 
may be useful in analysing the politics of tax treaties. OEP begins from the preferences of 
different interest groups, derived using rational economic models. It then considers how 
national political institutions aggregate these interests, taking into account the influence they 
give to particular groups and the way they shape incentives for political actors. 
A basic building block of work that uses the OEP approach is a model in which democratic 
political leaders’ economic policy preferences are shaped by the aggregation of two 
constituencies’ preferences: voters, who are affected through general welfare effects and 
want the provision of public goods, and interest groups such as businesses and trade unions, 
who seek private benefits for their members and can influence policy through campaign 
contributions.145 Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner supplement this by suggesting that an 
international economic agreement may serve as a tool to reassure the former group in a 
general sense that the government has not given in to the protectionist interests of the latter, 
given that they may not know about or notice directly the effects of individual trade policy 
decisions.146 It may also serve as a ‘credible commitment’ to investors about current and 
future governments’ adherence to specific liberal economic policies, or to a liberal 
programme more generally.147 
The way in which political institutions grant influence to interest groups and voters is also 
clearly pertinent, since “the state is not an actor but a representative institution constantly 
subject to capture and recapture, construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social 
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actors.”148 In the model formulated by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues, political 
leaders’ incentives, including in the area of tax policy, are shaped by the need to maintain 
support from a winning coalition among the ‘selectorate’, the group of people who control 
access to power.149  They argue that governments in democracies, who need a large winning 
coalition from among the electorate rather than among politically influential groups, will 
favour a lower tax rate that allows citizens to retain more of their earnings, encouraging 
them to work harder and stimulating growth, while maintaining enough revenue to provide 
the public goods that they expect. In contrast, leaders in less democratic countries, who rely 
on a small winning coalition drawn from the elite, prefer to levy higher taxes in order to use 
the revenue to provide private goods, which also compensate coalition members for the 
taxes they have paid. 
This logic does not work for international tax. Here, the government of a capital-importing 
country is taxing foreign companies who are not a part of the ‘selectorate’, and so it can tax 
them without imposing costs on actors it needs in its winning coalition. Indeed, there is little 
evidence from the interviews and archival research in this thesis that multinationals lobby 
host country governments directly for tax treaties, even though they may gain tax savings if 
a treaty is concluded. Their normal route of influence appears to be via their embassy and 
thus their home government, captured in Chapter 4 of this thesis. In contrast, the government 
might have concerns about domestic constituencies: voters and organised interest groups. 
2.5.1 Democratic politics 
Median voter effects may operate in two directions. In general, we expect that the median 
voter’s preference is for more inward investment, since this creates employment, both 
directly and through forward and backward linkages in the economy. Job creation is likely to 
be a greater priority for left governments.150 As chapter 3 will discuss, it is questionable 
whether the information available to policymakers in developing countries would lead them 
to conclude rationally that tax treaties are an effective way to achieve this; nonetheless, a 
solid evidence base is not a prerequisite for political debate about tax policy and investment. 
In Australia, for example, mining companies used their influence over public opinion to 
force politicians to reverse a decision by the incumbent Labour government to raise taxes on 
them, after the government indicated that it did not take threats of closures and 
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disinvestment seriously.151  Conversely, Nathan Jensen argues that at the US state level, tax 
incentives are used by governments, even when their effectiveness is questionable, as a 
device for claiming credit for inward investment.152 
If there is a prevailing public belief that tax treaties will attract inward investment, the 
median voter effect could create an incentive for governments, and especially those of the 
left, to seek to conclude them. There is little evidence, however, for such political debate in 
capital importing countries, and little if any public awareness of their existence. 
Furthermore, it is notable that, in the case studies discussed later in this thesis, it was in non-
democracies (1970s Zambia and 2000s Vietnam) that governments pursued tax treaties most 
enthusiastically.  
Indeed, it is hard to predict which way a median voter effect might push a government. 
Because they reduce the tax liabilities of foreign multinationals, tax treaties may 
compromise the government’s ability to redistribute wealth and provide public services that 
will increase the welfare of the voting public. This revenue effect may run counter to the 
prevailing political discourse of domestic resource mobilisation in many developing 
countries, and so the median voter and parties of the left may be more concerned that the 
government taxes foreign multinationals ‘fairly’. When the negotiators interviewed for this 
research commented on their country’s politicians, it was predominantly along the lines that 
they had slowed the ratification process. The argument developed in Chapter 5 thus includes 
the possibility that political actors may block tax treaties if they are concerned about their 
impact on revenue mobilisation. 
2.5.2 Special interest groups 
Two sets of actors that may be members of the ‘selectorate’, or otherwise able to exert 
influence beyond the democratic process, may have an interest in tax treaty conclusion. 
Domestic capitalists and other wealthy individuals may benefit from the tax avoidance 
opportunities created by some treaties. A tax treaty may effectively be a side-payment to 
wealthy individuals able to use it to avoid tax by ‘round tripping’, where they route 
investments in the domestic market via a tax haven in order to benefit from treaty 
advantages supposedly intended for foreign investors.153 A good example of this is India’s 
treaty with Mauritius, which has been abused by Indian nationals seeking to avoid Indian 
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capital gains tax.154 There is some suggestion that the Indian parliament may have been slow 
to introduce an anti-abuse clause because members were among those practicing ‘round 
tripping’.155 A tax treaty between Kenya and Mauritius, which contained no protection 
against round tripping to avoid Kenya’s newly introduced capital gains tax, was concluded 
despite opposition from the Kenyan Revenue Authority, possibly because of influence from 
wealthy Kenyans who would have been liable for the new tax.156 These examples are 
exceptions, however, and the bulk of discussion about tax treaties in developing countries is 
focused on the benefits they may provide to foreign multinational companies, rather than 
any selective benefits they may offer elites. It is also hard to see such advantages in the 
majority of tax treaties, which are with higher-tax countries rather than tax havens. 
Domestic capitalists and wealthy individuals may also have reasons to oppose the 
conclusion of tax treaties. For businesses, the tax treaty is in effect a reduction in the tax 
burden facing their foreign-owned competitors, which may give those competitors an 
advantage over domestically owned businesses. Again, however, there is little evidence for 
such organised interest group pressure against the conclusion of tax treaties. Law, 
accountancy and tax advisory firms are governments’ main interlocutors on tax treaty 
matters. Lobbying, where it occurs, is therefore primarily an interaction between 
government and private sector officials who are members of the international tax 
community, many of whom have previously worked together in government. This is the type 
of mechanism considered in Chapter 5, and it tends to push governments in the direction of 
entering into more tax treaties, and adopting more OECD-type tax systems, not less. 
A more compelling motivation to oppose a tax treaty pertains to the administrative 
cooperation obligations it includes, which help the revenue authority to investigate the 
offshore tax affairs of businesses and individuals. Those evading tax may be concerned by 
the revenue authority gaining information on any wealth they have deposited in the treaty 
partner. It is thought that the revenue authorities of developing countries may demur from 
using the information exchange provisions within tax treaties precisely because of the 
political influence of individuals who they would be investigating, in which case the same 
reticence might be expected at the policy level.157 Some studies have even found a negative 
impact of tax treaties on investment flows, which they attribute to this dynamic.158 
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None of the interview or documentary evidence gathered for this thesis supports the idea that 
such a mechanism influences tax treaty formation. With a few exceptions, jurisdictions that 
act as tax-friendly investment conduits for multinational firms are not generally the same as 
those that act as boltholes for illicit wealth, so any conflict between direct investment 
promotion and offshore evasion may again be limited to a small number of treaties. Just as 
the round tripping effect rests on the inclusion and exclusion of a particular combination of 
clauses, a negative effect from administrative cooperation also relates more to the specific 
clauses included than to the existence of a treaty per se.  
In sum, there are certainly reasons why foreign multinationals, domestic businesses, wealthy 
elites and voters might all have a stake in developing country governments’ tax treaty 
policies. There is little evidence, however, that these groups do have preferences strong 
enough to shape the incentives facing political actors. In part this may be because tax treaties 
have uncertain and contradictory effects that it may be hard for any interest group to 
compare: for example, creating possibilities for tax avoidance while acting against tax 
evasion; potentially attracting foreign investment while reducing government revenues. For 
sure, different interest groups may have less or more inclination for policies aimed at 
attracting inward investment, but tax treaties themselves are generally too obscure to attract 
much direct lobbying or political debate from these constituencies. It is only within the tax 
community that such influence plays any role. 
2.5.3 Bureaucratic capacity 
A wide literature on domestic resource mobilisation in developing countries considers the 
requirement for an extensive bureaucratic infrastructure in order to collect taxes.159 The 
state’s pursuit of its objectives may be limited more broadly by its bureaucratic capacity, for 
example its ability to gather and evaluate evidence, draft laws, and negotiate treaties. ‘State-
centred’ explanations relevant to tax policy also suggest that a state’s ability to pursue its 
revenue mobilisation goals, in spite of downward pressure from domestic interest groups and 
under globalisation, may be a function of the strength of its political and bureaucratic 
institutions.160 The development of a state bureaucracy capable of administering and 
enforcing tax laws must thus run in parallel with the political development of consent for its 
tax system, fostering a culture of compliance among taxpayers.161 Once created, state 
institutions, not least those for taxation, may also take on an autonomous logic of their own, 
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outlasting the configuration of social forces that led to their creation, or indeed shaping the 
construction of identities and interests among actors.162 
As the case studies in this thesis illustrate, it is certainly the case that a weaker, less 
specialised tax bureaucracy is less able to provide evidence-based advice to its political 
leaders, leaving them more exposed to the influence of ideas, interest groups and foreign 
governments. The creation of a stronger, specialist international tax unit within the 
bureaucracy can lead to a more focused, critical approach to the exogenous pressures to 
make tax treaties. As chapter 5 argues, it may also endogenise those pressures, creating an 
institutional logic of tax treaty-making, not least through a group of civil servants with a 
vested interest in maintaining an active tax treaty negotiation programme. 
This is not, however, a product of bureaucratic capacity per se, but something more 
idiosyncratic. Tax treaty policy tends to be a small, specialist function within most 
governments, a niche within the niche of international tax policy. Negotiations are 
frequently led by just one individual, or by at most a handful of staff, operating in obscurity 
with little scrutiny. Much therefore depends on the knowledge and experience of this person 
or people, as well as quite specific resourcing decisions concerning the number of people in 
such a team. Comparing the UK and US, for example, or Cambodia with Vietnam, illustrates 
that the size and competence of the tax treaty negotiating team does not necessarily correlate 
with the size of the state apparatus, even that pertaining to taxation. For this reason, the 
focus of this thesis, as outlined in Chapter 5, is precisely on the knowledge and experience 
of the officials themselves, as well as on how they are constrained within a system of checks 
and balances, rather than on a broader notion of bureaucratic capacity. While quantitative 
measures such as a government’s bureaucratic capacity and the ‘tax effort’ of its tax policy 
and administration apparatus may be proxies for the size and effectiveness of a country’s tax 
bureaucracy,163 neither is a reliable indicator of the bureaucratic capacity devoted 
specifically to tax treaties. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Tax is an existential matter for the state: without it, a government will have no resources 
with which to guarantee its citizens’ security and its rulers’ survival, but nor will it develop 
the fiscal contract with its citizens that underpins the ‘modern’ democratic state. This creates 
a strong sense of the state’s fiscal sovereignty. But taxation is globalised: since states first 
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began to design modern corporate taxes in the early 20th century, they taxed foreign-owned 
companies, and domestic taxpayers’ foreign earnings, bringing them into conflict and 
forcing them to cooperate in order to maintain their de facto sovereignty. The doctrine of 
fiscal anarchy that underpinned this cooperation was formed intersubjectively at the same 
time, shaping the identities and preferences of each ‘fiscal state’, especially of developing 
countries whose tax systems developed once international institutions had consolidated. The 
case for tax treaties, in particular, is premised on what Tsilly Dagan calls ‘the tax treaties 
myth’, the idea that states should cooperate to alleviate double taxation, which will 
otherwise impede international trade and investment.164 The next chapter examines the 
proliferation of tax treaties, and questions the evidence that they have a positive impact on 
trade and investment.
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3 The tax treaties conundrum 
If we are not careful in the negotiation of DTAs, we will become net exporters of revenue. 
- Allen Kagina, former commissioner, Uganda Revenue Authority1 
 
A tax treaty is a device through which states voluntarily accept constraints on their de jure 
fiscal sovereignty. International tax practitioners frame this process in terms of the allocation 
of ‘taxing rights’ between the host and home country for a particular piece of income or 
capital.2 The notion that states can only tax where they have been given the ‘right’ to do so 
immediately indicates the sacrifice of sovereignty entailed by the treaty. Where no treaty 
exists, a country is free to tax any activity that it wishes, subject to the constraints set out in 
chapter 2. So-called ‘double taxation treaties’ are understood as a tool to resolve competing 
claims to tax the same income, which would otherwise create double taxation, as well as 
instruments creating a legal framework for administrative cooperation to tackle tax evasion. 
But they are also heavily influenced by tax competition. 
Of the 3000 tax treaties in existence today, more than half have at least one developing 
country as a signatory. Yet why developing countries should have embraced tax treaties is a 
puzzle. On one hand, the legal rationale is disputed, and a policymaker seeking empirical 
evidence that tax treaties attract investment into developing countries would have drawn a 
blank during much of the period during which the tax treaty network was expanding. In 
recent years an evidence base has begun to emerge, but the picture it paints is far from 
conclusive. On the other, developing countries give up a disproportionate amount when they 
sign a tax treaty, partly because all tax treaties are based on concepts formulated among 
OECD countries in their own interests, and partly because most treaties that are negotiated 
still do not incorporate the amendments that have been proposed through model treaties 
designed to redress this balance. This chapter sets out this puzzle in detail, explaining what 
tax treaties are, how they have spread, and what is known about how they come about. 
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3.1 The diffusion of tax treaties to developing countries 
By 2013, over 2000 tax treaties had been signed by developing countries, more than half 
with upper income countries (Figure 3.1).3 The pattern of diffusion may not be consistent 
with the S-shaped explosion commonly associated with policy diffusion: rather, it seems that 
the growth has been linear since the 1980s. Broadly speaking, there has been a growth in 
treaties with all three income groups shown in Figure 3.1, but treaties with developing and 
middle-income countries represent an increasing share of the total.  
Figure 3.1: Cumulative total tax treaties signed by developing countries 
 
Source: IBFD.4 “Developing countries” includes all countries classified by the World Bank as low or lower-
middle income.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa and South East Asia, the two regions from which case studies in this 
thesis are drawn, have between them concluded just under 1000 tax treaties (Figure 3.2). 
While South East Asian countries have more treaties in total, Sub-Saharan Africa displays a 
much more consistent growth in the number of agreements since independence (treaties 
concluded during the colonial era are excluded from these figures). Indeed, most Sub-
Saharan African countries began to sign tax treaties during the 1960s, soon after 
independence (Figure 3.3). 
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Figure 3.2: Cumulative total tax treaties signed by developing countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa and South-East Asia 
 
Source: IBFD6 
Figure 3.3: Number of developing countries with at least one tax treaty 
 
Source: IBFD7 
Figure 3.4, which shows the treaty partners of sub-Saharan countries, sheds some light on 
this trend. Originally, sub-Saharan countries had mostly signed treaties with former colonial 
parents and Nordic countries. While the former are consistent with an investment promotion 
rationale, given the extensive economic ties that remained after independence, the latter is a 
more intriguing, since the Nordic countries are by no means the most significant investors 
into the sub-Saharan continent. In contrast, more recent sub-Saharan treaty-making activity 
has been with countries on the continent (South Africa, Mauritius, Tunisia), emerging 
economies (India, China) and with a different set of developed countries (Canada, Italy, 
Belgium, Netherlands). Emerging sources of FDI, such as China and India, and regional 
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ones such as South Africa, Morocco and Tunisia in the case of Africa, are consistent with a 
simple investment promotion rationale, and it has been observed that countries such as 
China and Turkey adopt a similar stance to OECD members when negotiating with less 
developed countries.8 
Figure 3.4: Countries with five our more treaties with sub-Saharan African countries 
 
 
Source: IBFD 9 
Mauritius, Switzerland and the Netherlands, in contrast, are generally not the originators of 
large amounts of investment themselves, but intermediate hubs through which large volumes 
of trade and investment pass.10 In general, they have generous tax regimes to start with, 
which means that the likelihood of double taxation is limited and a treaty is probably 
unnecessary to relieve it. Their attractiveness to investors, however, is premised not simply 
on facilitating investments without double taxation, but on the advantageous terms of their 
tax treaties that enable investors to avoid taxation at all. These treaties may leave developing 
countries particularly open to tax losses. There are also some treaties with countries which 
whom there does not seem to be a significant amount of investment. These treaties are likely 
to be motivated not by their specific terms and conditions, but by the political signal that 
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they send, and since their costs (as well as any benefits) are small, they will not be the focus 
of this thesis.11 
In sum, developing countries have been concluding tax treaties since independence, most 
commonly with their former colonial parents and other OECD countries. From the 1990s, 
developing countries continued to conclude treaties with traditional sources of investment, 
but they also began signing treaties with emerging economies, as well as to some extent 
among themselves. A particularly intriguing question is why they have signed so many 
treaties with conduit countries, when these countries are not sources of investment in their 
own right, may not lack the power to coerce developing countries, and these treaties are 
likely to be abused through treaty shopping. 
3.2 Tax treaties as distributional settlements between 
countries 
The formal function of tax treaties, reflected in the more commonly used term ‘double 
taxation treaties’, and in the words on the title page of most treaties (‘agreement for the relief 
of double taxation and [in more recent treaties] the prevention of fiscal evasion’) is to 
promote trade and investment, by reducing the potential that companies operating in the two 
countries will be taxed twice on the same income. For example, the introduction to the 
model tax treaty developed by the United Nations tax cooperation committee (“the UN 
model”), which is intended as a template for developing countries to use in negotiations, 
states: 
Broadly, the general objectives of bilateral tax treaties therefore include the protection 
of taxpayers against double taxation with a view to improving the flow of international 
trade and investment and the transfer of technology.12 
Similarly, the introduction to the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital (“the 
OECD model”) describes its main purpose as: 
to clarify, standardise, and confirm the fiscal situation of taxpayers who are engaged 
in commercial, industrial, financial, or any other activities in other countries through 
the application by all countries of common solutions to identical cases of double 
taxation.13 
Investment promotion is certainly a powerful narrative in developing countries, and among 
some organisations providing technical support on investment policy, supporting the idea 
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that tax treaties will attract inward investment. For example, investment promotion literature 
from countries including Kenya and Zimbabwe highlights tax treaties as important factors 
that should attract investors.14 In budget speeches introducing tax treaties to Uganda’s 
parliament, successive finance ministers have explained that their purpose was, “to protect 
taxpayers against double taxation, and to ensure that the tax system does not discourage 
direct foreign investment” and “to reduce tax impediments to cross border trade and 
investment.”15 A study conducted by the Ministry of Finance of Peru states that, “these 
conventions create a favourable environment for investment. In signing a double taxation 
convention, a country is sending a positive signal to foreign investment and offering 
investors security with respect to the elements negotiated.”16 
Treaties set boundaries on when and how each country is entitled to tax income earned by 
residents of the treaty partner (especially multinational companies) within its borders. Table 
3.1 summarises some of these restrictions. As can be seen, a large proportion of the treaty is 
designed to restrict the host country’s taxing rights over foreign investors. Broadly speaking, 
it does this in three ways. First, it sets activity thresholds for a foreign company’s activity in 
the host country, based on the length of time, extent of presence, and type of activity. Below 
these thresholds the host country cannot tax a foreign investor, and the treaty therefore shifts 
the balance of taxing rights away from the host country, by an amount that depends on the 
specific threshold. For example, Uganda’s tax treaty with China, signed but not ratified at 
the time of writing, would prevent the country from taxing Chinese companies’ construction 
sites in the country (of which there are many) unless they are present for six months. This 
may be a significant curb when, as a finance ministry official stated in an interview for this 
thesis, “the Chinese can do things in three months.”17 China’s tax treaty with Mongolia, 
signed in 1991, imposes a much higher threshold of 18 months, which in practice would 
exempt many Chinese construction projects from Mongolian tax. 
Second, in some instances tax treaties allocate the right to tax in a binary way. Income such 
as royalties, pensions, and many types of capital gains may only be taxable by the home 
country once the treaty comes into force, again shifting the balance of taxing rights in its 
favour. For example, where a company in the host country pays out pensions to its former 
employees who now reside in the treaty partner (typically former expatriate employees of a 
multinational firm who have worked a subsidiary in the host country) many treaties prohibit 
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the host country from taxing those payments.18 Another longstanding concern about India’s 
tax treaty with Mauritius has been that it prevented India from taxing capital gains made by 
Mauritian residents in India, and was a vehicle for tax avoidance as a result.19 In Uganda, an 
ongoing dispute between the tax authority and telecommunications multinational Zain 
relates to the Uganda-Netherlands tax treaty, which prevents Uganda from levying capital 
gains tax on certain types of gains made by Dutch residents, including holding companies, in 
Uganda.20 
Third, in some instances tax treaties set a maximum tax rate on cross-border transactions that 
the host state must not exceed. Developing countries commonly levy such ‘withholding 
taxes’ on dividends, interest payments, royalties and service fees. According to estimates by 
the development NGO ActionAid, tax treaties signed by Bangladesh deprive it of US$85 
million in dividend and interest withholding tax revenue per year.21 An IMF report estimated 
the equivalent cost to non-OECD states from their tax treaties with the US of the order of 
US$1.6 billion in 2010.22 The maximum withholding tax rates imposed by tax treaties are 
probably their most visible and high profile aspects in developing countries, where 
withholding tax rates tend to be higher than those in developed countries. 
In return for these restrictions in the home country, the signatories also agree to bear the cost 
of eliminating any remaining double taxation incurred by their residents by making 
allowances for taxes paid in the treaty partner when calculating their tax liability. This is 
usually done through a combination of credits for tax paid abroad and exempting income 
earned in the treaty partner altogether. From the 1970s to 1990s, it was common to include a 
‘tax sparing’ clause in which the home country agreed to honour any tax incentives its firms 
were granted by the treaty partner, by giving them credits as if they had paid taxes in full. 
This practice, which did create costs for capital exporting countries, fell out of fashion with 
the publication of an OECD report, ‘Tax Sparing: a reconsideration’, which argued that 
these provisions were vulnerable to tax avoidance, and encouraged investors to repatriate 
profits, rather than investing them in the developing country.23 
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Table 3.1: Selected provisions of tax treaties and their effects 
Article Tax(es) concerned Effect 
5 Corporate income tax Permanent establishment. Prescribes that states can only tax 
a foreign company if its activity within their borders meets the 
thresholds set out under the treaty definition of ‘permanent 
establishment’ (PE). Typically these thresholds include a 
minimum amount of physical presence over a minimum length 
of time, and a list of business activities that do or do not count 
as a PE. 
7 Corporate income tax Business profits. Sets out how the profits made by a foreign 
business should be calculated for the purpose of taxation by the 
state in which it is operating. The state can only take into 
account profits that it is permitted to by this article, and it must 
allow the taxable profits to be reduced by any expenses 
specified in this article. 
10-12 Withholding taxes Withholding tax limits. In addition to profit taxes, states often 
levy taxes on overseas payments made by companies, such as 
interest payments, royalties and dividends. These clauses 
specify the types of payments on which a country can levy 
withholding taxes, and the maximum rates at which they can 
levied. The maximum rates are usually set lower than the 
statutory rates in the capital importing country, as a key 
concession making the treaty advantageous to the capital 
exporting country. 
13 Capital gains tax Capital gains tax. The country in which a foreign investor 
realises a capital gain can only tax it in the circumstances set 
out in his clause. This may include that a shareholding being 
sold must constitute a minimum threshold (so that the host 
country can only tax gains on direct, not portfolio investment). 
21 Others Other forms of taxation. Generally this states that any only 
the home country has the right to levy taxes that are not 
explicitly mentioned in the treaty. 
23 All Relief of double taxation. All previous articles limit the 
capital importer’s taxing rights. This article is the quid pro quo,  
under which the capital exporter agrees that its resident 
taxpayers will either receive credits against their tax bills for 
equivalent taxes paid in the treaty partner, or that it will exempt 
income and capital in the treaty partner from taxation 
altogether. 
25 All Mutual agreement procedure. Where the provisions of the 
treaty are interpreted differently such that a taxpayer still incurs 
double taxation, this provides for a mechanism through which 
the countries can try to resolve the dispute. More recent treaties 
have begun to include taxpayer-initiated binding arbitration 
within this clause. 
26 All Exchange of information. Obliges and provides a legal 
authority for states to cooperate with each other when 
investigating taxpayers with affair in both countries. 
Source: Author’s own 
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If the flows of investment and people between the two treaty partners are broadly equal, 
changes to the balance of taxing rights resulting from the treaty may affect the incentives for 
particular taxpayers to move or invest between the signatories, but will not have a significant 
impact on the overall distribution of taxing rights between the two countries. This is because 
each country is simultaneously a home and host country with respect to different investors, 
and so will gain and lose in roughly equal proportion from the restrictions on host or home 
country taxing rights. But when a treaty is concluded between two countries between which 
capital flows are not equal, as between a developing country and a developed country, the 
settlement will have major distributional consequences.  
The negotiated content of the treaty may be more or less advantageous to the capital 
exporting country depending on the level of the permanent establishment threshold, the 
allocation of the binary provisions, and the maximum withholding tax rates set. But it is 
normally the case that even treaties that are comparatively favourable to the capital 
importing country still place significant restrictions on their taxing rights relative to 
domestic legislation. For example, accepting the concept of permanent establishment, 
regardless of how broadly it is defined, is a restriction relative to a domestic tax framework 
that does not include the concept. This illustrates the power of the model treaties, which are 
predicated on these concepts. It also illustrates that the real impact of tax treaties is often not 
to alleviate double taxation, but to transfer some of the cost of doing so from the capital 
exporting country to the capital importer, and to reduce the overall effective tax rate of 
investors operating across the two countries. 
3.3 Weighing up the costs and benefits 
We have established that a bilateral tax treaty between a capital-importing developing 
country and a capital exporter is an explicit political agreement in which each country agrees 
to surrender some of its fiscal sovereignty, giving up some of its so-called taxing rights. 
Where the treaty partner has already unilaterally committed to double tax relief through 
credits or exemptions, as most of the traditional FDI exporting countries have done, a tax 
treaty is more akin to a transfer of taxing rights to it from the developing country. The 
question for a developing country policymaker considering entering into negotiations is 
therefore what their country might expect to gain from signing a tax treaty, to offset these 
losses. This section considers the evidence available in both the legal and economic 
literature. 
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3.3.1 Legal scholars debate whether tax treaties are necessary to relieve 
double taxation 
A hypothetical rational policymaker would have little trouble finding work by lawyers in the 
policy and academic literature that might give them pause for thought. For forty years, legal 
scholarship has debated the extent to which the sacrifice of taxing rights by a developing 
country in signing a tax treaty is justified by its impact on the tax treatment of inward 
investment.24 Critical legal scholars have argued that tax treaties place too much of the 
burden of relieving double taxation on developing countries, or that the entire rationale is as 
‘a myth’ or “aid in reverse— from poor to rich countries,” because, rather than relieving 
double taxation, tax treaties between developed and developing countries merely shift the 
burden of doing so from the former to the latter.25  
This is because the credit or exemption provisions that limit the home country’s right to tax 
its own residents – the quid pro quo for the restrictions in the host country – are rendered 
less significant by the fact that a majority of major capital exporting countries have 
incorporated credits or – increasingly – exemptions for foreign-taxed profits into their tax 
systems unilaterally.26 The treaty may even increase tax revenue in the home country if it 
operates a credit system and its outward investors’ tax liability in the treaty partner falls as a 
result of the treaty. (If it operates an exemption system, the benefit of the restrictions in the 
host country accrues entirely to the multinational investor). 
It does appear to be the case that many tax treaties concluded by developing countries have 
been with countries that already relieve tax unilaterally. Authors who believe that tax treaties 
can nonetheless attract investment into developing countries make the following points.27 
First, not all capital exporting countries relieve double taxation unilaterally in all 
circumstances, in which case there may be a strong argument for a tax treaty in these cases. 
Second, although in other instances there may not be what Dagan refers to as “heroic” 
double taxation, there would still remain instances in which companies are caught out, for 
example because each country’s tax code defines a particular transaction differently. Treaties 
help to resolve this both by standardising many definitions and also by providing taxpayers 
with an avenue to initiate dispute settlement between the treaty partners. Third, an important 
                                                     
24 Irish, “International Double Taxation Agreements and Income Taxation At Source:”; Avi-Yonah, “Double Tax 
Treaties: An Introduction”; Thuronyi, “Tax Treaties and Developing Countries”; Pistone, “Tax Treaties with 
Developing Countries: A Plea for New Allocation Rules and a Combined Legal and Economic Approach”; 
Christians, “Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa: A Case Study.” 
25 Dagan, “The Tax Treaties Myth”; Irish, “International Double Taxation Agreements and Income Taxation At 
Source:,” 316. 
26 PWC, Evolution of Territorial Tax Systems in the OECD. 
27 Avery Jones, “Are Tax Treaties Necessary?”; Self, “Some Treaty Issues for Developing Countries”; Pickering, 
Why Negotiate Tax Treaties? 
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benefit to businesses from tax treaties is that they create stability. A tax treaty is effectively a 
tool to deliver a credible commitment that many aspects of the tax treatment of an 
investment will not change in a way that is dramatically worse for the investor, for example 
a large hike in withholding taxes. 
Finally, it is also argued that tax treaties create a more favourable treatment for investors 
because they reduce taxes that are a direct cost to businesses. This occurs if income is not 
taxed in the home country, as opposed to being taxed with a credit for taxes paid overseas, or 
if the home tax rate is lower than the host tax rate on the income concerned. For example, if 
both countries tax capital gains at the same rate, a business will be indifferent to which 
country is accorded the taxing rights in the tax treaty, since it will pay the same overall. On 
the other hand, if the home country doesn’t tax capital gains, then a treaty according this 
taxing right to the home country will entirely eliminate the potential for capital gains tax for 
investors, which may make the host country a more attractive destination for them. 
Tsilly Dagan’s paper, which has been the most influential critical analysis, uses game theory 
to demonstrate that, absent a treaty, the Pareto optimal outcome for a home country will 
always be to take unilateral steps to relieve double taxation incurred by its multinationals 
that invest abroad.28 For capital importing developing countries, then, the best strategy 
should be to sit tight. In Eduardo Baistrocchi’s analysis, Dagan’s result does not hold when 
multiple developing countries are competing for inward investment – in this situation they 
are in a prisoner’s dilemma, and once one host country has signed a tax treaty with the 
capital exporter, the optimal solution for the others is to follow suit.29 This competition 
model also applies if tax treaties are reducing direct costs to investors, as opposed to 
eliminating double taxation – here tax treaties may be tools of tax competition in the same 
manner as statutory tax rates, in which case developing countries face a collective action 
problem.  
What would a policymaker in a developing country, seeking rationally to analyse all the 
evidence available to them, conclude on the basis of a tax law analysis? Tax treaties may 
hold some attraction to investors, but this depends very much on the characteristics of the 
two signatories’ tax systems. Certainly, the sweeping statements about the benefits of tax 
treaties to developing countries often seen in policy literature seem hard to sustain. Perhaps 
more pertinent is the empirical question, “do tax treaties increase investment into developing 
countries?” to which we now turn. 
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3.3.2 Economics scholars debate the empirical record of tax treaties in 
facilitating investment 
The econometric evidence is, unfortunately for our hypothetical policymaker, not much 
more clear cut.30 Any survey of the academic literature, certainly one conducted before the 
last few years, would have cast further doubt on the benefits a developing country could 
expect from concluding a tax treaty. Only a literature review conducted with access to the 
most recent journal articles might offer grounds for optimism, and even here a close and 
critical reading calls into question the likely gains for developing countries. 
When a comprehensive collection of studies constituting the state of the art was published in 
2009, it gave mixed evidence for the effect of tax treaties on investment.31 Bruce Blonigen 
and Ronald Davies found no significant association between FDI activity and the negotiation 
of tax treaties with the US, and a negative association when examining treaties negotiated 
between OECD states.32 These findings were corroborated by Peter Egger and colleagues, 
and by Henri Louie & Donald Rousslang, the latter finding no change in the rate of return 
expected by US corporations investing in countries where a tax treaty had been negotiated.33 
Daniel Millimet and Abdullah Kumas used a different methodology that allowed for a lag of 
several years between the negotiation of a treaty and any effect on investment levels.34 They 
found a significant positive association between the presence of a tax treaty and inbound 
FDI activity into the US; for outbound investment, they found a less significant association, 
which was positive for FDI stocks, but negative for flows. Finally, Eric Neumayer found a 
significant and positive relationship between the negotiation of tax treaties with OECD 
countries and inbound FDI for middle-income countries, but not for low-income countries, 
in whom we are more interested here.35 
More recent studies have begun to find a more consistent positive effect, although 
conceptual issues with the study designs remain. One set of studies has used foreign affiliate 
microdata from Sweden, Germany, the US and Austria, finding positive effects in certain 
circumstances.36 These studies also provide interesting nuance. In particular, any positive 
                                                     
30 This section expands on some comments previously published online. See Hearson, “Do Tax Treaties Affect 
Foreign Investment? The Plot Thickens.” 
31 Sauvant and Sachs, The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment. 
32 Blonigen and Davies, “The Effects of Bilateral Tax Treaties on U.S. FDI Activity.” 
33 Egger et al., “The Impact of Endogenous Tax Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Theory and Evidence”; 
Louie and Rousslang, “Host-Country Governance, Tax Treaties and US Direct Investment Abroad.” Louie & 
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34 Millimet and Kumas, “It’s All in the Timing: Assessing the Impact of Bilateral Tax Treaties on U.S. FDI 
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35 Neumayer, “Do Double Taxation Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?” 
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effect seems to be limited to the extensive margin, in other words to the initial decision to 
enter a country, but not subsequent increases in the size of the investment (the intensive 
margin). This may be because tax treaties reduce the tax paid on cross-border payments, 
creating an incentive to remit profits elsewhere in the multinational group, rather than to 
reinvest them in the host country.37 The study of Swedish firms found that a tax treaty 
increased the likelihood of establishing an affiliate in a country by a small but statistically 
significant amount – from 0.6% to 0.7%.38 The German study offered a range of figures 
depending on the variables used, but found that the corporation tax rate had a much larger 
effect.39 Only the Austrian study, based on less granular data, found an effect at the intensive 
margin.40 
Bruce Blonigen and colleagues, using US data, demonstrate that tax treaties affect different 
sectors differently.41 They find that a tax treaty increases both the number of new entrants 
into a market (the extensive margin) and the volume of sales by a given affiliate (the 
intensive margin), but only for some firms. The explanation focuses on tax treaties’ Mutual 
Agreement Procedure (MAP), through which countries can settle disputes about who gets to 
tax them in certain circumstances. Without a treaty, a company will most likely be taxed by 
both countries if they disagree. This problem is unlikely to affect firms whose internal trade 
is dominated by ‘homogenous’ goods for which a price can easily be found, but firms 
trading in ‘differentiated’ products, whose values are more likely to be disputed between 
countries, are sensitive to the presence of a tax treaty. 
The conclusions we can draw about developing countries from these studies are limited, 
however. There is a major lack data on developing countries in the foreign affiliate 
microdata samples: the US only has one treaty with sub-Saharan Africa, Austria has few 
treaties with lower income countries, and German data only covers 51 host countries, with a 
bias towards larger economies and not a single African country. Given that pre-2009 studies 
found a difference between the effect of treaties in countries at different levels of 
development, this significantly limits the conclusions we can draw. Blonigen and 
colleagues’ hypothesised mechanism focusing on the MAP is unlikely to make much 
difference for investment in developing countries, most of which have never entered into a 
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tax treaty MAP.42 Only Ronald Davies and colleagues’ study using Swedish microdata has 
sufficient coverage of sub-Saharan countries to be able to apply its results to that region, and 
the effect it found was small.43 
Aggregate investment data offer better data coverage. Two studies using more 
comprehensive bilateral investment data have found significant positive effects of tax 
treaties on FDI stocks in developing countries: one focused on developing countries and 
found the effect to be in the region of 30 percent, while another not limited to developing 
countries suggested it was 21 percent.44 There are, however, problems with the dyadic 
approach used, by which the studies assess the extent to which a treaty between capital 
exporter E and capital importer I corresponds to higher investment from E into I. None 
controls fully for treaty shopping, in which investors from E into I use an intermediate 
vehicle in conduit jurisdiction C to take advantage of the treaty between C and I, a 
phenomenon for which Arjan Lejour tests and finds support, and which Francis Weyzig 
documents using Dutch microdata.45  
Both the aggregate FDI and microdata approaches are susceptible to a number of further 
problems. First, endogeneity, since qualitative research presented below suggests that 
treaties are often negotiated at the same time as or in response to investment decisions, 
rather than before them. A lag of one year is not sufficient to address this difficulty, since 
treaty negotiations and new investments may both take several years from the initial decision 
to an observable event.46 
Second, neither the dyadic FDI nor firm-level studies allow us to draw conclusions about the 
effect of a treaty on absolute levels of investment. A tax treaty is a unique form of tax 
incentive that only applies to firms from the treaty partner. If a treaty between capital 
exporter E and capital importer I lowers the tax cost for investors resident in E and operating 
in I, this may come at the cost of less investment into I from another capital exporter F, 
whose firms are no longer as competitive (this is indeed the fear expressed by British 
businesses and civil servants quoted in chapter 7). Country I may benefit from this 
competition, but by less than the total amount of any new investment recorded from E into I, 
because of the displacement effect. Alternatively, the treaty between E and I may divert 
investment from E that would previously have gone to capital importer J, but can now obtain 
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a better post-tax return in capital importer I. This diversion effect is a clear ‘prisoner’s 
dilemma’ situation. 
Third, on the other side of the coin, certain tax treaties provide benefits to investors that are 
not resident in the treaty partner country. This is because a multinational from country M, 
which has no treaty with I, may have another subsidiary in country E, and may make 
payments between its subsidiaries in E and I such that it benefits from the treaty between E 
and I, even though these payments are not reflected in the flows of FDI from E into I. 
A final note about the evidence base concerns ‘tax sparing’ clauses, which are added into 
some tax treaties signed by developing countries to give a stronger effect to tax incentives 
granted by the developing country to multinationals from the home country. The OECD 
asserts that, “[i]nvestment decisions taken by international investors resident in credit 
countries are rarely dependent on or even influenced by the existence or absence of tax 
sparing provisions in treaties.”47 In spite of this, several studies have found positive and 
significant effects of tax sparing provisions on investment into developing countries, 
independent of the presence of a tax treaty per se.48 
In sum, a rational policymaker evaluating all the available econometric evidence would be 
unlikely to conclude that this literature allows for any generalised conclusions about whether 
or not a given tax treaty will bring inward investment. Most studies that have looked 
specifically at developing countries have found little support, and there are strong reasons to 
question the validity of claims made by those that do appear to find an effect. In particular, it 
is difficult to distinguish between new investment resulting from a treaty, and investment 
diverted or routed from elsewhere to take advantage of its terms. In all probability, any 
effect of a tax treaty on investment depends on the interaction of the tax system of the host 
and home country to begin with, whether the treaty contains effective protection against 
treaty shopping, whether a country’s competitors have already concluded tax treaties, and 
the particular provisions agreed. Yet such qualifications are absent from policy discourse 
and, as the evidence in this thesis will show, from policymakers’ descriptions of their own 
considerations. It thus seems unlikely that the prevalent view, that tax treaties have a blanket 
investment-promoting effect, is based on a rational assessment of the strength of economic 
or legal evidence. 
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3.4 Getting a good deal 
The evidence for a generalised effect of tax treaties on investment is largely based on a 
binary explanatory variable, measuring the presence or absence of a tax treaty. Yet, while all 
tax treaties conform to the parameters set by the model treaties, there is still considerable 
variation in their content, which may affect a treaty’s impact on investment flows, and on tax 
revenues. Because tax treaties follow a standardised form, and tend to vary in a number of 
precise, standardised ways, patterns of negotiated outcomes should also reveal something 
about the preferences of the countries driving their negotiation. 
The fiscal costs to developing countries of tax treaties have never been the subject of an 
empirical academic study, but non-governmental organisations have attempted to draw 
attention to what they regard as a negative impact of the reduced withholding tax rates 
through both case studies and quantitative analysis.49 In 2012, Mongolia, Argentina and 
Rwanda between them repudiated a total of eight tax treaties, apparently due to fears that 
they were open to abuse or overly generous.50 Meanwhile the Dutch and Irish governments 
have recently conducted reviews of their tax treaties with developing countries.51 The IMF 
now advises developing countries that they “would be well-advised to sign treaties only with 
considerable caution.”52 
The UN model treaty is generally regarded as a better compromise between the costs and 
benefits for developing countries than the OECD model treaty.53 Where the two models 
vary, it is almost always because the UN model allocates greater taxing rights to the capital 
importing country. But some recent research has demonstrated that the outcome of tax treaty 
negotiations between developed and developing countries is generally closer to the OECD 
model than that of the UN: most of the clauses of the UN model that differ significantly 
from the OECD model, in areas such as the permanent establishment definition and capital 
gains tax, appear in only a minority of treaties signed by developing countries.54 Because the 
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UN model clauses are generally more common in treaties between two non-OECD countries 
than in treaties signed by one OECD and one non-OECD country, it appears that developing 
countries may seek, but fail to secure, more expansive taxing rights in negotiations with 
OECD countries, where the division of taxing rights really matters. 
A few papers have looked for patterns within the negotiated content of tax treaties. Kim 
Brooks observes that Australia has tended to be more generous in the terms of its tax treaties 
with developing countries than Canada, and that the latter has become less generous as time 
has progressed.55 Charles Irish suggests that the prevalence of African tax treaties with 
Nordic countries and West Germany in the 1970s was a result of these countries’ openness 
to negotiate and to conclude treaties on preferential terms. These countries “do recognise the 
necessity of greater taxation at source and are willing to enter into tax agreements favourable 
to developing countries.”56 
Veronica Dauer and Richard Krever survey tax treaties in 11 African countries, comparing 
the negotiated outcome of several clauses across treaties concluded by these African 
countries, as well as those concluded by six Asian countries. Their survey finds marked 
differences between some countries, and notes that “as a group, these African countries 
appear not to have been as successful as Asian countries in retaining taxing rights.”57 They 
advance, but do not test, three explanations for this: countries’ negotiating strength, national 
policy preferences, and emulation of regional partners. 
In a study of 500 treaties signed by developing countries, I found that Asian countries have 
generally been more successful at obtaining UN treaty provisions that safeguard their taxing 
rights than African countries.58 Since 1970, a trend towards lower withholding taxes in 
developing country tax treaties has been counterbalanced by more expansive taxing rights in 
permanent establishment provisions, while the picture with respect to capital gains is mixed. 
As a group, OECD countries are becoming more restrictive in their negotiating positions 
towards developing countries, and non-OECD countries more expansive. 
Jinyan Li analyses the historical development of China’s treaty network using a detailed 
typology.59 Broadly, she finds that China has changed its preference in negotiations, from 
preferring clauses that expanded its taxing rights as a capital importer, towards more 
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recently preferring clauses that expand its taxing rights as a capital exporter. Eduardo 
Baistrocchi’s describes an initial stage of Chinese treaty policy during which it was willing 
to accept treaties on OECD members’ terms, despite the costs it incurred as a capital 
importing country, in order to send the signal that it was open to investment.60 
Two studies consider the relationship between FDI asymmetries between the two negotiating 
countries and the withholding rates in those treaties. One looks at this for US treaties and for 
treaties between OECD members, while the other uses data from German treaties.61 Both 
studies find that withholding tax rates are higher where the asymmetry in the FDI 
relationship between treaty partners is higher. A much earlier, qualitative study observed 
that “treaty partners having unequal income flows will allocate jurisdiction to tax so as to 
achieve a more even balance between the two extremes.”62 
The findings of these three studies imply that countries in a more capital importing position, 
where the balance of taxing rights in the treaty is most important, are more likely to obtain a 
better outcome. But is worth noting that the treaties studied in these papers are 
predominantly among more developed countries. The descriptive studies that used a sample 
of lower-income developing countries have tended to find that these countries are quite 
unsuccessful at obtaining the versions of clauses that they seem to prefer when negotiating 
treaties with developed countries, as opposed to with each other.63 This is consistent with the 
view that a tax treaty between a developed and a developing country tends to act primarily to 
constrain the latter’s ability to tax investors from the former. 
3.5 Determinants of tax treaty formation 
So far we have seen that the existing literature on tax treaties creates something of a puzzle 
for why developing countries might sign them. The legal rationale is hard to generalise, but 
the most common ‘heroic’ explanation in terms of double taxation does not stand up in many 
instances. In any event, regardless of the legal position, policymakers have not generally had 
a robust econometric evidence base to support the idea that treaties achieve increases in 
investment.  And yet developing countries are signing tax treaties that, in many cases, 
significantly curtail their taxing rights. 
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The only study to date to test a ‘diffusion’ explanation for the spread of tax treaties suggests 
that competition for inward investment is an important driver. Fabien Barthel and Eric 
Neumayer conclude that developing countries are more likely to conclude a tax treaty with a 
particular country when their likely competitors for inward investment have signed a treaty 
with that country.64 Policymakers, it seems, are convinced enough of the benefits of tax 
treaties to engage in a competitive strategic interaction. 
A paper written for the UN tax committee by former Australian tax treaty negotiator Arianne 
Pickering, while devoting most of its attention to the investment-promoting rationale for tax 
treaties, also notes two further reasons why developing countries might sign tax treaties: the 
prevention of fiscal evasion through the tax information exchange and cooperation 
provisions of tax treaties, and “political reasons.”65 There is certainly evidence that tax 
officials from some developing countries, among them Zambia and Kenya, currently regard 
the information exchange provisions of tax treaties as important benefits to be weighed up as 
part of any assessment of the gains and losses from treaty negotiations and renegotiations.66 
This was not, however, a common motivation identified in the research for this thesis, not 
least because such provisions can be obtained without the need to sacrifice taxing rights, 
through a standalone Tax Information Exchange Agreement (TIEA). It is also the case that, 
historically, developing countries have not made much use of the information exchange 
provisions within their tax treaties.67 In Uganda, for example, although finance ministers 
have paid lip service to these benefits in the treaty ratification process, the country has made 
very few information requests.68 
Pickering breaks down “political reasons” into several elements: the signalling effect 
towards businesses that a country is “a responsible member of the international tax 
community,” international obligations (OECD and EU members, for example, are obliged to 
conclude tax treaties among themselves), diplomatic reasons unconnected with taxation, and 
the possibility of coercion: 
Frequently, developing countries commence negotiations for a tax treaty primarily 
because they feel pressured to do so by another country. The pressure may come in 
the form of diplomatic or political representations, or from the tax administration or 
revenue officials from the other country or directly from taxpayers resident in the other 
country.69 
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Charles Irish, writing in 1974 based on his experience as an adviser to the Zambian 
government, noted that Zambia had signed a number of unfavourable treaties, and suggested 
that this resulted from a number of factors combining to create a coercive mechanism. 
Developing countries were “unaware” of the disadvantages of tax treaties as proposed by 
developed countries, and of the possibility that they might challenge the allocation of taxing 
rights; developing countries “have or believe they have a relatively weak bargaining 
position”; developed countries “have a propensity to take advantage” of these two deficits.70 
One collection of studies is consistent with the idea that developing countries’ policymaking 
is not well developed in international tax. It describes the attitude to tax negotiation in 
several developing countries. The author of the book’s Ugandan chapter, for example, 
argues that, 
tax administration and tax policy officials in Uganda are not sufficiently trained in the 
area of tax treaties and international taxation. As a result, Uganda has a weak tax treaty 
negotiation team that concludes treaties more intensively reflecting the position of the 
other contracting state.71 
Similarly, the chapter on Colombia describes how a decision by the Uribe government in 
2004 to adopt a policy of “attracting investment at any price” led to poorly-prepared 
negotiations that resulted in an outcome that was less favourable to Colombia than might 
otherwise have resulted: 
In 2005 the Ministry of Trade thus issued a priority list of major trading partners for 
parallel negotiations of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and [tax] treaties…Due to 
the urgency of negotiations, Colombian officials decided to implement the [OECD 
Model, rather than the Andean or United Nations models] as the only available tool 
for negotiating with OECD Member countries.72 
These examples are consistent with my own experience prior to embarking on the research 
for this thesis: a tax policy official in Ghana told me that his country had lost out in 
negotiations through poor preparation, and had not fully taken into account the way tax 
treaties could allow certain jurisdictions to act as conduits for tax avoidance.73  
A different perspective is provided by Alison Christians in her account of field research in 
Ghana.74 Christians observed that most stakeholders in that country didn’t consider a tax 
treaty with the United States to be necessary in terms of its specific impact on the tax 
treatment of US investments into Ghana. The case study also casts doubt on the value of any 
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signalling effect from a tax treaty, in comparison to other potential drivers of inward 
investment such as BITs. 
In sum, the small literature examining developing countries’ reasons for signing tax treaties 
suggests a familiar set of issues for international political economy scholars: policymakers 
acting on imperfect information, power imbalances between countries, and the pursuit of 
economic objectives beyond the technical purpose of the treaty. These explanations certainly 
add nuance to the prevailing view that tax treaty diffusion to developing countries can be 
explained through the rational pursuit of inward investment. 
3.6 Conclusion 
The tax treaties myth entails two logical steps: first, that states’ competing claims to tax 
cross-border investment create the problem of double taxation, which is unresolved without 
cooperation between states; second, that by putting in place a tax treaty to resolve this 
problem, an actual barrier preventing investment flows will be lifted. As this chapter has 
shown, it is unlikely that policymakers have sufficient evidence to support such generalised 
claims , and some evidence that contradicts each.. 
In fact, we understand very little about why developing countries sign tax treaties, and hence 
we have no yardstick against which to judge whether they have been successful. What we do 
know is that developing countries have signed, and continue to sign, a great many tax 
treaties, many of which have been negotiated on terms that seem to have entailed a greater 
sacrifice of fiscal sovereignty than was necessary to reach agreement. The core question 
posed by the empirical literature is therefore why developing countries have concluded so 
many tax treaties, and on such disadvantageous terms. 
To answer this questions convincingly, it will be necessary to work across two disciplinary 
boundaries. First, to combine the detailed analysis of legal scholarship with the political 
scientist’s emphasis on causal hypotheses; second, to adopt a mixed methods approach that 
leverages the inferential power of large-N analysis with the specificity of qualitative case 
studies. In each case, it is important to combine the analyses systematically: to formulate 
hypotheses not just about the origins of tax treaties in general, but about specific clauses 
given their interaction with the domestic tax system; to embed case studies in a rigorous 
mixed methods approach that tests and clarifies the findings of quantitative work. By 
integrating these different approaches, the aim is to formulate a new understanding of tax 
treaty formation that questions the assumptions underlying existing analyses 
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The next two chapters begin that process by setting out a theory of tax treaty diffusion to 
developing countries, based on qualitative evidence gathered through interviews and 
observations. Chapter 4 focuses on non-specialists within a country’s policymaking process, 
who have little knowledge of the detailed content of tax treaties, nor of their interactions 
with domestic tax systems. For these individuals, it is the idea that countries wanting to 
attract investment should sign tax treaties that has driven tax treaty diffusion. Chapter 5 then 
turns attention to those within the bureaucracy who do have specialist knowledge, in 
particular the treaty negotiators themselves. These individuals’ technical knowledge is 
detailed, and packaged within a set of ideas about acceptable tax standards, which are 
embodied by the OECD model tax treaty.
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4 Turning the tables: competition for inward 
and outward investment 
Nobody comes to invest because you have a tax treaty. When you see the rationale to attract 
investment, it sounds laudable. But when you look at the evidence, it’s not the case. 
- Ugandan treaty negotiator1 
 
This chapter and the one that follows build on the theoretical and empirical foundations of 
the previous chapters to develop a theory of tax treaty diffusion in which ideas play a causal 
role. The propositions here are supported by anecdotal evidence drawn from interviews with 
tax treaty negotiators and participant observation at their international meetings, as well as 
from some documentary evidence. The present chapter focuses on the idea that tax treaties 
increase investment flows, and hence can be used to compete for investment. This idea 
departs from the double taxation problem discussed in chapter 2, whereby international 
investment is deterred by the multiple claims to tax it by different countries. 
Competition is one of four classic categories of policy diffusion mechanism, the others being 
learning, emulation and coercion.2 This chapter begins with a critical review of policy 
diffusion literature. It then builds a theory of ‘boundedly rational competition’, combining 
the insights from recent work on boundedly rational learning – especially on BITs – with the 
classic conception of policy diffusion through competition, or ‘race to the bottom’. As the 
evidence presented in this chapter shows, tax treaties have indeed diffused in some cases as 
a result of competition by developing countries for inward investment. The lack of a solid 
evidence base to justify this competition, and the views of treaty negotiators who are often 
sceptical that tax treaties will attract investment, suggest that non-specialist actors in 
developing countries who subscribe to the competition approach may be relying on ideas as 
well as, or instead of, purely rational analysis of the costs and benefits. Tax treaties are, 
however a harder case than BITs for theories of bounded rationality, because the costs are 
more immediate and certain than any potential benefits, and hence information on the costs 
might expected to be more ‘available’ to policymakers. With this in mind, it is proposed that 
the salience of fiscal costs to those actors is a scope condition for this diffusion mechanism. 
The chapter then turns the logic of competition on its head, demonstrating that tax treaties 
have also diffused through competition by outward-investing developed countries for 
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investment opportunities. Since tax treaties confer benefits in the developing country on only 
those multinationals based in the signatory country, investors from signatory countries gain 
an advantage over their competitors, who in turn ask their home governments to conclude 
tax treaties. Anecdotal evidence confirms that this mechanism has played an important role 
in the initiation of tax treaty negotiations between developed and developing countries, and 
hence in the observed pattern of tax treaty diffusion. This apparently simple observation is 
largely absent from any discussion of BIT and BTT diffusion in the literature. 
Competition for outward investment cannot explain why developing countries, which incur 
most of the costs of tax treaties, would acquiesce to requests from developing countries. The 
final task of this chapter is therefore to consider the means through which developed 
countries have influenced developing countries’ willingness to reciprocate, a process of 
‘coercion’.  
4.1 Evidence base 
To build the argument in this chapter and the one that follows, I use evidence from 
interviews, participant observation in international meetings, and official documentation. In 
total, the thesis draws on 68 interviews with 84 stakeholders in the tax treatymaking process. 
Of these stakeholders, 56 were or had been national civil servants involved in setting tax 
treaty policy, negotiating tax treaties - many were their country’s lead negotiator - or 
administering tax treaties (the umbrella term “tax treaty officials” will be used for all three 
types of civil servant). The sample also included 27 individuals currently working in the 
private sector, primarily for business lobby groups and tax advisory firms, and eight 
international organisation staff.3 These individuals came from 27 different countries, 
including the three case study countries; 50 interviewees were not from or working in case 
study countries.  
The sampling was a combination of convenience and purposive. Most of the interviews were 
conducted at meetings convened by the United Nations Committee of Experts on 
International Cooperation in Tax Matters (“UN Committee”), but these were supplemented 
with some in-country interviews during incidental travel. In addition to the three 
contemporary case studies – Cambodia, Vietnam and Zambia – in-country interviews were 
conducted in Uganda, Kenya, Denmark, South Africa and the US. A multi-stakeholder focus 
group was also conducted at a tax conference in Nairobi in 2013, involving local businesses, 
tax advisors, revenue authority officials and academics. The sampling strategy was designed 
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to obtain a cross-section of countries by income group and region, as shown in Table 4.1, 
which gives a breakdown of the countries covered by the interviews by income group. A 
detailed list of interviews is given in annex, although countries and names are kept 
confidential at the request of numerous interviewees. 
Table 4.1: Breakdown of interviews 
Country income group Negotiators 
Other 
government 
Private 
sector 
Total 
High 13 5 4 22 
Upper-middle 7 1  8 
Lower-middle 12 5 1 18 
Low 4 7 17 28 
Int’l organisation 8 1 5 14 
Total 44 19 27  
Source: Author’s own 
Where possible, interviews were undertaken on a semi-structured basis, with a series of 
general questions about the interviewee’s experience of negotiations, and how tax treaty 
decisions were made in their country. In addition, some specific questions were asked about 
recent developments in each country, such as recent treaty signatures, using lists obtained 
from the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation in advance.4 Some conversations 
were necessarily more informal than this, given that participants were interviewed in the 
margins of conferences. Interviews were not recorded, as requests to record early interviews 
had a significant chilling effect on the conversation. 
International meetings also provided the opportunity for participant observation. Meetings of 
the United Nations Tax Committee are gatherings of dozens of tax treaty officials that last 
over several days. During formal proceedings, the 25 committee members speak in a 
personal capacity, while country observers speak on behalf of their country, and a small 
number of representatives from NGOs, the private sector and NGOs also participate as 
observers.5 The meetings were an opportunity to observe both the formal statements made 
by participants during the committee’s deliberations, and the informal discussions during 
breaks and social functions. Comments made by committee members cannot, however, be 
attributed. 
There are several sources of bias in the use of such interview and observation data. First, not 
all countries attend United Nations events, and so the sample may over-represent countries – 
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or individuals – with a certain perspective on the matters under discussion (for example, 
those more instinctively amenable to international cooperation, and more particularly to the 
UN). Second, I am known by some participants for my past advocacy work, including a 
widely-distributed report that was somewhat sceptical of tax treaties.6 It is possible that 
participants may have adjusted their replies to take account of this background. Third, as the 
thesis discusses, the power balance between different groups of officials within the national 
bureaucracy influences a country’s approach to tax treaty negotiations. In many developing 
countries, the decision about whether or not to negotiate a tax treaty is made by the ministry 
of finance, while the tax treaty specialists – those who attend international meetings – reside 
in the revenue authority. For this reason, not all the tax treaty officials interviewed, despite 
being implementers, were privy to the decision-making process that produced their 
negotiating mandate. Fourth, developing country tax authorities experience a high turnover 
of staff, and as a consequence, a significant number of negotiators interviewed had not been 
involved in even relatively recent negotiations. 
Despite these limitations, the practical opportunity of an opportunity to speak with a large 
number of officials involved in the treaty-making process at international meetings was 
unique, and a number of mitigating factors help to address this potential bias. First, and most 
importantly, the task in this section of the thesis is merely proof of concept: my aim here is 
to demonstrate that the proposed mechanisms play a non-trivial role in tax treaty diffusion, 
not to draw any conclusions about their relative importance beyond this. This “how much” 
question is better addressed through the inclusion of a quantitative methodology within the 
formal testing approach outlined in chapter 6.7 Second, a degree of triangulation was 
possible within the interview methodology. Triangulation techniques included speaking 
independently with negotiators who had experience across the table from each other, 
speaking with more than one official from the same country, and using field visits to focus 
on interviews with stakeholders who did not participate in international tax meetings, in 
particular in finance ministries and the private sector. Third, it was also possible to 
triangulate between interview and observation data and other sources of information on the 
negotiating experience or practices of countries. Information was drawn from countries’ 
official statements about policy towards tax treaties, both in written form and from 
parliamentary transcripts, and from a number of unofficial accounts of the negotiating 
process. In addition, one source of material that provided useful data, some of which were 
also used as a basis for discussion in interviews, is the Public Library of US Diplomacy 
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which maintains a database of US diplomatic cables, including both a historical archive from 
the 1970s, and the more recent cables leaked to Wikileaks.8 Searches of the more recent 
cables for “tax treaty” and “double taxation” yielded 232 results, mostly cables recording 
discussions between finance ministers or officials and US diplomats. 
4.2 Diffusion theory: an overview 
At its most broad and simple, policy diffusion means that “the policy choices of one country 
are shaped by the choices of others.”9 Viewed more mechanistically, the term can refer to 
“the process by which institutions, practices, behaviors, or norms are transmitted between 
individuals and/or between social systems.”10 Its roots can be traced back as far back as 
1889, to remarks made by Sir Francis Galton at the Royal Anthropological Institute 
concerning the difficulty of distinguishing between cross-cultural similarities that emerged 
independently, and those that emerged because they had been transmitted in some way from 
one cultural unit to another.11 Before reaching international relations literature, the 
phenomenon of ‘policy transfer’ was understood within comparative politics as when 
“knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one 
political setting (past or present) is used in development of policies, administrative 
arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political setting.”12 
Policy diffusion is defined here as the underlying mechanism(s) driving an observed 
convergence in policies, not the convergence itself.13 The literature gives a menu of possible 
mechanisms, certain scope conditions for their effectiveness, and some methodological 
techniques associated with measuring and testing each. Mechanisms of policy diffusion are 
usually divided into four categories: emulation, learning, competition and coercion.14 The 
key objective of most contributions in the literature has been to identify which of these 
mechanisms have resulted in particular instances of policy diffusion. Diffusion studies 
commonly use cross-country event history models, in which the unit of analysis is the 
country-year or, in the case of bilateral treaties, the dyad-year.15 The particular innovation of 
                                                     
8 Wikileaks, “Public Library of US Diplomacy.” 
9 Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett, “The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion, 
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10 Welsh, “Inter-Nation Interaction and Political Diffusion: Notes toward a Conceptual Framework,” 3. Cited in 
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359. 
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12 Dolowitz and Marsh, “Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in Contemporary Policy-Making.” 
13 Gilardi, “Transnational Diffusion: Norms, Ideas, and Policies.” 
14 Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett, “The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion, 
Competition, or Learning?” 
15 For example, Simmons and Elkins, “The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International 
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these studies is the introduction of spatial lags: the occurrence of the same event in other 
countries is used as an independent variable, but is weighted according to “distance” 
measures that model the different diffusion effects. An early example that serves as a 
template for many subsequent diffusion studies examines competing explanations for the 
diffusion of economic liberalisation policies. The spatial lags used in that study are shown in 
Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2: Examples of spatial lag variables in a diffusion study 
Diffusion mechanism Spatial lag 
Competition  For export markets Similarity of trade relationships 
Similarity of basket of products exported 
For capital Similarity of bond ratings 
Similarity of ‘education and infrastructure 
variables’ 
Learning From high performers Adoption by countries in top growth decile 
From countries with which 
information is more likely 
to be shared 
Shared membership of trade agreements and 
bilateral investment treaties 
Cross-border business contacts 
Cross-border telephone traffic 
Emulation Of countries with 
‘perceived similarity of 
values and shared ideas’ 
Common language 
Common religion 
Common colonial heritage 
Of global norms Mean global adoption 
Source: Based on Simmons & Elkins16 
Zachary Elkins and colleagues modify this method to examine the diffusion of bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs).17 They find a significant effect from the variables that attempt to 
measure diffusion effects through competition and coercion when measured through 
recourse to IMF loans. Emulation effects, measured through various common cultural 
characteristics, are only significant in the case of religion. There is no evidence for learning, 
measured through variables that capture the effect of the available evidence of BITs on FDI. 
4.2.1 Critical reflections in the diffusion literature 
Since this early work, the policy diffusion literature has been characterised by increasingly 
sophisticated quantitative models that seek to identify and differentiate diffusion 
mechanisms.18 Yet, there is a growing recognition that more fine-grained analysis of the 
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national-level dynamics through which diffusion occurs is needed to triangulate these large-
N results. As Fabrizio Gilardi states, “[t]he nature of diffusion processes cannot be 
elucidated satisfactorily unless broad patterns can be supported by detailed information on 
the underlying dynamics.”19 Etel Solingen, in her essay on ‘dominoes’ and ‘firewalls’, 
observes that “similar mechanisms may yield different outcomes under different domestic, 
regional, and global conditions. And different mechanisms may yield similar outcomes 
under comparable circumstances.”20 
Covadonga Meseguer and Gilardi argue that the approaches followed in diffusion research 
thus far have tended to ‘homegenise’, looking for universal explanations for global 
convergence. They suggest that diffusion mechanisms are rarely sufficient conditions for 
policy change in a given country, which limits the predictive power of diffusion theories. 
This leads them to sketch out a research agenda which includes: 
(1) why some policies diffuse faster than others; (2) why regional patterns of policy 
diffusion vary so much; (3) why partisan politics retains predictive power to explain 
some policy adoptions but not others; (4) what mechanisms of diffusion are likely to 
be influential in early as opposed to late phases of policy diffusion; and (5) how 
patterns of policy diffusion are affected by political variables.21 
The importance of regional-level dynamics is highlighted by Jason Beckfield’s study of the 
growing regionalisation of the world polity.22 David Marsh & Jason Sharman also identify a 
need for more studies at the regional level, noting that, “[t]he states of Africa, the Middle 
East and most of Asia are either considered only in so far as they are present in global data 
sets, or ignored altogether.”23 They suggest that one might expect stronger coercion, 
competition and emulation effects in developing countries, due to their greater need for 
outside support, inward investment and state legitimacy. Marsh & Sharman challenge the 
reduction of policy diffusion down to a dichotomous dependent variable, suggesting that 
frequently policies are adopted as “hybridized combinations of outside and local 
knowledge,” a view supported by Amitav Acharya, who argues that international norms are 
‘localised’ as part of the diffusion process.24 
The assumption of a constant pattern of diffusion over time, which is implied by the 
methodology used in many of these studies, also merits some scrutiny. For example, Martha 
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Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink suggest that the diffusion of particular norms reaches a 
tipping point, after which a ‘cascade’ or ‘herding’ effect may occur.25 The story of BIT 
diffusion, for example, is divided into three phases: an initial phase in which treaties with 
countries that were key sources of investment were concluded to reassure investors, 
followed by a second cascade phase characterised by the conclusion of treaties between pairs 
of countries without significant FDI flows (the Attorney General of Pakistan suggesting that 
treaties were signed “because it was fashionable to do so”) and finally a third phase in which 
treaties were concluded in more limited circumstances once their negative consequences 
began to be observed.26 The aim here, as with studies of BIT conclusions, is thus to explain 
the variations over time and across countries in the pattern of tax treaty diffusion. 
4.3 From bounded learning to bounded competition 
4.3.1 Emulation and bounded learning 
Emulation, originally referred to by Frank Dobbin and colleagues as ‘constructivism’, is the 
spread of a policy through its social acceptance as a policymaking norm.27 These authors 
identify three ways in which this might occur: its adoption by countries which are seen as 
exemplars by others, its promulgation as a policy norm by expert groups even in the absence 
of an exemplar, and the adoption of a policy by countries sharing economic, social, political 
or cultural similarities. Much attention in the literature is focused on how norms reach a 
‘tipping point’ beyond which they become ‘standards of appropriate behaviour’, effectively 
the default behaviour for states.28 
Policy learning is distinguished from emulation in that it requires a change in policymakers’ 
beliefs about cause and effect, rather than their adoption of a norm because it is seen as 
appropriate behaviour. This distinction from emulation is clear if learning is rational, based 
on Bayesian updating, in which decision-making is a function of all the information 
available to decision-makers. In contrast, learning may also be modelled as ‘bounded’, in 
which case information is processed through a cognitive-psychological framework, 
employing cognitive shortcuts and heuristics that privilege certain pieces of information and 
downplay others.29 
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Such a bounded rationality framework builds on several of the classic diffusion and 
socialisation mechanisms, adding insights from behavioural economics, in particular 
‘prospect theory’, which argues that people making decisions under uncertainty employ 
‘heuristics’ as shortcuts to evaluate information.30 Kurt Weyland suggests that the typical 
characteristics of policy diffusion, as typified by Latin American pension reforms, cannot be 
explained by a fully rational learning approach, and require the insights of cognitive 
heuristics. First, the adoption of near-identical policies by countries with diverse needs and 
contexts implies that policymakers have not studied their own problems and all potential 
solutions in detail. Second, the geographic clustering seen in diffusion demonstrates that 
policymakers pay more attention to reforms adopted by countries close to home, rather than 
evaluating the full range of alternatives from around the globe. Finally, the typical S-shaped 
diffusion pattern seems inconsistent with a rational approach: the rapid upsurge in the 
middle of the pattern “deviates from rational learning, which requires a careful cost-benefit 
analysis that considers a longer track record,” while the eventual levelling out is also hard to 
explain because “the more countries adopt a promising innovation, the greater the 
competitive pressure on laggards to follow suit. Accordingly, diffusion should follow an 
exponential curve.”31 
Prospect theory introduces three heuristics used by people as shortcuts when evaluating 
information. First, the availability heuristic causes people to overvalue information that is 
more striking, for example because it is simpler to understand, or more dramatic. Weyland 
suggests that this explains the undue weight given to examples that are geographically 
proximate. Alternatively, policymakers might look more favourably on the evidence about a 
policy that conforms to their ideological preferences, in comparison to a policy that 
contradicts them.32 Second, through the representativeness heuristic, people tend to 
overestimate how generalisable the information gleaned from a small number of 
observations is. This would explain the explosive nature of the early stages of diffusion: 
after a certain point, the ‘informational cascade’ reaches a tipping point at which point 
countries stop accumulating new information, and decide to adopt the policy.33 Finally, the 
anchoring heuristic is the mechanism by which the stickiness of an initial piece of 
information biases further analyses, which would be the reason for isomorphism in policy 
diffusion.  
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Clearly, the boundary between emulation and bounded learning is blurred: in effect, the 
availability and representativeness heuristics result in a mechanism whereby countries 
‘learn’ by observing the actions of other countries that they are predisposed to emulate, 
rather than the results of those actions. Chang Lee and David Strang demonstrate a 
combination of emulation and learning in the example of changes in the size of the public 
sector in OECD countries.34 The emulation effect is based on the strength of trading 
relationship between countries, as well as a specific ‘follow the leader’ emulation of policy 
shifts by the US. That the adoption of a policy by ‘great powers’ is more likely to lead to 
diffusion than its adoption by other countries is a long-held suggestion in diffusion literature, 
often traced from the game theory model of ‘Stackelberg leadership’, in which a leader firm 
moves first, and is followed by other market participants.35 As Harvey Starr writes, “[t]he 
key issue in the study of diffusion is where the stimulus for emulation comes from.”36  
The emulation effect found by Lee and Strang is not dependent on what impact the adoption 
of reforms had in other countries, merely on the fact of them having been adopted; but they 
also observe a learning effect, which is dependent on the outcomes. Learning, the authors 
argue, is mediated by an ‘interpretive frame’, or belief that downsizing will encourage 
economic growth.37 Information that is consistent with this frame appears more ‘available’ 
than information that is not: changes to public sector size that are followed by changes in 
economic performance in the direction supported by the theory lead to public sector 
downsizing in other countries; changes that have a null or an opposite effect to that 
anticipated do not lead to increases in the size of the public sector. 
Nathan Jensen and René Lindstadt also demonstrate the cognitive mediation of a learning 
effect within OECD countries, in the case of corporate tax policy. They show that 
corporation tax cuts by right-leaning governments are not associated with diffusion effects to 
other countries, but that cuts by left-leaning governments trigger similar measures in other 
countries. This supports the argument that a policy decision taken against a government’s 
expected preference "communicates important information about the viability" of that 
policy.38 On the other hand, political leaders may have more or less motivation to learn from 
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others, depending on their natural disposition to implement a policy, in which case the level 
of accountability within the political system may mediate any learning effect.39 
The S-shaped curve discussed by Weyland is very visible for bilateral investment treaty 
diffusion, and the particulars of the BIT story seem to fit his hypothesis: at first, countries 
were quick to copy each other without a detailed consideration of the costs and benefits of 
signing BITs, then stopped once policymakers realised the costs could be significant.40 
Lauge Poulsen uses the availability heuristic to explain this pattern: developing countries 
entered into treaties without fully anticipating their consequences, because these 
consequences were remote and had lower salience, in comparison to the signal sent by their 
neighbours forging ahead with BIT signatures; they were slow to realise the implications for 
themselves when other countries experienced investor-state claims, especially when these 
claims were outside their own region, because the examples were, again, less salient.41 
Diffusion through bounded learning may include social knowledge, premised on the 
development of a policy consensus among elites, such as the theory of downsizing in Lee 
and Strang’s example, or of pension reform in Weyland’s. Learning may also be channelled 
through organisations and networks, for example mutual membership of international 
organisations.42 In several studies of different economic policy diffusion, Xun Cao finds that 
shared participation in intergovernmental organisations leads to diffusion through the 
“natural affinity” between members of the same intergovernmental organisation, as well as 
through policy learning.43 Brian Greenhill shows a similar for effect for human rights norms, 
whereby a state’s compliance is associated with that of its fellow intergovernmental 
organisation members.44 As the network of intergovernmental organisations becomes more 
fragmented, regionalised, and increasingly divided on core/periphery lines, patterns of 
diffusion through emulation and learning may be expected to become more heterogeneous.45 
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4.3.2 Emulation and bounded competition 
Under economic competition, strategic interaction between countries causes them to adopt 
policies in order to make them relatively more attractive to foreign investment, or to gain 
relatively more favourable access to export markets. This may lead to the diffusion of 
particular policies among countries competing with each other, or to the adoption of 
different policies in order to compete. Although Weyland and Poulsen situate their 
discussions of bounded rationality within the learning category of diffusion mechanisms, 
competition in diffusion need not presume perfectly rational behaviour. This may be so in at 
least three ways. First, in the choice of policy: the government of one country may respond 
to the adoption of a particular investment-promotion policy in a competitor country by 
adopting it, perhaps ignoring doubts about its efficacy because of a fear of losing 
investment. This may be a rational choice to take a risk-averse approach in the absence of 
evidence, a mechanism that has been described as ‘rational emulation’.46 Jensen argues that 
at the US state level, tax incentives are used by governments, even when their effectiveness 
is questionable, as a credit-claiming device.47 
It may also, in the language of prospect theory, be based on cognitive heuristics. States 
compete with each other over corporation tax, but there is evidence to suggest that such 
competition is far from purely rational. The literature on business power describes 
competition to attract or retain inward investment as a manifestation of businesses’ 
‘structural power’.48 Recent attempts to study structural power in practice have found that 
what matters is the perception of business power, more than the reality; indeed, different 
perceptions of the disinvestment threat among different actors in a country can lead to 
different preferences.49 
Second, the choice of competitor country may be imperfectly rational. Quantitative models 
define competitor countries objectively, based on economic statistics (similarity in trade 
patterns, bond ratings, and infrastructure characteristics in Table 4.2, for example) and hence 
implicitly assume that policymakers apply a similarly evidence-based approach to 
determining the countries with which they compete. Any strategic interaction with countries 
outside this pool would thus be categorised as emulation (by definition non-rational) or 
learning. Yet, just as with learning, the logic of competition may also apply in a boundedly 
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rational way, in which information about the actions of certain countries is more ‘available’ 
than others, regardless of the extent to which they are actually in competition with each 
other. 
Finally, policymakers in a state may have an imperfect understanding of the relationship 
between a particular reform and flows of trade and investment. As the example of anti-
money laundering rules shows, countries may adopt reforms on paper in order to send a 
signal to other countries and to investors, without real commitment to enforcing them.50 In 
corporation tax, policymakers’ focus on the headline rate of tax may differ from businesses’ 
interest in the effective rate, which is determined by more obscure factors such as capital 
allowances.51 
The possibility of bounded rationality in the operation of competition mechanisms is 
specifically excluded by many quantitative methodological designs, which identify 
competitive pressure by analysing objective economic variables, assuming that policymakers 
with a competitive mentality have done the same. For example, Simmons and Elkins 
examine the determinants of capital account, current account and exchange rate 
liberalisation, finding that economic competition drives the diffusion of such policies.52 
Elkins and colleagues find that potential host governments seem more motivated to sign 
BITs when countries whose exports compete in similar third markets, and countries whose 
economic fundamentals make them comparably “attractive” to investors have done so.53 It is 
possible that what is captured by emulation variables such as linguistic similarity and 
geographic proximity is not pure emulation, but rather competition employing cognitive 
heuristics to identify competitors. Thus, the conceptual boundaries popularly used in the 
policy diffusion literature may obscure more complex mechanisms, which can be more 
readily uncovered using qualitative research. 
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4.4 Competition and bounded rationality in the diffusion 
of tax treaties 
There is a widespread assumption that tax treaty diffusion is due to competition between 
developing countries for inward investment.54 As discussed in chapter 3, there are a number 
of reasons why policymakers in developing countries might expect a tax treaty to attract 
inward investment (double tax relief, tax sparing clauses, lower effective tax rates, signalling 
effects and credible commitments) but there are also strong reasons to question any 
anticipated benefits. In contrast, the tax costs are certain and significant. This opens up the 
possibility that any such competition may be underpinned by ‘bounded’ rationality.  
The technically complex, obscure and low-salience nature of tax treaties makes them an 
ideal candidate for bounded rationality: the simplicity of the idea that tax treaties will attract 
investment by eliminating double taxation contrasts with their complex nature and uncertain 
effects. Non-specialists cannot themselves assess the likely effects of tax treaties, and would 
need to rely on specialist officials, yet evidence suggests that they do not seek out the 
information that these officials could provide, or that these officials lack sufficient specialist 
knowledge to advise. According to a former technical adviser to Rwanda, which has 
renegotiated its treaty with Mauritius, the original agreement was "a classic case of 
somebody negotiating something they don't understand."55 A technical adviser at an 
international organisation observed that developing countries often have contradictory 
policies within their tax code, some of which are designed to maximise revenue, and others 
to give it away with the idea of attracting investment. “It’s at that political, strategic level 
that more could be done” to improve such coherence.56 
Although in one case a negotiator described having been asked by her finance ministry for 
an impact assessment, in many cases there is no detailed consideration of the costs and 
benefits by the developing country concerned, and no policy on which to base decisions.57 
One negotiator told me that “we are thinking that we should have a policy.”58 Another said 
that her country had sought advice from international organisations on conducting impact 
assessments, and been told it was impossible.59 Furthermore, a high turnover of staff means 
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a lack of institutional memory, illustrated by the fact that negotiators were rarely aware of 
the considerations around treaties that they themselves had not worked on.60 
Most of the negotiators from developing countries interviewed, who would be most likely to 
understand the situations in which investors would benefit from treaties, did not share the 
view they would attract investment, even when they did recognise that foreign investors into 
their country faced some double taxation. Eleven negotiators from developing countries 
expressed a clear opinion about the impact of treaties on investment when asked directly. Of 
these, four said treaties were not pursued in order to attract investment, four said that they 
were, and three emphasised the risk of saying no to a treaty, regardless of the evidence base. 
The sceptical views are illustrated by the quotes reproduced in Table 4.3. 
 
 Table 4.3: Quotes from developing country negotiators 
A treaty is not a central factor to promote investment, it’s more to eliminate 
double taxation.61 
I would agree that a DTA is not a major factor driving investment.62 
I know that there’s a position that these treaties affect FDI, but I think it’s not 
right.63 
Most of the time developing countries are disadvantaged by treaties. Treaties do 
not attract investment. It is other factors.64 
Source: Author’s own 
Other negotiators saw the matter differently, but their views were expressed more 
emotionally than factually. “We do have the idea that it will attract investment,” said one.65 
The other, from a much less developed country, said, “you must understand that we are 
afraid of losing investment. We are a poor country and we’re at the bottom of the pile.”66 
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A private sector interviewee explained that a request to a company’s home country 
government for a tax treaty with a country in which it was considering an investment would 
rarely be the deciding factor in an investment decision, but that it would come into play 
when evaluating the potential return on an investment, as a potential upside risk.67 While a 
few interviewees pointed to real examples of double taxation in developing countries in the 
absence of tax treaties,68 the consensus appeared to be that these examples were unlikely to 
be material to foreign direct investment decisions, or limited to a small subset of investors. 
One way to verify whether the active pursuit of tax treaties by developing countries has been 
underpinned by an understanding of their actual tax effects is to look for evidence that 
requests received by developed countries from developing countries coincided with interest 
from investors. If they did not, this would indicate that the absence of a treaty was unlikely 
to have been an impediment to investment flows. Because developed countries’ tax treaty 
policymaking is quite sensitive to multinational companies’ needs, and since the sacrifice of 
taxing rights entailed by a treaty is largely by the developing country, a developed country’s 
response to a request for a tax treaty is generally quite indicative of whether or not a treaty 
will really resolve problems that are preventing investment.  
According to one former treaty negotiator in a developed country, “requests come from 
developing countries and may wait for years before there’s a response.”69 Another told me 
that this experience “is true to some extent, but our in-tray is not large.”70 As Allison 
Christians observes, when examining the legal consequences of the absence of a tax treaty 
between Ghana and the United States: 
in today’s global tax climate, a typical tax treaty would not provide significant tax 
benefits to current or potential investors. Consequently, there is little incentive for 
these investors to pressure the U.S. government to conclude tax treaties with many 
LDCs… even if concluded, these treaties would not have a significant impact on cross- 
border investment and trade. 71 
US diplomatic cables dated between 2004 and 2010 give a number of examples of 
developing countries seeking treaties with the US. These include Vietnam, Hungary, Brunei, 
Croatia, Azerbaijan, Jordan, Malaysia, Libya, Honduras and Turkmenistan.72 In most of 
these cases, no treaty has since been signed with the US, and correspondence in the cables 
suggests that US reluctance was because US multinationals did not consider these treaties 
necessary. For example, a ‘scenesetter’ for an Assistant Secretary of State ahead of a March 
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2007 visit to Macedonia noted that while that government wanted to sign a tax treaty with 
the US during official visits later in the year, US businesses did not see any need for it: 
Regarding the double taxation issue, we are studying the Macedonian draft proposal 
and have advised the MFA that action on such agreements would require strong 
lobbying from US companies doing business in Macedonia, which has not yet been 
the case.73 
In December 2006, the US Ambassador met with the Croatian Foreign Minister, noting “that 
the Barr Labs $2.5 billion takeover of Pliva Pharmaceuticals may spur interest in concluding 
a double taxation treaty between the US and Croatia, and said he would be urging 
Washington to take a fresh look.”74 Records of meetings with senior US Treasury officials 
illustrate this line consistently. In 2007, Croatia’s finance minister was told that 
“investments, such as Barr, will help make Croatia a higher priority” for a tax treaty.75 The 
following year, Qatar’s Finance and Economy Minister was informed that, 
the [US Government] has limited resources to negotiate treaties and therefore has 
certain core requirements that would need to be addressed following consultation with 
U.S. companies to ensure that the proposed treaty would, in fact, address specific 
problems.76 
In some instances, then, the governments of developing countries have sought tax treaties 
despite (or in the absence of) analysis of their own expert officials about the likely impact of 
the treaty, or against these officials’ views about an appropriate negotiating position. The 
response from developed countries, where tax treaty policy may be supported by a greater 
awareness of the likely impacts, has sometimes been to delay or decline such requests. 
4.5 Scope condition: fiscal cost salience 
The story of tax treaty diffusion is at first sight a harder case to explain through bounded 
rationality than BITs, the costs of which are only incurred if an investor makes a claim 
against the state at some point in the future.77 Many of the costs of tax treaties are immediate 
and significant: withholding tax revenue is reduced from the moment the tax treaty comes 
into force, and can be estimated in advance (although in interviews it became apparent that 
such forecasts are rarely made). Some other, larger, costs do emerge later and may be 
unanticipated, in particular capital gains charges, which have been the subject of legal 
disputes in countries such as Uganda years after a treaty was signed. The costs of tax treaty 
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shopping, too, follow later, as investors construct tax planning structures using the new 
treaty.78 Furthermore, the growth in tax treaty diffusion has yet to level off. Even countries 
for which significant negative consequences of treaty conclusion have clearly become 
apparent have not generally stopped signing tax treaties, choosing instead to cancel or 
renegotiate some problematic treaties and carry on negotiating new ones.79 In addition to 
this, there is substantial variation between the number of tax treaties signed by countries 
under similar competitive pressure.80 
This poses the question: what scope conditions determine the effectiveness of the diffusion 
mechanisms discussed above? Why have some governments acted in spite of information 
about the fiscal costs, while others have not? A scope condition may be positive, increasing 
the intensity of competition, or negative, acting as a ‘firewall’. In the tax competition 
literature, the focus has been on the ideological and institutional constraints on 
governments.81 Scott Basinger and Mark Hallerberg find that political costs faced by a 
government in the form of veto players and ideological opposition reduce the likelihood that 
it will cut corporate taxes in response to competitive pressure: the governments of 
competitor countries take into account these political costs of their competitors in setting 
their own corporate tax rates.82 Duane Swank shows that the ‘neoliberal’ tax policies diffuse 
from the US to other countries through a process of competition for mobile capital, which is 
conditioned by national institutions: coordinated market institutions impede diffusion, and 
liberal market institutions assist it.83 Thomas Plümper and colleagues consider how domestic 
constraints affect the balance between capital and labour taxes, demonstrating that fiscal 
constraints on a government as well as prevailing norms among voters constrain capital tax 
reductions.84 The latter paper also demonstrates that competition over corporate tax rates is 
more intense between adjacent countries. Domestic stakeholders beyond the policy elite may 
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also act as agents of diffusion, rather than ‘firewalls’, if international norms diffuse to the 
domestic constituencies who shape politicians’ incentives.85 
Tax treaties, however, differ from corporate tax rates in that, while their costs are just as real, 
their visibility is lower, and the number of de facto veto points they must pass through is 
also fewer.86 In the UK parliament, tax treaties are ratified as statutory instruments through a 
delegated legislation committee, which rarely discusses them in any detail and has never 
declined to ratify a treaty.87 In Canada, legislative scrutiny is similarly cursory.88 In Uganda, 
tax treaties are laid before parliament, but only for information purposes, and in Denmark, 
parliamentary approval was only introduced in the last few years.89 This lack of engagement 
by political actors illustrates that tax treaties are not clearly identified with any ideological 
positioning, most likely because they are regarded as serving a primarily administrative 
function. Furthermore, they reduce taxes on capital, which is generally considered a 
preference of the right, but they are also regarded as tools for investment promotion, which 
is a preference of the left in developing countries. There is no identifiable political 
constituency likely to oppose tax treaties, which may explain why they are rarely 
controversial.90 A government’s preference for concluding tax treaties is therefore unlikely 
in most cases to be impeded by vetoes imposed by its domestic constituencies or within the 
political system (chapter 5 will discuss how conflict between political and bureaucratic 
actors may occur at veto points). 
A more pertinent scope condition for tax treaties in developing countries is the importance 
of their fiscal costs to political actors. The ‘availability’ of this information may vary. While 
governments do not routinely collect information on the taxes foregone through their 
treaties, such information becomes apparent when NGOs or the media highlight tax 
avoidance structures that exploit tax treaties, or when a court case over eligibility to treaty 
benefits thrusts particular elements of a treaty into the limelight.91 Fiscal cost information 
may also become more ‘available’ if the underlying constraints on policy change. For 
example, political conditions may create incentives for a government to re-examine the tax 
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revenue it raises from foreign investors, either because this is a vote-winning policy, or 
because a government wants more tax revenue across-the-board to obtain autonomy from 
donors. Fiscal conditions may also influence how ‘available’ the information about fiscal 
costs is: where tax revenue is scarce, or corporate tax makes up a larger share of total 
revenue, the revenue foregone through a treaty is likely to be a bigger concern. Finally, there 
is some evidence that individual policymakers differ in their predisposition to be concerned 
about fiscal costs. In one developing country, a finance ministry official who led treaty 
negotiations explained that: 
Before we came, the leadership in treasury felt that we were going to lose a lot of tax 
revenue. The perception then was that if we enter into these treaties we are going to 
lose tax.92 
The salience of the revenue sacrifice resulting from a tax treaty in the eyes of policymakers 
who are weighing up the perceived investment/revenue trade-off is therefore an important 
scope condition for the effectiveness of diffusion through boundedly rational competition for 
inward investment. The case studies later in this thesis will illustrate that, where ministers 
and officials are very conscious of the fiscal costs, they are more likely to resist pressure to 
sign treaties, whereas, if raising tax revenue is less of a priority, they are more likely to 
acquiesce. 
4.6 Turning the tables: tax treaties as outward investment 
promotion tools 
So far, consistent with the existing literature on tax treaties and also BIT diffusion, I have 
focused entirely on competition among capital importing countries. I now turn to another 
possibility, that competitive pressure might act on capital exporting countries, driving them 
to seek tax treaties with developing countries. Mark Manger has argued with respect to 
preferential trade agreements that, 
concentrated interests in FDI-exporting countries have a strong incentive to lobby for 
preferential agreements because they confer specific advantages over competitors. To 
be politically attractive, these agreements must have a discriminatory effect on trade 
and investment with non-members.93 
Such a position is certainly logical for tax treaties, which provide a tax advantage to firms 
investing outward into the treaty partner over their competitors from countries where such a 
treaty does not exist. Indeed, there is ample evidence that business lobbying, exercised in the 
home country rather than the host, has been at the origin of many tax treaties between 
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developed and developing countries. At a discussion in the Danish parliament in June 2015, 
for example, business pressure on the Danish government was very evident. A private sector 
participant stated that “Danish industry sees DTTs as an important competition parameter,” 
while Denmark’s tax minister stated that “we have several times heard expressions of 
interest regarding Nigeria, but we have been unable to get them to sign.”94  
In support of this proposition, a majority of negotiators interviewed from developing 
countries stated that their country’s pattern of treaty signatures was mainly the result of 
requests from other countries. “We’re more or less on the waiting position...they come to 
us,” one stated. 95 According to another, “normally we negotiate when we receive requests, 
and have always responded positively. It’s always a request from the other party.”96 In this 
country’s case, the treaty would only be signed and ratified once the treaty partner had 
pushed again, usually following further requests from the investor. Negotiators from two 
developing countries that had recently signed their first tax treaties indicated that, once it 
became known that they were open to concluding agreements, they had been inundated with 
requests from capital exporting countries.97 
Developed countries formulate their negotiating priorities through consultation with their 
multinational businesses. Many have an established procedure to solicit private sector input 
into their future plans for treaty-making. European treaty negotiators interviewed were all 
happy to say that their country actively solicits business input into their annual treaty 
priorities, and that this was the main factor determining those priorities, alongside other 
diplomatic and economic matters. Some typical quotes from these interviews are given in 
Table 4.4. The same applied to middle-income countries whose negotiators were 
interviewed, in respect of their treaties with lower-income countries. 
Indeed, many individual treaties are the result of lobbying by a single multinational around a 
particular investment in a developing country. Talking about a particular treaty that had been 
concluded on his company’s behalf, a business interviewee in a developed country said, “we 
were the first [to invest in that country] but they knew there would be others…If you went 
through any developing country and looked at big investments, you’d see a treaty just before 
or afterwards.”98 In Nairobi, Kenya’s 2007 tax treaty with France is widely understood 
among tax professionals from the public and private sectors to have been specifically linked 
to France Telecom’s investment in the country, although this was denied by a Treasury 
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official. “The entry of France Telecom into Telkom Kenya has yielded a tax benefit across 
all sectors with the signing of a double taxation treaty between Kenya and France,” a local 
newspaper report noted at the time.99 As another example, several interviewees from 
government and the private sector in different African and Asian countries hinted that 
certain tax treaties had been concluded in response to pressure from regional airlines. 
Table 4.4: Quotes from developed country negotiators 
When we agree our treaty negotiation programme the main concern is how it is going 
to benefit [our] companies.100 
It’s a matter of competition: we’re a small country.101 
We do have a treaty with [an African country] because at that time we had a 
construction company [investing there].102 
[If a competitor is from a treaty country] this will make it impossible for [our 
company] to compete.103 
Source: Author’s own 
Of the negotiators from developing countries who gave a direct answer to the question, nine 
claimed to have a predominantly passive role in the initiation of negotiations, while only one 
said that they usually requested negotiations with capital exporting countries. Outside of 
Latin America, all the negotiators that I spoke with indicated that they never decline requests 
for tax treaties from developed countries, except from tax havens. “We never reject a request 
for negotiation. This has something to do with diplomacy and international relations,” said 
one African negotiator.104 Several did indicate that responses to some requests might be 
deliberately stalled – for example if it was politically necessary to conclude treaties in a 
certain order.105 
Tax treaties are, therefore, frequently initiated at the behest of outward investors, via their 
home states, rather than by host country governments seeking to attract inward investment. 
Developing countries usually accept these requests to negotiate for a variety of reasons: a 
positive but passive attitude to tax treaties, diplomatic necessity, lack of capacity to analyse 
the costs and benefits, or simply because they are following the path of least resistance.  
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4.7 Coercion 
If the advantages of tax treaties accrue predominantly to the developed country signatory, 
and in many instances it is the actions of that developed country that lead to the initiation of 
negotiations, this sheds a different light on why developing countries may have been willing 
– and even enthusiastic – to sign tax treaties. The organising concept in this case is 
‘coercion’, defined broadly in diffusion studies and sometimes excluded on the grounds that 
it is a hierarchical process through which a third party changes states’ incentives, rather than 
their preferences.106 In Dobbin and colleagues’ framework, however, three coercive 
mechanisms exist: changing material incentives through either conditionality or the 
formation of a policy consensus around a policy leader, and the influence of ‘hegemonic 
ideas’. “What unites these studies,” they say, “is their focus on the influence of an external 
source of pressure or ideas.”107 
There is only very limited evidence of explicit conditionality associated with tax treaties. For 
example, several negotiators indicated, always about other countries rather than themselves, 
that Spain had threatened to withdraw tax-related technical assistance, and even aid funds, as 
part of treaty negotiations.108 British civil servants discussed using aid as leverage to obtain 
tax treaties in principle, but there is no evidence that they did so in practice.109 
There are more examples of developed countries insisting on a tax treaty as a quid pro quo 
for some other form of agreement. A US embassy cable from 2009 outlines Colombia’s 
pursuit of free trade agreements (FTAs): 
According to the [Government of Colombia], Japan has insisted on negotiating a BIT 
[bilateral investment treaty] (fourth negotiation round is in late November), followed 
by a DTT [double taxation treaty], before it will begin FTA [free trade agreement] 
negotiations with Colombia.110  
In 2007, Argentina requested a Tax Information Exchange Agreement (TIEA) with the US. 
This is a kind of abridged tax treaty that would allow Argentina to obtain information about 
its citizens’ US tax affairs, to help in investigations of potential tax evasion. The US 
responded by stating that it was only willing to discuss a full tax treaty, which would give 
Argentina the same information, but would also require Argentina to surrender some of its 
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tax base to the US.111 This led to a stalemate, which has yet to be resolved. According to the 
Commissioner General of the Kenya Revenue Authority, Kenya received a similar response 
when it requested a TIEA with Singapore.112 
The second form of coercion, policy leadership, occurs when a country or bloc with market 
power takes an action that changes incentives for other market actors – whether deliberately 
or not. Thus, since OECD countries have all adopted a common approach to international 
taxation based on bilateral tax treaties, developing countries have an incentive to do the 
same. Eduardo Baistrocchi frames these advantages using the concept of a network market, 
which creates three types of network effects that incentivise adoption of a particular policy 
instrument: positive externalities, whereby the detailed elaboration of model tax treaties and 
case law on their implementation reduces the transaction costs for other countries choosing 
to adopt them, and for taxpayers operating in those countries; an expectation among market 
actors that countries will follow the lead of the OECD countries; and ‘lock-in’ effects, a 
similar concept to path dependency in which the existing regime has significant sunk costs 
that make it difficult for new, incompatible entrants to the market to gain ground, even if 
they have advantages over the existing technology.113 In practical terms, this explains why 
developing countries might face a binary choice – sign OECD-type tax treaties or not at all – 
rather than develop an alternative approach. Such an alternative was formulated by the 
community of Andean nations and signed in 1971, but failed to gain a foothold because 
OECD member states refused to use it as the basis of negotiation.114 
Finally, coercion through hegemonic ideas refers to how “dominant ideas become 
rationalized, often with elegant theoretical justifications, and influence how policy makers 
conceptualize their problems and order potential solutions.”115 Norms emerge within a social 
hierarchy of states, and their association with this hierarchy is important: a norm may be 
more likely to spread in a universal way if it is associated with the behaviour of an 
‘advanced’ state.116 David Rosenbloom, a former US tax treaty negotiator, famously stated 
that many developing countries regarded tax treaties as a “badge of international economic 
respectability.”117 Arianne Pickering, a former Australian treaty negotiator, concurs that, 
                                                     
111 US Embassy cables 07BUENOSAIRES1795, Mon, 10 Sep 2007, and 07BUENOSAIRES2241, Tue, 20 Nov 
2007 
112 Commissioner General John Njiraini, speech at Strathmore University, Nairobi, 12 September 2013. 
113 Baistrocchi, “The Use and Interpretation of Tax Treaties in the Emerging World: Theory and Implications.” 
114 Ibid.; Goldberg, “Conventions for the Elimination of International Double Taxation: Toward a Developing 
Country Model.” 
115 Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett, “The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion, 
Competition, or Learning?,” 456. 
116 Towns, “Norms and Social Hierarchies: Understanding International Policy Diffusion ‘From Below.’” 
117 Annual institute on federal taxation. 
Chapter 4 Turning the tables: competition for inward and outward investment 
102 
 
a country may want to signal to the global economy and potential investors that it is a 
responsible member of the international tax community that is willing and able to 
conform with widely-accepted tax rules and norms.118 
By concluding a tax treaty for broader reputational reasons, policymakers may therefore be 
acting in a purely rational incentive-driven way, making a conscious instrumental 
calculation based on a logic of consequences. Alternatively, they may be following a logic 
of appropriateness, taking for granted a norm that associates tax treaties with the way 
‘advanced’ countries behave.119  
Dobbin and colleagues emphasize that some combination of international organisations, 
epistemic communities and policy entrepreneurs is usually required to construct the 
conceptual framework supporting an idea, even if it subsequently gains hegemonic status 
because of its endorsement by powerful actors.120 The chapter that follows this one considers 
how such processes have created diffusion by shaping the ideas of tax specialists; here we 
are interested in how policymakers who rely on heuristics in place of specialist knowledge 
might be ‘coerced’ by a hegemonic idea, that a tax treaty will attract investment, with origins 
elsewhere. 
While conditionality and policy leadership were mechanisms premised on shifts in 
incentives that would alter how a fully rational decision maker acted, such a mechanism of 
ideational hegemony is fully consistent with a bounded learning, bounded competition, or 
emulation account.  Indeed, Jason Sharman suggests that the nexus between coercion and 
other diffusion processes is under-studied: 
By understating the power-based character of mimicry, scholars have also understated 
to a significant degree the proposition that, at least for the developing world, policy 
diffusion by mimicry is often a coercive process. 121 
He suggests that governments in developing countries may emulate others in adopting 
reforms associated with being ‘developed’, regardless of the content of those reforms, “to 
show peers and reassure policy-makers themselves that they are in line with shared 
values.”122 To quote Kurt Weyland, writing within the bounded learning framework, 
“governments dread the stigma of backwardness and therefore eagerly adopt policy 
innovations, regardless of functional needs.”123 
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4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter illustrated one manner in which the tax treaties myth has contributed to 
diffusion to developing countries, by shaping the preferences of non-specialist actors. The 
idea that, by eliminating double taxation, tax treaties will attract investment acted as a 
‘cognitive shortcut’ in a boundedly-rational decision making process. Tax treaties are a 
harder case to explain through bounded rationality than bilateral investment treaties, because 
their costs are immediate and foreseeable. Thus, the ‘availability’ of information about these 
costs is critical to the bounded rationality framework. When governments are less dependent 
on corporate tax revenue as part of their income, concerns about fiscal costs may be less 
salient, which means that such information may be less cognitively ‘available’ than it is for 
countries where raising more tax revenue is a major concern. 
For a tax treaty to be concluded, two countries must agree, yet the diffusion literature on 
bilateral treaties focuses overwhelmingly on the capital importers. As a tool for attracting 
inward investment, a tax treaty is an odd choice, because it has the distorting effect of 
lowering tax costs for foreign investors from one country in comparison to those from other 
countries in the host country market. In contrast, for capital exporting countries, the effect of 
that distortion is to give their outward investors a competitive advantage in the developing 
country over investors from other countries. For this reason, and as the evidence provided 
showed, it is commonly capital exporters who initiate tax treaty negotiations, not capital 
importing developing countries.  
Two of the mechanisms of ‘coercion’ in the diffusion literature offer explanations for why a 
developing country would respond positively to a request from a developed country. First, 
policy leadership among OECD states creates incentives for other countries to sign treaties 
that are compatible with their approach to international tax. Second, the ‘hegemonic idea’ of 
the tax treaties myth, or even that signing tax treaties is what advanced countries do, 
permeate analysis of tax treaties in developing countries. Having focused on ideas about tax 
treaties among policymakers who do not have a deep specialism in the subject, the next 
chapter shifts focus to international tax specialists, for whom tax treaties serve an altogether 
different purpose.  
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5 Expert authority in the diffusion of tax 
treaties 
Rob Marris:  I congratulate the Minister on the width of his expertise on taxation in Senegal on 
cinematographic matters. It is most impressive.   
Mr Gauke:  I am grateful. It is recently acquired expertise—[ Laughter ].  
- ‘Debate’ on ratification of the UK-Senegal tax treaty in the UK parliament, 20151 
 
Since the origins of the international model treaties with the League of Nations, and the 
negotiation of some of the earliest bilateral agreements, tax treaties have primarily been the 
project of a community of international tax practitioners, who share common educational 
and professional backgrounds, meet each other regularly, share in the performance of 
negotiations among states or between states and businesses, and have a vested interest in 
protecting the internal coherence of what they see as a technical project against political 
interference.2 This chapter turns the attention from mechanisms that act on policy makers 
with little familiarity with tax treaties, and on to this community of international tax 
specialists. 
Whereas the tax treaties myth leads non-specialists to seek treaties as a way of stimulating 
investment by lowering investors’ tax costs, those with detailed technical knowledge take a 
different view. For them, tax treaties transmit a series of procedural and content rules 
concerning the taxation of investors, from the authors of model treaties – a community of 
specialists revolving around the OECD – to the signatory countries. They regard the creation 
of a consistent global approach to taxation modelled on OECD standards as a long-term 
project to enhance trade and investment flows, a public good to be diffused as widely as 
possible, reducing the negative effects of international fiscal anarchy.3  
To the extent that these rules lower the risk-adjusted tax cost to investors, this could be 
conceptualised as a more nuanced version of the tax competition mechanisms discussed in 
the previous chapter: firms protected by tax treaties’ reference to international standards 
incur an advantage over others who are not. However, competition premised on the diffusion 
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of international standards and competition premised on lower short-run tax rates do not 
always produce the same preferences, either in terms of treaty partners or the content of tax 
treaties. Furthermore, members of the international tax community do not necessarily 
support a form of competition that applies its standards as a private good, to benefit only 
investors between treaty signatory countries. They take a more sceptical view about the 
likely impact of any one tax treaty on investment flows. 
This chapter argues that the development of different levels of technical knowledge within a 
country can create a negative interaction. Conflict between the preferences of two groups 
within a country – specialists and non-specialists – can block diffusion driven by one or the 
other group. Specialists may seek to block the negotiation of tax treaties motivated by short 
term investment gains, and they may seek to negotiate treaties in which non-specialists have 
little interest. There is evidence that, as dedicated international tax officials build their 
technical knowledge about tax treaties, they can become more sceptical about the benefits, 
and more aware of the costs, of tax treaties to their countries. The control that specialists and 
non-specialists have over veto points in the treaty making process becomes an important 
scope condition for tax treaty diffusion. 
The chapter begins by describing the roles of different groups of stakeholders in the process 
of tax treaty formation, including the international processes through which model treaties 
are formulated. It then describes the international tax epistemic community responsible for 
both the model treaties and bilateral negotiations. The chapter then includes some specific 
discussion of the OECD and United Nations, two international forums in which the 
processes of intersubjective knowledge generation take place. 
5.1 The international tax epistemic community 
An epistemic community is “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge 
within that domain or issue.”4 Despite the general failure of the concept of epistemic 
communities to inform significant analytical advances in international relations,5 it seems 
inescapable here, and has been evoked by numerous writers discussing the making of 
international tax standards.6 The international tax community is characterised by a core 
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group of senior tax professionals based in tax authorities, finance ministries, multinational 
businesses, business services firms, academia and international organisations. These 
professionals interact regularly at numerous international meetings and conferences, and 
within international organisations.7 
Epistemic communities, in Peter Haas’ classic formulation, share four interconnected sets of 
ideas: normative beliefs, causal beliefs, ideas about how to evaluate knowledge claims, and a 
collective policy project.8 While the individuals within the international tax community are 
positioned on different sides of various axes of distributional conflict and several possible 
professional trainings, their frequent interactions and longstanding relationships, embedded 
within an international community that is close to 100 years old, have created just such a 
shared set of ideas. 
The process of intersubjective idea formation began in the 1920s. Both the German and 
Dutch negotiators of the controversial early 1900s tax treaty between these two countries 
were invited to join the “Committee of Technical Experts on Double Taxation and Tax 
Evasion” whose work from 1925 to 1930 led to the formulation of the first model treaty for 
the League of Nations.9 While the final report, drafted by 14 ‘experts’ from League member 
states, set the basic parameters of the OECD model treaty that became the basis of thousands 
of intergovernmental agreements,10 its preface stresses that, “although the members of the 
Committee are nominated by their respective Governments, they only speak in their capacity 
as experts, i.e., in their own name.”11 One of the participants in the early League of Nations 
work, Edwin Seligman, observed that, while at first, the technical experts’ “concern was 
                                                     
Are Enmeshed in a Trans- National Epistemic Community.” A distinct conceptualisation of the socialising 
community is ‘communities of practice’, which one of its main exponents in international relations, Emmanuel 
Adler, claims to be a broader category of which epistemic communities are just one example. Practices are 
“knowledge-constituted, meaningful patterns of socially recognized activity embedded in communities, routines 
and organizations that structure experience.” See Adler, “The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of 
Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO’s Post--Cold War Transformation.” 
7 Durst, “The Two Worlds of Transfer Pricing Policymaking”; Christians, “Networks, Norms and National Tax 
Policy.” 
8 Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” 3. The contours of one 
particular community, described in Drake and Nicolidais’s contribution to the epistemic communities themed 
issue of International Organisation, seem very similar to that of the international tax community: “The 
community's membership has two tiers. The first includes personnel from governments, international agencies, 
and private firms—individuals who work for organizations with direct interests in alternative policy solutions. In 
contrast, the second tier includes academics, lawyers, industry specialists, and journalists—individuals whose 
stakes, if any, are more purely intellectual or a matter of professional entrepreneurship. But the members of the 
first and second tiers share a conceptual framework and agenda, and this, coupled with the latter's organizational 
independence, helps legitimate the former's views in the eyes of cautious policymakers.” See Drake and 
Nicolaidis, “Ideas, Interests and Institutionalization : ‘trade in Services’ and the Uruguay Round.” 
9 League of Nations, Report of the Committee of Technical Experts on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion. 
10 Mcintyre, Bird, and Fox, “Developing Countries and International Cooperation on Income Tax Matters : An 
Historical Review”; Vogel, “Double Tax Treaties and Their Interpretation”; Rixen, Politicization and 
Institutional (Non-) Change in International Taxation. 
11 League of Nations, Report of the Committee of Technical Experts on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, 6. 
Chapter 5 Expert authority in the diffusion of tax treaties 
107 
 
primarily to enter into some arrangement which would be politically agreeable to their 
respective countries”: 
when they learned to know each other more intimately; and especially in proportion 
as they were subjected to the indefinable but friendly atmosphere of the League of 
Nations, their whole attitude changed. Suspicion was converted into confidence; doubt 
was resolved by the feeling of certainty of accomplishment; and aloofness gave way 
to warm personal friendship which contributed materially to smoothing out the 
difficulties.12 
According to Sol Picciotto, the international community created by this process of 
deliberation has played a longstanding role in international tax policy formation: 
[P]erhaps the most important outcome of the inter-war years was to begin to create a 
community of international tax specialists...a community within which ideas and 
perspectives as well as economic advantage could be traded. It was these direct 
contacts between specialists which filled the gap created by the difficulties of 
resolving by any general principles the issues of international allocation of the tax 
base of international business.13 
Today, the burden of participating in a large volume of international meetings, often in 
different capacities as members of numerous committees, is a common complaint overheard 
among these people during coffee breaks, but it is clear that close social relationships 
develop as a result. One staff member of an organisation that frequently hosts international 
tax meetings observed, “these people are friends, they stay at each other’s houses.”14 
According to a former treaty negotiator from an OECD country, participation in OECD 
meetings “was very much a club, people didn’t want to lose that gig, a really clubby 
arrangement.”15 Elements of this ‘clubbiness’ observed at international meetings include 
delegates’ habitual reference to each other in formal discussions by first name, and the 
clearly warm nature of informal discussions during breaks and over dinner. It is also clear 
that such comradeship exists principally between longstanding members of the group from 
OECD countries, the private sector and international organisations; developing country 
delegates, who are newer, attend fewer meetings per year, and generally change over 
positions more quickly, appeared at the meetings observed to interact primarily among 
themselves, and with less familiarity. In this sense, the community can be thought of as 
having a core-periphery structure, with longstanding members from OECD countries 
forming a close social group, while developing country participants occupy a satellite role. It 
is a common observation that discussions at the UN committee of experts are dominated by 
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OECD members who have coordinated their positions in advance, unlike developing country 
members who act in isolation.16 
5.1.1 Characterising the community’s ideational underpinnings 
Any characterisation of the shared ideas developed among this community must begin with 
common normative belief in the aim of eliminating double taxation.17 Although this 
originates with a causal belief – that eliminating double taxation will enhance cross-border 
trade and investment – the abhorrence of double taxation has become a principled belief 
with its own normative weight, rather than merely a means to achieve an end. The strength 
of language used in one of the original League of Nations reports illustrates this: 
Double taxation…imposes on such taxpayers burdens which, in many cases, seem 
truly excessive, if not intolerable. It tends to paralyse their activity and to discourage 
initiative, and thus constitutes a serious obstacle to the development of international 
relations and world production.18 
The modern day successor to that report, the OECD model tax treaty, adds that: “It is 
scarcely necessary to stress the importance of removing the obstacles that double taxation 
presents to the development of economic relations between countries.”19 A report from 
consultancy firm PWC on international taxation in developing countries states, with no 
support, that, “[o]verall, double taxation is detrimental to economic development.” 20 
From the departure point of avoiding double taxation, the international tax community has 
elaborated a series of further concepts, embodied in the model tax treaties and their 
associated guidance, with a status bordering on customary international law.21 Two 
important concepts are the ‘arm’s length principle’ for allocating the multinational tax base 
through transfer pricing, and ’permanent establishment’ for determining the threshold of 
activity at which a business becomes liable to pay tax in a country. Policies are evaluated 
against compliance with these criteria above all else, while criteria on which community 
members may differ, such as particular tax rates, or the distribution of taxing rights between 
different countries, are subjugated below it. This makes the concepts powerful social 
conditioning tools within the community, underpinning instances that socialisation scholars 
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would recognise as ‘normative suasion’, wherein actors are persuaded to change their 
opinions through recourse to shared values.22 
They are regularly invoked in debates at international organisations, such as the meetings of 
the United Nations tax committee observed by the author. In one typical instance, delegates 
from the US government and the accountancy firm PWC engaged in a lively debate with a 
speaker from Brazil over whether unconventional aspects of the latter’s tax law were 
consistent with the arm’s length principle.23 In a fraught debate between members of the UN 
tax committee over a proposed new article to the UN model treaty conferring greater rights 
to tax on developing countries, opponents claimed that the new article would create double 
taxation, instantly shifting the burden of proof onto proponents.24 
When in 1986 the United States adopted transfer pricing laws that deviated from OECD 
guidance, its tax policy was roundly criticised by businesses and tax officials other countries, 
provoking a decade-long international debate. A short statement by UNICE, which 
represents European businesses, made reference to the arm’s length principle in nearly every 
paragraph: various different parts of the US regulation were “a dangerous departure from the 
arm’s length principle,” “a threat to the arm’s length principle,” “at odds with the arm’s 
length principle” and “alien to the concept of arm’s length.”25 The OECD formed a task 
force to review the US proposals, and effectively negotiate with the US. It concluded that the 
US rules, 
could risk undermining the consensus that has been built up over a number of years 
on the application of the arm’s length principle and thereby increase the risk of 
economic double taxation.26 
Arguing by reference to these norms, which are framed in technical language, instantly 
delineates between community members and others. While they may be on different sides of 
particular debates, community members share a notion of the validity of different 
contributions – the third part of Hass’ characterisation of an epistemic community – that 
rests on the qualifications of those making authoritative claims: an education in taxation, 
experience of its practice, and familiarity with a bewildering array of technicalities. In 
informal conversations at international meetings, it is clear that popular criticism of the 
system, as has occurred recently, has united the community’s different factions in opposition 
to the “misunderstandings” propounded by parliamentarians, NGOs and journalists. After 
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the UK’s Public Accounts Committee criticised multinational firms and the UK’s tax 
authority, one industry publication referred to its Chair as ‘Tax Prat of the Year’.27 The 
OECD’s landmark publication launching its international tax reform programme observes 
that, “[c]ivil society and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have also been vocal in 
this respect, sometimes addressing very complex tax issues in a simplistic manner.”28 
“The influence of epistemic communities persists mainly through the institutions that they 
help create and inform with their preferred world vision,” wrote Haas and Emmanuel 
Adler.29 For the international tax community, the policy project that is the fourth uniting 
characteristic in Haas’ definition is the promulgation of such an institution, a set of common 
international standards, so that countries are not encouraged to deviate from international tax 
norms, and thus double taxation is avoided. “Treaties are the means whereby sovereign 
states endeavour, usually on a bilateral basis, to harmonize the rules of their national laws,” 
according to a former US negotiator.30 In particular, these standards incorporate the OECD 
model treaty, which underpins the growing network of some 3000 bilateral tax treaties, and 
the accompanying guidelines that stipulate how a multinational company’s tax base should 
be divided across the countries in which it operates (the transfer pricing guidelines). 
Because international tax specialists see the alleviation of double taxation as an end in itself, 
rather than merely a means to facilitate trade and investment, they weigh the costs and 
benefits of tax treaties differently to others. In this view, tax treaties are needed because 
there is investment, not in order to attract it. “Treaties come later, after the company has 
invested,” explained one negotiator from a developing country.31 Another from a resource-
rich country explained that companies would invest regardless, “but a bit later you cannot 
avoid it, you must have a treaty” to resolve the tax issues faced by businesses as they 
expand.32 Of course, tax specialist officials from a given country may see a network of tax 
treaties as part of creating a healthy investment environment with long-term benefits, and 
those in capital exporting countries may recognise the value for their outward investors of 
being taxed according to international standards. This is not, however, the same as believing 
in a cause-and-effect relationship between individual tax treaties and investment flows into 
developing countries. 
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5.1.2 Blurred boundaries and competition for authority  
Not all of the international tax community’s participants have equal authority. Some country 
delegates, as well as some external commentators such as prominent lawyers and academics, 
are particularly influential.33 Competition for authority within a community is a key theme of 
the ‘linked ecologies’ approach, which defines the unit of study in terms of relationships and 
interactions, rather than professions and institutional affiliations.34 As Sending & Neumann 
argue, there is no reason researchers should a priori assume and reproduce the traditionally 
understood boundaries between realms, such as institutional affiliation or professional 
qualification; rather, communities should be identified empirically.35  Individuals with 
diverse backgrounds and patterns of interaction in multiple ecologies employ ‘epistemic 
arbitrage’, gaining a more authoritative position through their familiarity with (and in) 
multiple different ecologies.36 This is an especially appropriate concept for international 
taxation, a field that combines law, accounting and – to a lesser extent – economics, as well 
as spanning public and private boundaries, and organising at a national and supranational 
level. The international tax community’s most authoritative participants are able to leverage 
knowledge from these multiple ecologies, as well as to ‘be heard’ in multiple professional 
spaces.37  
Consider first the links between different professional ecologies at national level. “The 
concept of a single ‘tax profession’ or tax practitioner is difficult to comprehend,” write Rex 
Marshall and colleagues, continuing: “In practice, the term ‘tax practitioner’ covers a diverse 
group of individuals, business structures and professional groups.”38 Yet these people with 
different professional trainings, representing organisations on different sides of various 
distributional conflicts, do identify as part of a common ‘tax profession’. For example, the 
Chartered Institute of Taxation in the UK was founded in 1930 by a mixed group of 
accountants and lawyers drawn from private practice and the Inland Revenue, to “promote 
the study of taxation, hold examinations, facilitate the exchange of information, make 
representations and establish and maintain a high standard of conduct.”39  
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Tax is a hybrid discipline combining law and accountancy, requiring familiarity with both, 
and individuals with more diverse careers are more often found in positions of authority 
within formal institutions.40  Inside law and accountancy firms, businesses and revenue 
authorities, international tax is a niche field within the already specialist field of tax, and 
those who practice it are small in number, often building closer professional links with 
fellow specialists outside their own institution.41 
Next, consider the public and private sectoral ecologies. While one might naturally assume 
that governments and taxpayers are in conflict over whether a firm’s profits are paid as tax 
or retained by the company, in practice international tax policymaking has always been a 
collective endeavour between the two groups. In their history of the League of Nations 
years, Graetz and O’Hear describe how the International Chamber of Commerce “exercised 
primary leadership in the movement against international double taxation,” developing 
terminology and concepts that were adopted as the basis of the League technical experts’ 
subsequent work.42 In many respects, it was negotiations between the ICC’s national 
chapters that established the contours of an international agreement, ahead of discussions 
among the League’s committee. Resolutions passed by the ICC, according to an observer 
quoted by Graetz and O’Hear, were “used as the firm basis on which draft conventions have 
been built or actual treaties adopted.”43 Furthermore, the ICC’s Double Taxation Committee 
(representing businesses), and the League’s Technical Expert committee (representing 
governments) actually had overlapping memberships, a textbook example of ‘epistemic 
arbitrage’. Thomas Adams, the US-appointed member of the League committee, chaired a 
committee for the US Chambers of Commerce as well as participating in the ICC’s work; his 
successor, Mitchell Carroll, was a lawyer advising multinational firms on their tax affairs, as 
well as working on behalf of the US at the League.44 
Today, as noted above, representatives of multinational companies and tax advisers regularly 
mix at international tax meetings. In addition to private sector representatives’ attendance at 
meetings of the OECD and United Nations, governmental and international organisation 
representatives are commonly in attendance at meetings organised by tax professionals, such 
as an annual conference organised jointly by the US Council for International Business and 
the OECD.45 At national level, in the UK for example, interactions between governments 
and private sector lobbyists are frequent, and “the corporate tax reform policy community 
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has a tightly integrated and fairly constant membership” leading to “an almost astonishing 
assimilation of professional expertise to the legislative function, born no doubt of many a 
congenial meeting over coffee and biscuits in Whitehall.”46 The UK government used 
secondees from Deloitte to help develop reforms to its laws surrounding taxation of 
multinational companies, who subsequently returned to the firm to advise private clients.47 
The same is certainly true in developing countries: Thailand, for example, formed an 
advisory committee with representation from all the ‘big four’ accounting firms to develop 
more competitive international tax laws;48 in Zambia, the Revenue Authority contracted tax 
advisers Grant Thornton to perform some of its tax assessments.49 Advice to the European 
Commission on international tax law and administrative reforms in developing countries was 
contracted out to accountancy firm PWC.50  
Added to this is the ‘revolving door’ phenomenon, as individuals move between tax roles in 
government, the private sector, and international organisations.51 A majority of the tax 
advisors interviewed for this research had worked in the past for governments or tax 
authorities. The creation of semi-autonomous revenue authorities at arm’s length from the 
civil service has led to the appointment of tax commissioners and others in senior roles from 
the private sector, in countries as far apart as Uganda and Colombia, while the UK’s HMRC 
has a governing board drawn primarily from the private sector.52 The community within 
which international tax norms are formed and propagated thus permeates the public/private 
border, and furthermore, those whose authority is recognised within both ecologies have 
greater influence as a result. 
Finally, consider the national and international ecologies. As well as interaction between 
these different groups at national level, many of the most influential within these national 
linked ecologies also operate at the international level, which forms itself an ecology distinct 
from each of the national ecologies from which its members also hail, but now, as Leonard 
Seabrooke and Eleni Tsingou suggest, “in a different social space and reconfiguring how 
they work rather than replicating their national institutions or changing their own to reflect 
other national institutions.”53 Seabrooke argues elsewhere that international professional 
networks, “provide a common language to those generating economic policy knowledge and 
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they also stretch and test allegiances to national interests when these conflict with the 
professions’ ideologies and beliefs.”54 
The epistemic community of international tax professionals is thus heterogeneous, with a 
ragged boundary, incorporating people from different countries, professions and sectors. 
These individuals are united by a common set of ideas that depart from a belief in the 
abhorrence of double taxation. To participate, one must be fluent with the ideas and 
language of the community, which is complex and technical. Authority within the 
community is a function of the ability to deploy this language and to leverage experience 
from within different professional ecologies.  
5.2 Internal influence: socialisation and learning 
Broadly speaking, an epistemic community has two routes though which to influence 
national policy: the possibility for its members to ‘infiltrate’ the policymaking apparatus 
directly, and its ability to influence the knowledge and hence preferences of policymakers.55 
The former, considered in this section, entails the ‘socialisation’ of bureaucrats, “a process 
of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community.”56 This entails moving 
from a ‘logic of consequences’, based on material incentives and outcomes, to one of 
‘appropriateness’, in which actors make decisions based on what is the appropriate thing to 
do in an international context.57  
Mechanisms of socialisation have been divided into three categories: those based on 
instrumental calculations in response to social incentives; role playing, in which actors 
emulate those around them in order to fit in; normative suasion, in which actors are 
persuaded to change their opinions by others through recourse to intersubjectively-derived 
shared values.58 Alastair Iain Johnston distinguishes between a first stage of socialisation in 
which an actor makes a ‘conscious instrumental calculation’ to follow the logic of 
appropriateness (changed constraints), and a second stage that leads to the ‘taken for 
grantedness’ of institutional norms (changed preferences).59 Michael Zurn & Jeffrey Checkel 
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suggest that compliance with norms based on a purely instrumental motivation may lead to 
the internalisation of norms over time, as a result of the cognitive dissonance created.60 
Kerrie Sadiq describes Australia’s integration into the international tax ‘regime’ as a four 
stage process, the first of which, she argues, required a conscious decision to recognise the 
concept of an externally-derived, pre-existing legal regime. She maintains that Australian 
policymakers’ actions were based on instrumental calculations about the constraints created 
by this regime, rather than any change in preferences: 
assessing the gains in tax revenue as well as other economic benefits from attracting 
capital imports as well as international perception against the forfeiture of a certain 
amount of autonomy and sovereignty.61 
Identifying whether or not preferences and identities have truly changed over time – whether 
norms have really been internalised – is empirically very challenging, and this is not the aim 
of this thesis.62 It will be enough to treat statements made by actors in anonymised 
interviews as an accurate reflection of the ideas they hold now. 
We can consider two ideal type mechanisms through which socialised individuals infiltrate a 
bureaucracy, which differ in terms of sequencing. In the first type, infiltration occurs 
because individuals who have been socialised into the community through professional 
training or a scientific career move into policy jobs. For example, Jeffrey Chwieroth finds 
that countries that appoint to senior posts economists who have trained in an academic 
environment likely to have socialised them into neoliberal orthodoxy are more likely to 
adopt neoliberal economic policies.63 The relevant senior appointments for tax treaties would 
be senior roles in international tax policy within the finance ministry, and tax 
commissioners, who tend to be career civil servants and may not have a tax background at 
all. Even civil servants who do work on tax treaties do not have prior specialist training 
beyond general tax law or accountancy background. Since tax treaties do not form a part of 
the standard neoliberal consensus, or indeed any typical professional training leading to 
these roles, such individuals are unlikely to have been fully socialised into any kind of views 
about tax treaties, and are more susceptible as non-specialists to the kind of ideas about 
investment promotion discussed in the previous chapter. 
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A second type of infiltration that is more likely to be relevant to international tax occurs 
when individuals, in the course of doing their job, interact with a community and become 
socialised. If international socialisation causes actors to adopt different preferences to those 
of their colleagues at home, they may have to play a ‘two level game’, negotiating 
internationally and within their national bureaucracy.64 Ideas within the international tax 
community are formed intersubjectively, through the interactions between members, but 
membership of the community is dynamic, with individuals moving in and out of its porous 
boundaries. The majority of tax treaty negotiators are career civil servants, in many instances 
long-term tax or finance ministry officials, and international tax is a niche field that 
generally develops as a specialism once people are employed within relevant roles in 
industry or the public sector, not as a major part of their training. If civil servants from 
developing countries take academic training in international tax, they generally do so after 
they have been appointed, not before.65 
Tax treaty officials from developing countries are most likely to be socialised through 
hierarchical processes, in which existing community members ‘teach’ newer members about 
expected behaviour within the community.66 Teaching and learning may occur through the 
numerous tax treaty negotiation trainings that are organised for developing countries, usually 
delivered by the OECD and United Nations tax committee, but sometimes under the 
auspices of developing country organisations such as the African Tax Administration 
Forum. A United Nations treaty negotiation manual for use at such trainings, for example, 
contains only a very brief section on the arguments against signing treaties, focusing almost 
entirely on the arguments in favour.67 The international meetings of the epistemic 
community, at which developing countries are increasingly represented, include the OECD’s 
annual Tax Treaties forum, and the annual sessions of the United Nations tax committee. 
Treaty negotiation rounds themselves, which can take one or two weeks, are often described 
by their participants as teaching and learning environments too. Several interviewees 
indicated that they had used negotiations with developing countries to teach them about the 
technical detail of tax treaties.68 As the tax manager of Maersk, the Danish multinational 
shipping company, put it: 
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By negotiating these agreements, they are led into a train of thought about how various 
forms of tax are administered.69 
As André Broome and Leonard Seabrooke argue, learning within a socialising, specialist 
context means that “policy space is reduced as actors converge on a shared policy language 
and learn to solve problems through common diagnostic practices embedded within ‘best 
practice’ policy norms.”70 Thus, the ‘learning curve’ leads to an equal and opposite ‘policy 
curve’, as the logic of appropriateness circumscribes possible policy responses (Figure 5.1). 
In the case of tax treaties, however, policy autonomy requires a degree of technical 
knowledge, without which policymakers will either be unable to analyse policies correctly, 
or reliant on external sources of expertise. The case studies later in this thesis illustrate how 
developing countries often began treaty negotiations without the knowledge to understand 
the circumstances in which tax treaties were and were not likely to benefit them, nor when or 
how to counter the negotiating preferences of developed countries. Former treaty 
negotiators, tax lawyers and international organisation staff, all members of the epistemic 
community, played an influential role in shaping the approach to tax treaty negotiation in 
late Cambodia and Zambia. 
From this starting point, learning can still lead to socialisation, but the negative effect of 
socialisation on policy space is in competition with the increase in policy space created by 
the acquisition of basic technical knowledge. Renegotiations to fix past mistakes by Vietnam 
and Zambia discussed later in this thesis illustrate precisely this process. I suggest that this 
produces a ‘policy curve’ shaped more like a normal distribution (Figure 5.2): with a small 
amount of capacity, officials resort to norms, which close down policy space. A large 
amount of capacity building leads to socialisation, which restricts policy space in a different 
way. It is with an intermediate amount of capacity building – sufficient to question the non-
specialist norms, but not enough to have internalised the specialist norms – that policy space 
is maximised. Learning by tax specialist bureaucrats is therefore simultaneously a diffusion 
mechanism and a scope condition, since an intermediate level of learning may create a block 
to other mechanisms of tax treaty diffusion. 
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Figure 5.1: Policy space and capacity building curves, generic 
 
Source: Broome & Seabrooke71 
 
Figure 5.2: Policy space and capacity building curves, this case study 
 
Source: author’s own 
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5.3 External influence 
The previous section considered how an epistemic community may influence policy by 
infiltration, leading to the formation of a cohort of specialist bureaucrats that hold pro-treaty 
norms occupying positions within the bureaucracy. But such mechanisms can only influence 
bureaucrats at a junior level such that their remit is specialised. For non-specialists, 
including those in more senior bureaucratic and political roles, we need to consider how an 
epistemic community influences people outside its own boundaries. Such influence is widely 
expected to be greatest under conditions in which policymakers experience significant 
technical uncertainty, but the means through which they exert influence is not well 
understood.72 Although Peter Haas originally suggested that epistemic communities’ 
influence is greatest in a crisis, when uncertainty is also greatest, many studies using the 
framework have focused on longer-term influence.73 For example, both Clare Dunlop and 
Andreas Antoniades distinguish between an epistemic community’s ‘cognitive’ ability to 
shape foundational knowledge and hence policy goals, and its more practical ability to 
influence policy processes in situations when policymakers have already identified their 
interests and policy goals, but are uncertain about the means to achieve them.74 
Taxation is unusual in that it is entirely a legal construct, which carries with it a certain 
inevitable deference to tax professionals who are seen to monopolise expert knowledge not 
just on its interpretation, but on its very nature.75 So it is not surprising that concerns about 
the domination of international tax policy by a technical community are also highlighted by 
critical legal scholars writing in the Bourdiesian tradition. The starting point for this is Pierre 
Bourdieu’s article describing a juridical social field as “the site of a competition for 
monopoly of the right to determine the law.” As he argues: 
It divides those qualified to participate in the game and those who, though they may 
find themselves in the middle of it, are in fact excluded by their inability to accomplish 
the conversion of mental space – and particularly of linguistic stance – which is 
presumed by entry into this social space. The establishment of properly professional 
competence, the technical mastery of a sophisticated body of knowledge that often 
runs contrary to the simple counsels of common sense, entails the disqualification of 
the non-specialists’ sense of fairness, and the revocation of their naïve understanding 
of the facts, of their ‘view of the case’. 76 
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This view describes with prescient accuracy the tax community’s interactions with the 
broader political and public space. John Snape regards international corporate taxation as an 
example of how “private regulation is transformed into public law with the complex 
reasonings of specialized professional disciplines as its chief characteristic.”77 Sol Picciotto 
sees a resonance for international tax in the way that “law operates to defuse social conflicts 
and depoliticize them, shifting political and economic conflicts on to the terrain of debates 
over the symbolic power of texts.”78 He argues that the cohesiveness of the international tax 
'interpretive community' of stakeholders from organisations with apparently conflicting 
interests is maintained by elaborating new rules that maintain a broad ongoing consensus, 
and by “limiting the membership of the interpretative community and trying to ensure that 
they are like-minded.”79  Secretive meetings at the OECD in the 1960s and 1970s have given 
way to public discussions to which access is restricted by the technical complexity of legal 
rules and the language used to debate them. This leads to a self-reinforcing in-group of 
people “able to invest in learning the arcane terminology and linguistic techniques familiar 
to that group.”80  This linguistic gatekeeping, he argues, is bolstered by a social and financial 
pressure not to question the community’s foundational principles. 
Certainly, where there is political involvement in the specifics of multinational corporate 
taxation, this is an exception, rather than a rule.81 As Pepper Culpepper emphasises, civil 
servants and business representatives may exercise a de facto veto over political actors 
because of the disparity in knowledge. Business power in ‘quiet politics’, he argues, 
is not primarily because of the structural power to disinvest, which Lindblom 
emphasized. It is instead because they [businesses] know the facts on the ground, and 
that expertise is extremely valuable in negotiating with other members of the policy 
subsystem. On the rare occasions when politicians turn their attention to typically low 
salience areas, they enter with an asymmetry of expertise vis-a-vis the representatives 
of business.82 
In fact, Charles Lindblom referred to the complicity between civil servants and their private 
sector interlocutors in his classic analysis of business power, in which he argued that one 
strategy employed by businesses is to attempt to keep policy issues below the political radar. 
He suggests that civil servants will often support such efforts because “they are caught in a 
potential crossfire between privileged controls and polyarchal controls.”83 Ash Amin and 
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Ronen Palan also emphasise that there is no reason to assume a priori that actors within 
government bureaucracies and multinational firms are in an antagonistic relationship.84  
Tax policy in developing countries has historically been shaped by an outside professional 
community. There is a critical strand of literature on tax reform that describes how a ‘tax 
consensus’ developed among development policy advisers in the 1980s and was transmitted 
to developing countries through conditionality and technical assistance. According to Odd-
Helge Fjeldstadt and Mick Moore, this consensus focused on the elimination of trade taxes 
and their replacement with the value added tax, as well as a bureaucratic reform: the creation 
semi-autonomous revenue authorities that were not under the direct control of finance 
ministries.85 This view, they argue, formed among “an epistemic community of taxation 
professionals, employed in national tax administrations, in consultancy companies and in 
international financial institutions, and organised in regional and global professional 
associations” during “a period of unusually radical tax reform in the developing world since 
the 1980s.”86 “The key factor,” writes Miranda Stewart, “is the development of an 
international consensus, or ‘norm’, of tax reform and policy driven largely by the 
international institutions, and propounded by non-government tax experts.”87 
Three main concerns are highlighted by authors discussing this tax consensus: its close 
association with the neoliberal Washington consensus, its ‘one size fits all’ approach, and, 
crucially, the depoliticisation of decisions with important distributional impacts, which 
critics argue should fundamentally be part of the democratic process.88 Lisa Philipps 
describes how “tax and budgetary issues are frequently constructed as technical matters that 
can be resolved rationally according to economic, mathematical or other ostensibly neutral 
principle,” with policymaking processes dominated by technical experts despite the political 
nature of outcomes.89 Stewart concurs: 
tax reform projects have been mass-produced and have spread rapidly across the globe 
through broad, superficial, and generalized tax policy recommendations grounded in 
the consensus…The contemporary mass production of tax reform militates against 
any real domestic political participation in the determination of tax policies and laws 
in the countries undergoing reform.90 
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This literature has focused on domestic tax reforms, in particular the elimination of trade 
tariffs and the introduction of value added tax, during the past three decades. Yet 
international institutions and experts play a similar driving role in the international tax 
reforms adopted by developing countries, in particular with respect to transfer pricing and 
tax treaties.91 A review of developing country tax systems commissioned by the European 
Commission from PWC, for example, urges that “donor support initiatives should eventually 
aim at lifting the TP [transfer pricing] legislation and its application in developing countries 
to a common international standard. In our opinion, this is vital to reduce economic 
uncertainty and foster investment and growth.”92 In Vietnam, business lobby group the 
Vietnam Business Forum regularly urges the government to “align…Vietnam tax policy 
with international practice,” calling in 2014 for it to “study and provide guidance base on the 
description and regulation about permanent establishment under international practice and 
standard as the UN and the OECD [sic].”93 
The international tax community can thus be characterised as an epistemic community 
whose ideas are formed intersubjectively in the social context it creates. Through formal 
professional competence, high technical and linguistic barriers to participation, and its own 
pivotal role in standard-setting, the community claims a monopoly on the ‘correct’ 
interpretation of the principles of international tax law. Because tax is a legal construct, this 
claim extends to defining its every aspect. The community itself is dynamic and fluid, the 
nexus of several overlapping ecologies: accountancy and law, private and public, national 
and international. Many of the leading roles in international tax are played by individuals 
who have authoritative positions within these multiple ecologies. The community influences 
policy in part by socialising bureaucrats who occupy relevant specialist positions into its 
norms, and in part through non-specialist policymakers’ deference to its expertise. 
Policymakers’ technical uncertainty, the emphasis in the epistemic communities literature, 
certainly leads them to defer to the community, yet the community itself actively creates 
such uncertainty, through the proliferation of ever-greater complexity.  
5.4 The OECD as a site of authority 
It is impossible to discuss international tax without discussing the OECD. Its hegemonic 
status is widely recognised by tax law scholars, and so a theoretical understanding of the 
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organisation is essential for this thesis.94  Yet in comparison to other international 
organisations, international relations scholarship on the OECD is relatively limited.95 Work 
on the OECD’s role in international tax relations has generally been focused on its initiatives 
to target harmful tax practices and ‘tax havens’, which are largely distinct from its work on 
tax treaties.96  
International organisations are of particular importance in the field of socialisation, both as 
providers of advice and, along with their associated communities, as settings for 
socialisation. 97 According to Martha Finnemore, international organisations should be 
considered as autonomous actors, “shapers of actors or interests,” above and beyond the sum 
total of their member states.98  She points to the ‘teacher’ role fulfilled by international 
organisations, “according them more autonomous and causal status, particularly as shapers 
of actors and interests.”99 Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie argue that: 
In the international arena, neither the processes whereby knowledge becomes more 
extensive nor the means whereby reflection on knowledge deepens are passive or 
automatic. They are intensely political. And for better or for worse, international 
organizations have manoeuvred themselves into the position of being the vehicle 
through which both types of knowledge enter onto the international agenda.100 
The OECD’s model tax treaty and associated guidance have a hegemonic status, forming the 
basis of all bilateral tax treaties. Variations, such as the UN model tax treaty, still take the 
OECD model as their point of departure. Yet the OECD has achieved this outcome not as a 
purveyor of hard law, but rather as a site in which soft law instruments are created and 
promulgated. For this reason, much OECD scholarship focuses on its ideational leadership. 
As Charles Nelson wrote as early as 1970:  
The OECD is important not for the decisions it makes but for the decisions it 
prepares...there are very few important international economic problems which the 
OECD can legitimately resolve ... This is the most important single characteristic of 
the OECD. The major decisions prepared within it are inevitably formalized and 
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carried out elsewhere: in the IMF, in GATT, in the UNCTAF [sic], in the World Bank, 
or through traditional diplomatic channels.101 
Bengt Jacobsson suggests that the OECD has two main functions: a meditative function, 
through which standards are developed, and an inquisitive one, its distinctive peer review 
process through which states’ compliance with those standards is assessed.102 While the peer 
review process is a part of the OECD’s taxation work, this is in areas other than tax treaties, 
and so it is on the ’meditative’ role that this discussion will dwell. It is worth noting, 
however, that the OECD’s authoritative position as the grouping of the world’s most 
‘advanced’ democracies occupies a mutually reinforcing role with respect to its peer review 
process, which simultaneously relies on, and bolsters its position as a source of authoritative 
knowledge about how an ‘advanced’ economy should behave, because it can “modify the 
reference groups of national bureaucrats, their aspirations, and their behaviour.”103 
An influential paper by Martin Marcussen segments the OECD’s ideational role into five 
categories: an artist, which formulates, tests and diffuses policies; an agent, which transfers 
ideas from more prosperous to less prosperous states; an agency, which takes emerging ideas 
from states, develops them, and then sells them back in a more refined form; an arbitrator, 
through which civil servants are socialised; finally, an authority, used by states to back up 
their positions.104 Each of these roles helps to explain the OECD’s central role in the world 
of tax treaties. 
Consider first the ‘artist’ role. The OECD is the place in which international tax standards 
are formulated and reformulated, since it inherited the responsibility for the model tax treaty 
from its predecessor the OEEC. Whenever tax specialists within its member states identify a 
need for new or changed standards, it is to the OECD that they turn. This was the case in the 
late 1990s, when states began to be concerned about ‘tax havens’, and it applied again in 
2012, when corporate tax avoidance rose up the political agenda.105 Arthur Cockfield 
suggests that this is part of a trend towards doing the technical work on new standards at the 
OECD first, rather than first developing standards at national level and then using the OECD 
as a forum to reconcile different approaches: 
Because of the history of cooperation along with more recent efforts, it may be the 
case that the OECD member states have learned to trust the OECD process to the point 
where they are increasingly prepared to accept the OECD's leadership in resolving 
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other areas of international tax policy concern, including binding multilateral 
mechanisms in limited areas such as transfer pricing arbitration.106 
Studies of the OECD have emphasised the informal interaction between specialist 
bureaucrats as a forum for socialisation since its early days as an organisation. Henry 
Aubrey emphasised that the formal part of meetings and the ‘informal contacts in the 
corridors and over meals’ led to 'mutual appreciation and trust' between civil servants.107 
Marcussen, citing Gunnar Sjostedt, describes how officials in OECD deliberations “develop 
a common language,” “start using the same kind of causal reasoning” and further: 
develop a common selective perception of the world and they start to employ a 
common frame of reference and a common worldview. The latter helps them to define 
what can be considered as a relevant problem in the first place and which instruments 
can legitimately be employed to solve this problem.108 
A little more recently, Scott Sullivan, in an authorised account that presumably reflects the 
OECD’s self-perception, describes how OECD committees, “serve as a crucible for its 
members' future actions…In the corridors and coffee bars between sessions, officials with 
similar interests but very different backgrounds meet, argue, forge friendships.”109 
A focus on the OECD’s members and their interactions through the OECD, however, risks 
underspecifying the entrepreneurial role of the OECD secretariat. For Rianne Mahon and 
Stephen McBride, the organisational culture within the OECD is an important contributor to 
its meditative function: 
OECD staff conducts research and produces a range of background studies and 
reports. In this, they draw on their disciplinary knowledge, supplemented by what 
Dostal refers to as an ‘organizational discourse’ – ‘claims encapsulating long-term 
political projects as defined by the organization in question’. The latter reflects the 
effects of organizational learning.110 
A survey of career histories of staff from the OECD’s Centre for Tax Policy and 
Administration, 45 of whom have a profile on LinkedIn, illustrates that the OECD tax 
bureaucracy reflects the public-private epistemic community. Some 42 percent of its staff 
came to the OECD from multinational businesses, accountancy firms and law practice, while 
58 percent worked in finance ministries and revenue authorities; when full career histories 
were taken into account, 75 percent of CTPA staff had worked in tax specialist roles in both 
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the public and private sector at some point.111 The OECD secretariat is therefore the 
embodiment of an expert community whose reach transcends the public and private 
boundaries. As Jason Sharman argues, the normative weight of the OECD’s output rests on 
its “technocratic identity…as an international organisation composed of ‘apolitical’ 
experts.”112 
Secretariat staff and civil servants interact frequently through the OECD’s various tax 
committees, working parties and forums. For Allison Christians, it is this tripartite 
interaction between national government representatives, ‘experts’ from academia and 
business, and secretariat staff (largely drawn from the first two groups) that defines the 
OECD’s way of working: 
These tax policy groups form an intertwined epistemic community that holds an 
important and influential position in the law-making order. Together, the CTPA 
(OECD employees) and the CFA (public servants or national representatives) 
diagnose and prescribe tax policy reforms that are informed by, and that play out 
within, national legal regimes.113 
If the internal milieu of the OECD is a potential socialising context for the tax profession, 
the external-facing aspects of Marcussen’s typology also seem highly apposite. He describes 
the OECD’s ‘agent’ role as the manner in which it transfers policy from more prosperous to 
less prosperous nations.114 As a socialising forum and a promulgator of standards, it is not 
just that the OECD is a focal point for other states, as Thomas Rixen argues, but also that its 
standards are associated with the ‘advanced’ reputation of its member states.115 As Tony 
Porter and Michael Webb write, the OECD’s technical work “is reinforced by the diffuse 
sense that the OECD’s knowledge is an expression of the best states’ best practices.”116 
This authoritative role towards non-members is not merely established passively by the 
OECD, but also through active outreach. This takes two forms: civil servants from 
developing countries are invited to participate in various forums in Paris, and the OECD also 
engages in sensitisation and capacity building work. Since the mid-1990s, the OECD’s 
Centre for Tax Policy and Administration has maintained an active programme of outreach 
to developing countries, based on training workshops and seminars with civil servants many 
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of whom went on to lead their country’s tax treaty negotiations.117 Such outreach is premised 
on the technical superiority of the OECD’s international tax instruments, as demonstrated by 
their adoption across its members and more widely. A prominent policy paper from the 
OECD states: 
There is already a significant amount of work being done by the OECD and other 
international organisations to support developing countries to address these 
[international tax] challenges. This work aims at disseminating effective international 
standards, improving access to data and information, building capacity and assisting 
in tax audits 118 
Another part of the OECD’s meditative function, as described by Marcussen, is the manner 
in which it is cited as an authority by its members (and, we might say, by other actors in the 
international tax milieu). For example, a consultancy report on transfer pricing written for 
the European Commission by PWC states: 
The OECD Guidelines could serve as common global standards for TP and we would 
advocate that developing countries orient themselves to these standards when 
adopting and implementing TP legislation […] the selected countries should 
particularly draw attention to the development of a network of DTAs. This can foster 
the local investment climate by providing a legal mechanism to address potential cases 
of double taxation.119 
The OECD is the guardian of concepts that, as outlined earlier, are foundational to the 
international tax community.  
It is worth noting that the OECD, while exercising a dominant position, is not the only 
organisation in which the tax expert community operates. Some regional organisations of 
developing countries have developed their own model treaties, but in every case these 
organisations use the OECD’s model treaty as their jumping-off point.120 More important is 
the United Nations tax committee, a grouping of 25 tax treaty negotiators (acting, like the 
League of Nations group, in their personal capacity) which produces its own model treaty 
that is supposed to be explicitly designed to take into account the special needs of 
developing countries. The UN model treaty differs from the OECD model in the wording of 
a number of clauses, some of which can be found in a majority of tax treaties signed by 
developing countries.121 In practice, however, the committee’s debates exist within a 
framework of legitimate dissent, whereby differences in interests between developed and 
developing countries are tightly contained within the overall framework of the standards 
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formulated by the OECD, which are not questioned. Many of the senior roles within the UN 
committee are occupied by individuals who also play leading roles within the various OECD 
working parties (Table 5.1).122   
Table 5.1: Overlap in membership between UN and OECD tax committees 
Name and country UN role(s) OECD role(s) 
Andrew Dawson (UK)
  
Committee member Chair of Working Party 1 on Tax 
Conventions and Related Questions 
Carmel Peters (New 
Zealand) 
Chair of Base Erosion and 
Profit-Shifting subcommittee 
Vice Chair of Working Party 1 on 
Tax Conventions and Related 
Questions, Chair of BEPS Action 6 
Focus Group 
Armando Lara Yaffar 
(Mexico) 
Chair Chair of Working Party No. 10 on 
Exchange of Information and Tax 
Compliance 
Liselott Kana (Chile) Vice Chair, Chair of 
Subcommittee on Tax 
Treatment of Services 
Chair of BEPS Action 7 Focus Group 
Xiaoyue Wang (China) Committee member Bureau Member, Working Party No. 
6 on the Taxation of Multinational 
Enterprises 
Ingela Wilfors 
(Sweden) 
Committee member Bureau Member, Working Party No. 
6 on the Taxation of Multinational 
Enterprises 
Stig Sollund (Norway) Chair of Subcommittee on 
Article 9 (Associated 
Enterprises): Transfer Pricing 
Bureau Member, Working Party No. 
6 on the Taxation of Multinational 
Enterprises; Bureau Member, 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs 
Christoph Schelling 
(Switzerland) 
Committee member Bureau Member, Committee on 
Fiscal Affairs 
Source: United Nations and OECD123 
More importantly, the UN committee serves as a forum for socialisation of developing 
country officials. This objective is set out clearly in an internal UK civil service document 
from the 1970s: 
Our view, which is shared by the Americans and the Dutch, has been that it is of little 
use to try to “educate” developing countries – at the United Nations Expert Group on 
tax treaties and elsewhere – about acceptable international fiscal standards if, when it 
comes to the crunch, we are prepared to sacrifice principle in order to secure an 
agreement.124 
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We can see, therefore, that the OECD is at the heart of a tax ecosystem that incorporates 
other international organisations, business groups and countries, held together by the glue of 
an epistemic community of tax professionals who are simultaneously participants in these 
different organisations’ work. The OECD’s central position is a function of two mutually-
reinforcing perceptions: the technical superiority of its standards, and their endorsement by 
the world’s most advanced economies, the members of the OECD. The international tax 
community’s emphasis on tax treaties as the correct way of establishing the tax treatment of 
multinational companies gains authority from the organisation’s wider economic policy 
authority. 
5.5 Scope condition: control over veto points 
Just as diffusion research has taken a turn towards unpacking the heterogeneity in diffusion 
processes, ‘bringing the national back in’ is a common refrain in discussions of the state of 
socialisation research.125 Interest in socialisation has focused on the ‘scope conditions’ that 
make mechanisms more or less effective. These tend to be characteristics of international 
institutions, the agents who participate in them, and the national context from which those 
agents originate.126 Here we focus on the national level. 
For example, in his work on socialisation of economic policymakers, Jeffrey Chwieroth 
demonstrates that IMF-led teaching of neoliberal economic ideas to developing countries in 
the 1980s and 1990s was much more likely to lead to capital account liberalisation in the 
presence of an IMF technical assistance programme, this organisational channel acting as “a 
critical conduit through which the [IMF] staff can disseminate their ideas.”127 In contrast, 
where socialisation into the neoliberal policy programme had already occurred through 
professional training of economic professionals, “the formation of a coherent policymaking 
team, characterized by a preponderance of like-minded experts in key bureaucratic 
positions” in a country was an important scope condition for the adoption of capital account 
liberalisation.128 
The process of tax treaty negotiation, from the initial policy considerations through to 
ratification, is indeed guided in almost every country by a small team of technical 
professionals. The formation of a strong specialist international tax unit within a finance 
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ministry or revenue authority, with institutionalised links to the OECD, UN tax committee, 
or other socialising environment, is likely to determine the extent to which officials learn. 
But these professionals’ autonomy is circumscribed by a number of veto points, at which 
political or other bureaucratic actors may have some formal or informal influence. While the 
process varies across countries, these veto points are generally: ex ante negotiating authority; 
opening negotiations; agreement at official level (‘initialling the draft’); signature; 
ratification. Given that the preferences of specialists and non-specialists may not align, it 
may be an obstacle to treaty diffusion via experts if there are veto players whose preferences 
for tax treaty negotiation differ.129 Conversely, if experts hold a veto at the point of opening 
negotiations, they may block diffusion through competition, which acts on non-specialist 
actors.  
Such tensions have been inherent since the very first tax treaty to be negotiated between two 
countries – Prussia and the Netherlands in the 1910s. First, the treaty was not ratified by the 
Dutch side because of objections from the business community to its information-sharing 
clauses, which only emerged at the last minute when the outcome of negotiations was made 
public.130 The treaty was described as a “personal project” of lead negotiator Jan Sinninghe 
Damsté. An attempt at renegotiation stumbled because, according to a communication from 
the Dutch ambassador to Germany, "this matter was previously dealt with by the Minister of 
Finance, and…the current official did not understand these matters"131 
Few countries have an explicit policy regarding who they will negotiate with. As a result, 
decisions about whom to negotiate with are made informally by civil servants, often without 
ministerial oversight. In one country, a treaty had been negotiated by a previous tax 
commissioner, understood by current officials as a “personal project” based on his personal 
connections to the treaty partner, and quietly shelved when the commissioner was replaced. 
Seven years later, when its existence was uncovered by a senator, it was ratified, to the 
consternation of the revenue authority.132 In another, ministerial approval to open 
negotiations was fully understood to be a box-ticking exercise, and had never been 
declined.133 Uganda has even initiated a review of its treaty network with the aim of 
soliciting some political guidance where previously decisions have been taken entirely by 
tax officials.134 
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As discussed in the previous chapter, tax treaty negotiators from most capital exporting 
countries consult at the prioritisation stage, with businesses and with other government 
departments. In some countries, the decision to enter into negotiations requires direct 
ministerial approval, while in others that comes later, once the text is ready for signature, or 
even further down the line. The UK case study in this thesis records how the minister 
responsible sought to have approval of treaty texts before signature, rather than simply being 
shown them before he proposed their ratification to parliament. 
Negotiators’ autonomy is in part circumscribed by the law that gives them force. For 
example, in the UK, the Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 2010 defines the 
‘double taxation’ that is to be relieved by tax treaties, and specifies the taxes to which the 
mechanism can apply. To give effect to an agreement that exceeds this mandate, the law 
would have to be changed, as it was in the case of the UK-Brazil negotiations (discussed in 
section 7.4.2). Within the legal parameters, only new precedent generally requires 
ministerial approval.135 In contrast, section 88 of Uganda’s income tax act merely states that 
an international tax agreement “shall have effect as if the agreement was contained in this 
Act.” Uganda’s chief negotiator indicated that the country’s current review of its tax treaties 
was in part designed to give a political steer where previously negotiators had only their own 
opinion to guide them in negotiations.136 
An important addition to this discussion is the role played by model treaties in setting the 
parameters of negotiations. OECD member states have their own national model treaties, 
which are largely used in private to set out their opening negotiating position,137 and which 
are published by a small number of countries.138 They also adhere to the articles of the 
OECD model convention, which they have negotiated among themselves in advance, except 
where they have specified reservations to its text.139 Other countries may also refer to 
regional models, such as the COMESA, SADC and EAC models in Africa, or the ASEAN 
model in South East Asia. These models are generally formulated by the treaty negotiators 
themselves, in particular at the OECD, where a dedicated working party of civil servants 
updates the model convention, which is then approved by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs, 
made up of “high-level officials in national treasuries and tax administrations.”140 In recent 
years, the process of modifying the OECD model has become more consultative, with 
business groups submitting comments on published drafts or participating in working 
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groups.141 Political oversight, however, remains minimal.142 A United Nations model adapts 
the OECD model for treaties between developed and developing countries, but the 
committee producing it is made up (largely) of treaty negotiators formally acting in a 
personal capacity, rather than on behalf of their country. Notably, the COMESA model 
treaty was drafted by European private sector consultants, while the accountancy firm 
KPMG drafted an ASEAN position on tax treaties.143 
Tax treaty negotiations are generally led by a country’s finance ministry or its tax authority, 
with the exact division of labour depending on the institutional structure. In countries such 
as the UK and Cambodia, it is the tax authority that leads, while in others such as Zambia 
and the US, responsibility lies with the finance ministry, although the revenue authority may 
also participate in negotiations.144 Foreign affairs and investment promotion ministries often 
also participate, but make little if any contribution. In the UK, for example, the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office approves treaty texts before they are signed, but in general its only 
input is on the definition of the contracting states.145 In all the case studies in this thesis, 
negotiations were led by officials from finance ministries or revenue authorities, with 
varying degrees of specialism in international tax; in wider interviews, a handful of 
examples were given of negotiations led by other government ministries, such as in one case 
an investment promotion authority.146 
Tax treaties are intergovernmental agreements which, once signed, become a part of their 
signatories’ tax law. Ratification follows different procedures in different countries. 
Typically, in developing countries, tax treaties are ratified by the cabinet, with no 
parliamentary approval. This is the case, for example, in Uganda, where treaties are merely 
laid before parliament, and Zambia, where they never pass through parliament.147 An 
ongoing legal dispute in Kenya concerns the lack of parliamentary ratification of a treaty 
with Mauritius: Kenya’s new constitution requires parliamentary ratification of treaties, but 
the government argues that the tax treaty is merely an administrative agreement.148 
                                                     
141 Cockfield, “The Rise of the OECD as Informal World Tax Organization through National Responses to E-
Commerce Tax Challenges”; Ault, “Reflections on the Role of the OECD in Developing International Tax 
Norms.” 
142 Christians, “Networks, Norms and National Tax Policy”; Ring, Who Is Making International Tax Policy? 
International Organizations as Power Players in a High Stakes World. 
143 Bunting, Fawcett, and Makasa, Working Document COMESA Model Double Taxation Agreement and 
Commentary; Farrow and Jogarajan, ASEAN Tax Regimes and the Integration of the Priority Sectors: Issues and 
Options; Farrow and Jogarajan, “ASEAN Tax Regimes: Impediment or Pathway to Greater Integration.”  
144 Interviews, anonymised 
145 Correspondence reviewed in chapter 7 
146 Interview 10 
147 Hearson, Tax Treaties in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Critical Review. 
148 Kenyan High Court, petition number 494 of 2014, documents on file 
Chapter 5 Expert authority in the diffusion of tax treaties 
133 
 
In developed countries, it is more common – but not universal – for parliaments to approve 
new tax treaties. A survey of the parliamentary ratification of Canada’s last 33 treaties 
revealed “expeditious implementation through Parliament with little or no scrutiny,” with 
deliberations not coming to a single vote in one of the two chambers.149 In the UK, tax 
treaties are made law as statutory instruments, a mechanism that is designed for non-
controversial laws that are passed through a delegated legislation committee. Ratification 
rarely entails more than a token debate in this committee, and no treaty has ever been 
rejected or sent back for renegotiation.150 In Denmark, parliamentary ratification was 
introduced during the 1990s, but is equally uncontroversial.151 In contrast, the US senate is 
famously thorough in its scrutiny of tax treaties. It forced a change to the US-UK treaty 
before ratification in the 1990s, and in recent years has held up ratification altogether.152 
There is certainly considerable heterogeneity across countries in the number of veto points 
and players. At one end of the spectrum, a combination of formal rules and their 
authoritative position would give a coherent team of tax treaty experts near total control over 
the process of treaty-making. Some treaty negotiators interviewed did indeed claim that 
ministerial and parliamentary scrutiny, where it existed, was largely a rubber-stamping 
exercise.153 At the other end, negotiators are unable to realise their preferences because other 
stakeholders, who do not share their ideas about tax treaties, exercise a veto at various stages 
of the process. Even where there was no parliamentary ratification, some negotiators 
explained that the approval process could get held up because finance ministers did not 
approve signature.154 
Finally, there is specific evidence that tax treaties are sometimes pushed through by non-
specialists in spite of the reticence of tax treaty specialists themselves. A study of tax treaty 
negotiations in Colombia, for example, suggests that tax officials received a political 
instruction to negotiate treaties swiftly in pursuit of “investment at any price.”155 One 
negotiator from a developing country interviewed for this thesis explained that his country 
had signed a treaty with Mauritius, a tax haven, on very disadvantageous terms, because the 
negotiation had been initiated by the country’s newly-created investment promotion 
authority, and conducted without any revenue authority involvement. The tax implications 
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were not considered, and the country didn’t even formulate an opening position before 
beginning negotiations.156  
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on tax treaty specialists: those who formulate international models 
and national policies, and negotiate treaties themselves, as well as the other actors within 
their community, such as from businesses and academia. The doctrine of international fiscal 
anarchy forms the raison d’être for this epistemic community, leading to a distinct 
conceptualisation of the role of tax treaties grounded in a set of norms concerning the 
appropriate way to tax multinational firms. The community wields the double taxation 
problem as a tool through which to strengthen its influence over national tax policymaking 
over time, in effect wresting sovereignty away from political actors, whose actions will 
naturally tend to create ‘double taxation’. Much of this is achieved by the use of increasingly 
obscure language and elaboration of every more detailed terms, as well as by the 
community’s claim to authority derived from professional expertise. 
To understand the boundaries of and contestation within the international tax community, 
the chapter also brought in the linked ecologies perspective, which recognises that each 
individual’s identity and their perceived authority within and outside of their community 
stems from their role within multiple overlapping relational contexts, such as their 
profession, organisational affiliation and the country in which they operate primarily. 
‘Revolving doors’ between the public and private sector, and between national and 
international organisations, are particularly important to the understanding of the 
international tax community because this diverse experience gives individuals greater 
epistemic authority. These patterns may also help to explain why developing country 
officials, despite being in the majority, are predominantly ‘norm takers’. 
The ability of the international tax community to exercise power within national 
bureaucracies varies over time and between countries. In developing countries, the number 
and experience of international tax bureaucrats varies, which is one reason for the variation 
in approaches to international tax: as individuals become socialised into the international tax 
community, their attitude to tax treaties changes, as they first learn about their costs and 
benefits framed in terms of their pre-existing ideas (often creating a sceptical outlook), and 
then come to internalise the community’s ideas about the function of tax treaties (often 
creating an enthusiastic outlook).  
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The influence of specialist tax bureaucrats over treaty-making in a country depends further 
on their autonomy within the government structure. The number and nature of veto players 
varies between countries, and where they exist they may cause treaties to fail because of 
differing preferences over treaty partners, treaty content, or the whole project of tax treaties 
itself. These differences do not necessarily emerge because different actors have different 
material incentives, but because they hold different ideas about what tax treaties are for, and 
indeed about the function of international tax rules. 
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6 Case selection and methodology 
The previous chapters sketched out an argument explaining the mechanism through which 
tax treaties have diffused, using a range of documentary sources and interviews with 
negotiators. The anecdotal nature of that evidence means that, while it can be used to 
establish the existence of certain mechanisms, I cannot infer from it any wider conclusions 
about the role played by those mechanisms in comparison to others. The remainder of the 
thesis offers a more formal test, using individual cases that are selected with the aim of being 
able to draw such wider conclusions 
This short chapter describes the case selection methodology. Each of four country cases is 
‘nested’ within a quantitative analysis derived from a time-series model founded on the 
hypothesis that tax treaty diffusion is the result of rational competition for inward 
investment. The UK is ‘on the line’: it signed tax treaties at a (high) rate predicted by the 
quantitative model. If the quantitative results are in part the product of competition by 
developing countries for inward investment – in this case British investment – the case study 
should confirm this. If the data capture competition for outward investment, I should find 
evidence of this mechanism as well (or instead). The three developing countries – Zambia, 
Vietnam and Cambodia – are all ‘off the line’, having signed significantly more or fewer 
treaties than predicted by the model. These cases should reveal the additional diffusion 
mechanisms and scope conditions that are responsible for this unexplained variation. 
For added explanatory power, the cases have been selected to permit within-case 
comparisons where possible, and between-case comparisons where not. Because the 
quantitative analysis underlying case selection is based on dyads of countries, the very 
granular archival evidence used for the UK case allows for a statistically-driven comparison 
between individual negotiations. Interview evidence was less granular, with interviewees 
often reluctant or unable to speak in detail about particular negotiations. For this reason, 
within-case comparison for Zambia is based on two different historical periods of times, 
rather than individual treaties. when national-level variables changed. For Vietnam and 
Cambodia, which began to consider signing tax treaties only relatively recently, the 
comparison is between neighbouring countries over the same time period. 
6.1 Mixed methods and the nested analysis approach  
The aim of the mixed methods research design in this thesis is to use quantitative and 
qualitative methods synergistically, leveraging both the detailed causal claims made through 
qualitative case studies and the generalisability of conclusions drawn from large-N 
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quantitative work. The thesis uses a nested analysis approach, in which country case studies 
are selected based on the results of an initial regression replicated from a previously 
published study.1 Before elaborating this methodology, the development of mixed methods 
as a category of research design is briefly discussed. 
The idea of combining different methods is often credited to a 1959 article that coined the 
term “multiple operationalism” to refer to the use of multiple methodological techniques to 
triangulate research results.2 By the 2000s, mixed methods was a popular enough technique 
to have acquired its own methodology journal, the Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 
published by Sage. The growing popularity of mixed methods research within the social 
sciences is attributed by some of its proponents to a reaction against the perceived conflict 
between qualitative and quantitative research paradigms during the 1980s and 1990s, and in 
particular Designing Social Inquiry, which argued for an approach to qualitative research 
that built on the positivist epistemology of quantitative methodologies.3 A fundamental point 
for these mixed methods scholars is that the positivist-orientated quantitative paradigm is 
epistemologically incompatible with an intepretivist qualitative paradigm; what is required, 
therefore, is a ‘pragmatic’ approach to epistemology.4 
In keeping with the pragmatic approach to mixed method research, this project treats 
economic constructivism as “a conceptual toolbox rather than a theoretical paradigm.”5 As 
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink argue: “Constructivism opens up a set of issues, and 
scholars choose the research tools and methods best suited to their particular question.”6 A 
reflexive epistemology is inevitably a part of my approach to research, however, since 
academic and quasi-academic work contributes to the pool of ideas that influences policies 
towards tax treaties. This is especially the case in the area of tax law, where the boundary 
between practitioner, advisor and scholar is porous. 
There are, naturally, myriad definitions of mixed methods research. In general, mixed 
methods research designs are distinguished from ‘multi-methods’ research, in that the latter 
combine different methods to answer different questions within an overall research design, 
while the distinctive quality of mixed methods approaches is the use of one methodological 
                                                     
1 Lieberman, “Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research.” 
2 Campbell and Fiske, “Convergent and Discriminant Validation by the Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix.” 
3 King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. 
4 Morgan, “Paradigms Lost and Pragmatism Regained: Methodological Implications of Combining Qualitative 
and Quantitative Methods”; Bergman, “1 The Straw Men of the Qualitative-Quantitative Divide and Their 
Influence on Mixed Methods Research.” 
5 Broome, “Constructivism in International Political Economy,” 199. 
6 Finnemore and Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and 
Comparative Politics.” 
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technique to frame the whole project, with other, subsidiary techniques situated within it.7 
This rigid distinction is not universal, however. One group of researchers surveyed 
practitioners of mixed methods and formulated the following broad synthesis definition: 
Mixed methods research is the type of research in which a researcher or team of 
researchers combines elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches 
(e.g., use of qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, data collection, analysis, 
inference techniques) for the broad purposes of breadth and depth of understanding 
and corroboration. 8 
John Creswell and colleagues provide a helpful typology of mixed methods research 
designs.9 Excluding experimental designs, they present three types. In a ‘triangulation’ 
design, qualitative and quantitative analyses are conducted in parallel and then merged in 
order to combine or compare results. An ‘explanatory’ design begins with quantitative 
analysis, the results of which are followed up using qualitative methods to explain the 
observed pattern. Conversely, an ‘exploratory’ design begins from qualitative analysis, using 
it as the basis of a quantitative design that allows for the generalisation of the initial 
qualitative findings. 
Evan Lieberman’s ‘nested analysis’, the method used here, follows the same logic as 
‘explanatory’ and ‘exploratory’ designs.10 It begins with an initial regression, which tests for 
a significant relationship between the explanatory and independent variables. If such a 
relationship is found, then the qualitative phase serves as a ‘model-testing’ or explanatory 
stage in which case studies serve to confirm whether or not the observed quantitative 
relationship is created by the hypothesised causal mechanism. If no significant relationship 
is found, qualitative case studies serve a ‘model building’ or exploratory role, on the basis of 
which the quantitative model can be redesigned.  
The case selection rationale differs depending on whether a model-testing or model-building 
strategy is being followed. For the former, selection should proceed on the basis of cases that 
are ‘on the line’ (that is, well-predicted by the model) and that have different values of the 
dependent variable. For theory-building strategies, the model can be best improved by 
selecting at least one outlier, as this is where causal processes that are not specified within 
the model are most likely to be present. Outliers should not be extreme, since these are likely 
to be driven by more unusual causal processes, but should rather be from the more poorly 
fitted end of the general population of cases. 
                                                     
7 Berg-Schlosser, Mixed Methods in Comparative Politics Principles and Applications; Morse and Niehaus, 
Mixed Method Design : Principles and Procedures. 
8 Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, and Turner, “Toward a Definition of Mixed Methods Research,” 123. 
9 Creswell, Plano Clark, and Garrett, “Methodological Issues in Conducting Mixed Methods Research Designs.” 
10 Lieberman, “Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research.” 
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This approach differs from that propounded by Gary King and colleagues, who argue against 
selecting cases for variation in the dependent variable, to avoid selection bias.11 It also 
differs from that proposed by Janice Morse and Linda Niehaus, who argue that: 
Traction in building and testing theories can be gained only by comparing mechanisms 
that contribute to creating the same outcome.12 
On this basis, only cases in which the explanatory variable, dependent variable and any 
scope conditions are all present should be used. Comparisons should then be drawn between 
most and least likely cases within this subset, which means cases in which an explanatory 
variable is more or less present, but the outcome still occurs. For continuous variables, it is 
possible to reconcile this approach with that advocated by Lieberman for model-testing, 
since the difference is only one of degree, but for binary variables the two approaches are 
polar opposites. 
Figure 6.1: Case selection under different strategies 
 
Source: Author’s own, based on Lieberman and Morse & Niehaus13 
The aim of this thesis is both model-testing and model-building. First, the hypothesis of 
competition for inward investment underlying a quantitative model, originally developed by 
Fabien Barthel and Eric Neumayer, is to be tested against an alternative explanation, 
compatible with the same quantitative results, in which competition for outward investment 
                                                     
11 King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. 
12 Morse and Niehaus, Mixed Method Design : Principles and Procedures, 146. 
13 Lieberman, “Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research”; Morse and Niehaus, 
Mixed Method Design : Principles and Procedures. 
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by the capital exporting country in each pair of countries explains some or all of the 
results.14 Second, a model for the unexplained variation is to be built, based on the 
boundedly-rational nature of competition among developing countries, and learning by tax 
specialists. For this reason, both cases that are ‘on the line’ and ‘off the line’ need to be 
selected. 
One of the motivations of Lieberman’s approach is to move away from the idea of trying to 
find cases that hold conditions constant when choosing different countries, since shortcuts 
such as choosing cases from similar regions rarely succeed in this aim.  A similar view is 
taken by John Gerring, who argues that within-case comparison is a much better vehicle for 
the method of difference than between-case comparison.15 The approach taken here is 
wherever possible to identify within-case comparisons. This is made possible by the use of 
country case studies selected from a dyadic dataset: the dyad A-B can be compared with the 
dyad A-C as a within-case comparison with respect to country A. Within-case comparisons 
can also be made across time, and there are clear variations over time in countries’ 
approaches to tax treaty negotiations. 
6.2 Model re-estimation 
In the quantitative model, tax treaty formation in a given dyad is associated with the number 
of treaties signed by countries with which members of the dyad would be expected to 
compete for investment.16 Barthel and Neumayer’s estimated Cox model is specified as 
follows: 
ℎ(𝑡|𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡) = ℎ0(𝑡)exp(?́?𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + ?́?𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡) 
where ℎ0(𝑡) is the baseline hazard function, 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 represents the control variables, and 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡  
represents ‘spatial lag’ variables capturing the competition effects (‘competitive pressure’); i 
and j are the two dyad members, and t is the year. 
The original paper specifies competition using three different ‘spatial lags’, each of which 
weights the conclusion of a tax treaties by other countries with a measure of the degree to 
which those countries are in competition with the dyad in question. The first spatial lag, 
common region, applies a weighting of 1 to treaties signed between countries in the same 
regions as the two dyad members, and 0 in other cases. For example, competitive pressure 
                                                     
14 Barthel and Neumayer, “Competing for Scarce Foreign Capital: Spatial Dependence in the Diffusion of Double 
Taxation Treaties.” 
15 Gerring, “What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?” 
16 Barthel and Neumayer, “Competing for Scarce Foreign Capital: Spatial Dependence in the Diffusion of Double 
Taxation Treaties.” See also Neumayer and Plümper, “Spatial Effects in Dyadic Data.” 
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on the Germany-Ghana dyad increases when treaties are concluded between other European 
and sub-Saharan countries. The second spatial lag, export product similarity, applies a 
weighting based on the basket of goods and services exported by each country. For example, 
competitive pressure on a dyad in which one country’s exports are dominated by agricultural 
products is increased each time another agricultural exporter signs a tax treaty. A third 
spatial lag, based on export market similarity, did not significantly affect the probability of 
tax treaty conclusion, and so has been excluded from this analysis. The spatial lags are also 
lagged by one year, to reduce concerns about endogeneity. 
As can be seen from this description, this specification of competition is symmetrical except 
that it includes a focus on exports, and not imports. Export product similarity reflects the 
structure of a country’s production for international markets, but this could measure a 
country’s outward investment interests, as well as the types of inward investment it seeks to 
attract. Thus, the spatial lags could capture competition for outward investment, as described 
in chapter 4, as well as competition for inward investment. In the Ghana-Germany dyad, for 
example, it could be that Ghana is reacting to its neighbours’ signature of tax treaties with 
European countries, or the conclusion of tax treaties with Germany by other countries that 
also export cocoa, gold and oil; it could also be that Germany is reacting to its competitors’ 
signatures of tax treaties with Ghana or with other sub-Saharan countries.17 
In addition to the spatial lags, a range of control variables are included in the model. They 
are discussed in detail, with sources, in the original paper.18 The size and wealth of the two 
economies are captured using the product of their population sizes and GDP per capita. 
Policy variables included are the openness to trade and the extent of political constraints, 
both also measured as the produce of these values for both countries. Several variables 
specific to international tax policy are also incorporated: a dummy variable indicating 
whether one country is an offshore financial centre (OFC), dummies for dyads made up of 
one or two OECD members, the number of years since both dyad members were 
independent, and the number of tax treaties signed by each dyad member, as well as the 
maximum of those two values. Several controls for economic and political relations within 
the dyad are also included: bilateral trade, presence of a BIT between the two countries, joint 
                                                     
17 Barthel and Neumayer include a robustness test that incorporates a ‘directed’ version of the model, based on a 
situation where OECD members coerce non-OECD members into concluding treaties with them. This 
specification, “in which the propensity of a non-OECD member to sign a DTT with a given specific OECD 
member depends on the weighted sum of DTTs signed by other non-OECD members with the very same OECD 
member” produces a result in line with the main, ‘undirected’ specification. As the description indicates, 
however, this is not a specification that focuses on competition among OECD members. See Barthel and 
Neumayer, “Competing for Scarce Foreign Capital: Spatial Dependence in the Diffusion of Double Taxation 
Treaties,” 657. 
18 Ibid., 649–650. 
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membership of a regional trade agreement (RTA), diplomatic representation in each other’s 
capitals, and distance between capitals. 
I have extended Barthel and Neumayer’s dataset, which ended in 2005, to 2012. This brings 
the predictions of the quantitative data closer to the time of fieldwork, which was conducted 
during 2014-15. New data for 2006-12 were appended to the existing data from 1969-2005, 
increasing the number of years covered from 37 to 44, but swelling the number of 
observations by one third as a result of better data coverage for recent years. Descriptive 
statistics for the old and new datasets are provided in Annex 2. To check consistency, data 
for 2004 and 2005 were reconstructed: new and existing values of the export product 
similarity spatial lag were 88% correlated, and the predicted survivals generated by the two 
models for 2004 were 93% correlated. In the re-estimated model (Table 6.1), the coefficient 
of the main variable capturing competition, export product similarity, is nonetheless smaller, 
although its sign does not change. This may be because, in the dataset as a whole, dyads 
with the largest competitive pressure had largely conclude a treaty by 2005, reducing (but by 
no means eliminating) the explanatory role of this variable for later years. 
Table 6.1: Original and re-estimated coefficients for the Cox proportional hazard model 
Variable Correlation coefficients 
Original dataset, 
1969-2005 
Extended dataset, 
1969-2012 
Spatial lags:   
Common region (product) (t-1) 1.229*** 1.287*** 
Export product similarity (sum) (t-1) 11.38*** 6.018** 
Product of populations (ln) 0.0855*** 0.0994*** 
Product of GDPs per capita (ln) 0.0234 0.1500*** 
Bilateral trade (ln, t-1) 0.137*** 0.0813*** 
Product of openness to trade 6.92e-05*** 4.34e-05*** 
BIT 1.310*** 1.365*** 
RTA -0.174 -0.134 
OFC -0.463*** -0.346*** 
Diplomatic representation 1.201*** 0.8945*** 
Distance (ln) -0.255*** -0.302*** 
Product of Political Constraints 0.640*** 0.313** 
OECD-OECD dyad -0.143 -0.244 
OECD-nonOECD dyad -0.504*** -0.628*** 
Min. years of independence -0.00605*** -0.00469*** 
Max. number of DTT (t) -0.0356*** -0.0349*** 
Cumulative number of DTTs, country i (t-1) 0.0430*** 0.0400*** 
Cumulative number of DTTs, country j (t-1) 0.0417*** 0.0394*** 
Observations 198,820 289,226 
*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
Source: Barthel & Neumayer; Author’s own19 
                                                     
19 Barthel and Neumayer, “Competing for Scarce Foreign Capital: Spatial Dependence in the Diffusion of Double 
Taxation Treaties.” 
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6.3 Case selection 
To select cases following the nested analysis strategy, I need to compare predicted with 
actual values. To generate predicted values from a Cox proportional hazard model, the 
‘predicted survival’ is used. This is the probability that a failure event (signing a treaty, in 
this case) does not occur in a given dyad-year. It is estimated as: 
?̂?𝑖(𝑡) = [?̂?0(𝑡)]
exp(?̂?𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡+?̂?𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡)
 
where ?̂?0(𝑡) is the Breslow baseline hazard estimator.
20  
While the predicted survival is a continuous variable, the actual values of the dependent 
variable are binary: signing a treaty or not. Case selection in nested analysis requires plotting 
actual values against the model’s predicted values (Figure 6.2). I therefore convert the binary 
dependent variable to a continuous variable by using aggregate figures at the country-decade 
level. Specifically, the dependent variable becomes the proportion of dyad-years within the 
country-decade for which a treaty was signed. This is plotted against the average predicted 
survival across the country-decade. Since there is not a simple one-to-one equivalence 
between these predicted and actual values, an ordinary least squares regression line using the 
country-decade values provides an indicator of how consistent each country’s actual values 
are with the model’s predictions. 
Figure 6.2: Selecting country cases 
 
Source: Author’s own 
                                                     
20 Breslow, “Covariance Analysis of Censored Survival Data.” 
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The model predicted less treaty signing activity 
than actually occurred for this country: look for 
alternative diffusion mechanisms. 
(Zambia 1970s, Vietnam 2000s). 
The model predicted the amount of treaty 
signing activity about right: test the causal 
hypothesis. (UK 1970s). 
The model predicted more treaty signing 
activity than actually occurred for this country: 
look for unfulfilled scope conditions. 
(Zambia 2000s, Cambodia 2000s). 
 
Regression line 
using country 
values  
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While each dyad of countries at a given time could be considered a case based on the dyadic 
model, aggregating results at the country-decade level has several advantages beyond the 
ability to apply Lieberman’s methodology: 21 
• Selecting in this way allows me to compare individual dyads as a within-case 
comparison, which is a much stronger way of holding other variables constant to use 
the method of difference. 
• The explanatory variables and scope conditions in which I am interested are all at 
the national level (even the diffusion effect, although dyadic, is either the sum of the 
pressures on the two dyad members or an interaction between the competitive 
pressures on each). The negotiating officials and politicians, in particular, are the 
same for the same country across different treaties. 
• Researching several treaties within a country case is more practical for fieldwork. 
Two different decades are used, tailored to different data sources. For archival 
documentation, the earliest possible time period, 1970-79, is used. This maximises the 
number of government documents available for scrutiny, given that the statutory delay in 
releasing documents in the UK, for example, is 30 years. Conversely, developing countries 
do not tend to keep and disclose such records. For interview-based fieldwork, the most 
recent time period, 2003-12, is used, since it is easier to trace interview subjects with 
knowledge of more recent years, and interview data may become less reliable over time. 
Although many of the variables affecting tax treaty formation vary across time and between 
countries, the nature of tax treaties has barely altered since the formulation of the first 
OECD model tax convention in 1963, and most treaties negotiated in the 1970s are still in 
force un-amended; consequently, while each case study needs to be situated in historical 
context, it is reasonable to compare between case studies from these different time periods. 
To confirm this, one case study (Zambia) is examined across both the early and late time 
                                                     
21 An alternative approach might be to aggregate at the county-year level, rather than country-decade, plotting 
values for all country-years together. Aggregating at this level is problematic, however, because the dependent 
variable is highly sensitive to the timing of treaty signature, which can vary by a year or more after agreement on 
the treaty content has been reached (Table 7.1), variation which may be for purely administrative reasons. 
Because most countries sign only one or two new treaties in a given year, the dependent variable displays wide 
variation across consecutive years, and it is necessary to aggregate over a longer time period to smooth this out. 
At the other extreme, the results for each country could be aggregated across the whole 44-year time period at 
once. This has the disadvantage that variation over time within a country is lost. For example, during the 44 years 
covered by the dataset, both Vietnam and Zambia, case studies for this thesis, have periods of intense negotiation 
and other, lengthy periods during which no treaties at all were concluded, reflecting major economic and political 
changes. Averaged over the full period, Zambia appears significantly ‘above the line’, reflecting its early start at 
treaty negotiations, while Vietnam appears ‘below the line’, because it didn’t start signing treaties until halfway 
through the observation period. Yet during the 1970s and 2000s respectively, Zambia and Vietnam were 
intensive negotiators of tax treaties, far exceeding the model’s predictions. Aggregating across all 44 years is 
therefore not the best approach, as it reduces the sensitivity of the case selection. The selection of decades is a 
compromise between these two extremes, which smooths out the year-to-year variations in signature dates, but 
also allows for variation over time. 
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periods. The different time periods and methodologies also suit the availability of 
information in different countries. While it is possible to have fairly frank conversations 
with officials in developing countries, developed country officials are generally more 
concerned about retaining the confidentiality of their negotiating positions. 
Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4 show how the country case studies are selected using this adapted 
version of Lieberman’s nested analysis case selection technique. To test the hypothesis that 
Barthel and Neumayer’s results reflect rational competition for outward investment, against 
the conventional view that these results reflect competition for inward investment, a 
developed country is selected whose treaty-signing activity is well-predicted by the model 
(‘on the line’). This is the UK 1970-9. The UK also offers the advantage that its average 
predicted survival is low, and it signed a comparatively large number of treaties. meaning 
that variables driving diffusion are strongly present. Because the documentary sources 
provide highly detailed information on each individual negotiation, within-country 
comparisons are possible here between individual dyads involving the UK. 
Two pairs of developing country case studies will also be used. First, Zambia 1970-9 will be 
compared with Zambia 2003-12. In the first case, Zambia is above the line, meaning that it 
signed a larger number of treaties than predicted by a rational competition model; in the 
second, it is below the line, meaning that it signed fewer than predicted. A comparison of 
these two time periods should reveal variables not captured by the model that differ across 
the two time periods. The second pair of countries is Vietnam and Cambodia 2003-12. These 
countries were predicted to sign a similar number of treaties, but in practice Vietnam signed 
a larger number more than expected, and Cambodia none at all. A comparison of the two 
should again reveal variables not captured by the model that explain signature and non-
signature. 
Table 6.2 presents the data for case selection in a different format, with the addition of 
competitive pressure, the explanatory variable. During the 1970s, the UK had a lower than 
average predicted survival, and, consistent with the model, a larger proportion of dyad-years 
with a treaty signature. Competitive pressure on dyads involving the UK was also greater 
than average, illustrating that both the explanatory and dependent variables were strongly 
present in this case, making it an ideal test for the causal hypothesis underpinning the 
quantitative model. 
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Figure 6.3: Case study selection using aggregate values per country, 1970-79 
 
Source: Author’s own, based on Barthel & Neumayer and supplementary data22 
Figure 6.4: Case study selection using aggregate values per country, 2003-12 
 
Source: Author’s own, based on Barthel & Neumayer and supplementary data23 
                                                     
22 Barthel and Neumayer, “Competing for Scarce Foreign Capital: Spatial Dependence in the Diffusion of Double 
Taxation Treaties.” 
23 Ibid. 
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Dyads involving Zambia 1970-9, in contrast, have a predicted survival slightly above 
average, with competitive pressure below average. This suggests that Zambia should have 
signed fewer treaties than the average, because of a lack of competitive pressure. Instead, it 
has an above-average share of dyad-years with signature. By 2003-12, Zambia’s predicted 
survival and competitive pressure are relatively close to the average, and yet the proportion 
of dyad-years with signature is low. These Zambian cases do not vary more than one 
standard deviation from the mean values, meaning that Zambia is a moderate outlier. 
Cambodia and Vietnam show predicted survivals and competitive pressure close to the 
mean, and yet both their proportions of dyad years with signature are around a standard 
deviation from the mean, in opposite directions. There appears to be a major unexplained 
variation between these two countries, which the comparative analysis may help to explain. 
Table 6.2: Model fit for case study countries 
 
 
Predicted 
survival 
% dyad-years 
with signature 
Competitive 
pressure 
1970-9 Mean 0.956 2.22% 0.276 
 (Standard deviation) (0.032) (3.42%) (0.054) 
 UK 0.878 8.70% 0.351 
 Zambia 0.967 4.57% 0.235 
2003-12 Mean 0.650 3.52% 1.212 
 (Standard deviation) (0.165) (3.74%) (0.123) 
 Cambodia 0.730 0.00% 1.372 
 Vietnam 0.630 7.12% 1.239 
 Zambia 0.743 0.53% 1.097 
Source: Author’s own 
6.4 Introducing the cases 
Table 6.3 summarises the case studies discussed in the remainder of the thesis. The UK in 
the 1970s, discussed in chapter 7, is an example of a country whose dyads are a good fit with 
the model. While there is some evidence of competition by developing countries driving 
some treaty signatures, in many other cases it was the UK that drove treaty signature, with 
two different mechanisms at work: competition for outward investment based on lowering 
tax costs is the main mechanism acting on non-specialists, and dissemination of international 
tax standards (partly a competition rationale) acting on specialists. Comparing well-
predicted and poorly-predicted dyads within the country case, I find that the view of 
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specialists is the determining factor in treaty signatures, because non-specialists had little 
influence over treaty negotiations. 
Table 6.3: Summary of case studies 
Chapter 
number 
Case study Model fit Main diffusion 
mechanism 
Scope condition 
present? 
7 UK (1970s) Good 
1 Competition for 
outward investment 
 
8 
Zambia 
(1970s) 
More treaties 
than predicted 2. Competition for 
inward investment 
Yes. Fiscal costs not 
salient 
9 
Cambodia 
(2000s) 
Fewer treaties 
than predicted 
No. Fiscal costs 
salient 
9 
Vietnam 
(2000s) 
More treaties 
than predicted 
3. Dissemination of 
standards 
Yes. Specialists 
control veto points 
8 
Zambia 
(2000s) 
Fewer treaties 
than predicted 
No. Specialists do 
not control veto 
points 
Source: Author’s own 
Two contrasting eras in Zambian treaty negotiations are discussed in chapter 8. During the 
1970s, it signed more treaties than expected, while during the 2000s, it signed fewer. The 
1970s was a point where Zambia did not appear to have any dedicated tax specialists, and 
treaty negotiations were led by a changing roster of political appointees, based on a 
competition rationale. A lack of analysis of even the simplest tax impacts led to an 
inconsistency between the policy of seeking treaties and that of imposing withholding taxes 
on foreign investors, and some extraordinarily one-sided treaties. From 2003-2012, Zambia 
had a cohort of tax specialists who espoused the project of double tax relief, but they had 
little control over veto points in the treaty making process; the politicians who did were 
much more concerned about the tax costs of treaties in an era of politicised corporate 
taxation. 
Chapter 9 compares Vietnam, which signed many more treaties than predicted from 2003-
2012, with Cambodia, which signed none at all. Both countries signed other forms of 
economic cooperation agreements within a few years of each other; both were subject to 
competitive pressure among ASEAN countries, as well as to requests from capital exporters 
to open negotiations. While competition appears to have been a driving force during the 
1990s in Vietnam, from 2000 onward negotiations were driven by a specialist team who 
believed that every investor, no matter how small, should be covered by a tax treaty. The 
different attitude between the two countries appears to be attributable to the salience of 
corporate tax losses, which was low in Vietnam, and high in Cambodia. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
Mixed methods research designs provide a powerful way to make generalised claims about 
causal processes. In this chapter an adapted version of Evan Lieberman’s ‘nested analysis’ 
approach was used to select case studies to be investigated in the second part of this thesis, 
taking an existing quantitative study of tax treaty diffusion as the starting point. Lieberman’s 
approach provides for both explanatory or ‘model testing’ case studies, and exploratory or 
‘model building’ case studies. The three case study chapters that follow include examples of 
each. The UK in the 1970s, a good fit with the existing quantitative model, has been selected 
as a model-testing case study to examine the causal process underlying the observed pattern 
of diffusion. The remaining case studies are moderate outliers, selected for model-building.  
Vietnam in the 2000s and Zambia in the 1970s signed more treaties than predicted, and so it 
is likely that explanatory variables not captured in the model were present in these cases.  
Cambodia and Zambia in the 2000s signed fewer treaties than predicted, and so they provide 
opportunities to look for scope conditions that prevent the action of the diffusion 
mechanisms captured here.
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7 The United Kingdom 
Above all, [tax treaties] impose acceptable standards 
…where such standards would otherwise be absent. 
- Deputy Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue1 
 
The United Kingdom has the widest tax treaty network of any country in the world. Since 
the international tax regime’s founding in the 1920s, it has played a leading role in the 
formulation of model treaties, and it is still at the heart of the OECD’s tax work. This 
chapter focuses on the 1970s, a period when the tax treaty network expanded rapidly into 
recently independent developing countries that were certainly keen to attract inward 
investment. Britain entered into negotiations with about 40 developing countries during the 
period 1970-1979, successfully concluding agreements with just over half.  Most of these 
agreements are still in force today.  
The UK in the 1970s is an excellent case study with which to test the nature of tax treaty 
diffusion through competition. This is because, on average, dyads involving the UK during 
the 1970s are a very good fit with the quantitative model elaborated in the previous chapter, 
with the proportion of dyad-years covered by a treaty strongly consistent with the model’s 
predictions. Furthermore, the dependent variable is strongly present (a relatively large 
number of dyads including the UK signed treaties), as is the independent variable 
(competitive pressure on the dyad members). Thus, by examining dyads involving the UK 
during the 1970s, we would expect to see the competition mechanism underlying the 
quantitative model at work. 
This chapter will test the conventional competition hypothesis, in which the observed pattern 
of diffusion is the product of competition by developing countries seeking inward 
investment from the UK, against my alternative hypothesis, in which it results from 
competition between the UK and other home countries of multinational investors for 
outward investment opportunities. Having established that competition for outward 
investment explains many of the UK’s treaty negotiations, it then examines the drivers of 
competition in more detail. This demonstrates that the dominant logic of tax competition in 
the UK was one compatible with the specialist viewpoint of tax treaty negotiators in the 
Board of Inland Revenue, for whom the goal of tax treaties was to export ‘acceptable’ 
OECD tax standards wherever they operated. Non-specialist stakeholders in the treaty-
                                                     
1 Memo from Alan J Lord, Inland Revenue, 1 March 1976. File ref FCO 59/1459. 
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making process analysed competition through a different, ‘boundedly rational’ focus on 
double taxation, and on the perceived effects of tax treaties on the short-term effective tax 
rate of UK multinationals. This led to clashes of preferences, which the Inland Revenue 
generally put down to misunderstandings or parochialism. The role played by expert 
technical knowledge in shaping the preferences of tax specialists is illustrated by the private 
sector actors, who did not align with each other, but with the two civil service camps, based 
on their level of expertise. 
Evidence presented in this chapter is drawn from civil service documentation released under 
the United Kingdom’s 30-year rule. It covers the decade from 1970, the beginning of the 
quantitative model’s predictions. The documents reviewed include internal civil service 
correspondence, minutes of negotiation meetings, and correspondence between the UK and 
other countries’ negotiating teams.  The focus is therefore on the variables driving the UK’s 
actions, rather than those internal to the developing country. We cannot tell conclusively 
from this evidence what motivated the developing country, but by mapping the process of 
each negotiation, it is possible to determine the extent to which the developing country was 
driving forward negotiations, or acquiescing to the UK’s enthusiasm, a crucial test of 
whether competition in the developed or developing country was responsible for the treaty’s 
conclusion. 
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. The next section briefly discusses the archival 
documents used. Sections 7.2 and 7.3 establish some general findings about roles and 
attitudes of different stakeholder groups in the treaty-making process, drawing from some 
specific examples as well as overriding policy considerations. In section 7.4, I conduct a 
more formal hypothesis test by comparing three pairs of negotiations between the UK and 
developing countries. Two predicted signatures are compared with two unpredicted 
signatures, to examine what explanatory variables might have resulted in this otherwise 
unexplained variation in the dependent variable. The predicted signatures are also compared 
with two unexplained non-signatures, cases where the model predicted a signature. This is to 
establish what scope conditions should be included in the model to explain this otherwise 
unexpected positive value of the dependent variable. 
7.1 Context 
The evidence used in this chapter is drawn from the UK National Archives, which release 
civil service files 30 years after they have been closed (70 years for files that include 
information on identified people’s tax affairs). Each file is recorded in an online database 
that includes its name and a short description. To find the relevant files, this database was 
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searched for the terms ‘double tax’, “double taxation” and ‘tax treaty’, yielding 2301 results. 
The majority of these were country-specific files originated from the Inland Revenue or the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office and its predecessors. They include internal civil service 
correspondence, correspondence between countries, and minutes of negotiation meetings. 
This means that they include both the internal thinking of the UK and the positioning of the 
negotiating partner, supplemented on occasions by intelligence about its motivations from 
other British sources. 
Most of the country files indicate that sporadic contact between the two sides was the norm 
before any serious negotiations were initiated. The UK might have made tentative enquiries, 
as in the case of Latin American countries, or an ambassador from a developing country 
might have expressed an interest that the UK judged not to reflect a serious intent on behalf 
of that country’s tax treaty decision-makers. The UK entered into serious discussions with 
around 40 developing countries during the period under study, shown in Table 7.1. The 
median length of time from the UK’s first successful contact with a country with a view to 
negotiating a tax treaty to signature was 38 months, but a significant number of negotiations 
took over 72 months (Figure 7.1). The median time from first contact to ratification by both 
parties was 60 months. That the average period of time between the decision to open 
negotiations and the observable event of signing a treaty is over three years, and this gap was 
often as long as six years, calls into question the typical one-year lag used in quantitative 
studies of policy diffusion.  
Negotiations were undertaken by a small team of officials within the Board of Inland 
Revenue. Most of the information used in this chapter is drawn from that team’s files, 
although most treaties also have a corresponding Foreign Office file, which may include 
communication between the embassy and the desk officer in London, but is often purely 
procedural. In general, for each treaty the file begins with the report of a conversation with a 
developing country, or correspondence between either the Inland Revenue and its 
counterpart, or the Inland Revenue and the British embassy. Preliminary discussions then 
give way to a formal request to start negotiations, and the Inland Revenue circulates a 
written request for comment to the Treasury, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the 
Department (or Departments, depending on the date) of Trade and Industry. 
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Figure 7.1: Histogram showing length of time between first contact and signature 
 
Source: Author’s own (see Table 7.1) 
A typical negotiation consisted of an exchange of drafts (or simply the UK sending its draft, 
and the developing country responding with comments) then a first round of negotiations in 
person. Finding a mutually convenient time to meet was a lengthy process when 
correspondence was principally by air mail, and a year’s delay at this point for purely 
practical reasons was not atypical. After the first round of negotiations, the file usually 
includes formal minutes and a more informal memo circulated to accompany them, giving 
the negotiators’ impressions of their opposite numbers. Further correspondence on 
outstanding issues usually led to a second round of negotiations, at which the agreement was 
initialled, signalling agreement at official level. The treaty was then subject to final checks, 
including translation and finalising the definition of countries with the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO), before it was signed. Sometimes errors, legislative changes 
or a change of heart by one side could lead to amendments being made at this stage, either to 
the text itself or via a protocol, signed at the same time. Ratification followed, which in the 
UK involved the Minister of State presenting the agreement to a parliamentary committee: 
the file usually includes a copy of the briefing given to the minister, explaining any salient or 
unusual features of the treaty, and giving suggested answers to anticipated questions; while 
these briefings are usually formulaic, they sometimes include information explaining the 
UK’s reasoning. It was not unusual for signature or ratification to be delayed in the 
developing country, and the files sometimes show the UK negotiators seeking to rally the 
developing country.  
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Table 7.1: UK negotiations with developing countries during 1970-1979 
Source: National Archives, various files. Where no information was available in the archives this is indicated by 
a dash. Blank spaces indicate that this stage of negotiation did not take place. Use of square brackets in the 
second column indicates a renegotiation initiated while a current treaty was already in force. *Kenya, Tanzania 
and Uganda’s negotiations with the UK began as part of a joint negotiation on behalf of the East African 
community. 
 
Negotiations 
initiated by 
Discussions 
opened 
First round of 
negotiations 
Treaty 
signed 
Treaty in 
force 
Argentina UK 1979 1980   
Bangladesh UK 1976 1977 1979 1980 
Botswana [Counterpart] 1974 1974 1977 1978 
Brazil UK 1972 1973   
Colombia UK Informal discussions only 
Czechoslovakia UK 1975 1977 1990 1991 
Egypt UK 1976 1976 1977 1980 
Fiji - 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Gambia - 1974 1974 1980 1982 
Ghana [Counterpart] 1974 1974 1977 1978 
Greece UK Informal discussions only 
Hungary UK 1976 1977 1977 1978 
India UK 1976 1976 1981 1981 
Indonesia -   1974 1976 
Iran UK 1973 1975   
Ivory Coast - 1978 1979 1985 1987 
Jamaica [Counterpart] 1969 1969 1973 1973 
Kenya* [Counterpart] 1971 1971 1973 1977 
Korea - 1974 1975 1977 1978 
Lesotho - Informal discussions only 
Malaysia [Counterpart] 1971 1975   
Mauritius - 1974 1975 1981 1981 
Mexico UK 1978    
Morocco Counterpart 1970 1976 1981 1990 
Nigeria UK 1978 1979 1976 1978 
Philippines Counterpart 1974 1975 1976 1978 
Poland UK 1975 1975 1975 1978 
Romania Counterpart 1975 1975 1975 1977 
Saudi Arabia UK 1977    
Spain UK 1973 1975 1975 1976 
Sri Lanka Counterpart 1972 1974 1979 1980 
Sudan [Counterpart] 1973 1974 1975 1977 
Swaziland - Informal discussions only 
Tanzania* Counterpart 1976 1977   
Thailand UK 1974 1976 1981 1981 
Tunisia Counterpart 1975 1976 1982 1984 
Turkey UK 1978    
Uganda* - 1971    
Yugoslavia - 1975 1976 1981 1982 
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There are also some files relating to the UK’s general negotiating position, such as 
correspondence within and between departments relating to a cross-departmental review of 
double taxation treaties. Another set of files records meetings and correspondence with 
business organisations, including quarterly “state of play” reports on all the UK’s 
negotiations which were compiled as briefing documents for civil servants attending these 
meetings. These are discussed in more detail in the sections that follow. 
7.2 The UK’s active pursuit of tax treaties 
Since the earliest files discussing potential treaties, correspondence inside the UK civil 
service indicates that the UK was not merely a passive respondent to requests from 
developing countries, “stand[ing] ready with model treaties in hand,” but rather it was 
actively shaping its own treaty network.2 Already in 1957, discussion of a potential 
agreement with Colombia states: 
for years we have been unsuccessfully trying to conclude an agreement with a South 
American country without any success…This is, therefore, the only area of the world, 
apart from the countries behind the Iron Curtain in which we have made no progress.3 
With Turkey, the UK proposed talks in 1978 and again in 1979, but a note in 1981 indicates 
that the Turks "have expressed no enthusiasm" for a treaty.4 Similarly, the UK sent a draft 
treaty to Czechoslovakia in 1975, but in 1976 a civil servant wrote that “despite reminders, 
the Czechs have not responded.”5 In the latter case, negotiations did take place in 1977 and 
1978, but a stalemate was reached because “the Czechs [were] refusing to reduce their tax on 
royalties.6" Iran’s previous “apparent lack of response” to the UK gave way to a 
“willing[ness] to have talks” in 1974, but later the same year the civil service files record 
that “[o]ur embassy is pressing the Iranians as much as we can."7 A final example is Mexico, 
with which the UK requested negotiations in 1978 following an approach to the Inland 
Revenue from business groups.8 The next mention in the “state of play” reports is in 1981, 
which record that the UK had been “told they are not yet ready."9 
Of course, if the UK was keen to sign treaties with all developing countries, but many of 
them rejected its overtures, this would be consistent with the view that it is policy in the 
                                                     
2 Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons, “Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-
2000,” 822. 
3 Letter from DG Daymond, Inland Revenue, 21 January 1957. File ref FCO 371/126504. 
4 “State of play on countries - January 1981” File ref IR 40/18110 
5 “State of play on countries - January 1976” File ref IR 40/18110 
6 “State of play on countries - January 1981” File ref IR 40/18110 
7 “State of play on countries – October 1974” File ref IR 40/18110 
8 Letter from JH Clement, Department of Trade, 13 November 1978. File ref IR 40/18110 
9 “State of play on countries - January 1981” File ref IR 40/18110 
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developing country that is the primary determinant of the timing of treaty negotiations. The 
picture painted by the files, however, is clearly one in which the UK actively reached out to 
certain developing countries to urge them to open negotiations, exerting diplomatic pressure 
where necessary. Excluding renegotiations, three quarters of the negotiations listed in Table 
7.1 (17 of 23) for which information is available were initiated by the UK. Where 
developing countries did make the first move, this was often because they wanted to 
renegotiate the terms of an existing agreement put in place when that country was a British 
colony. 
7.3 Actors and actions in UK treaty-making 
In this section, I outline the roles of different groups of stakeholders in the decision-making 
processes surrounding the UK’s tax treaties. Specifically, I examine the preferences of tax 
treaty specialists in the Inland Revenue, who led negotiations, and those of non-specialists, 
in particular those in the rest of government. I also consider what happened when these 
different preferences created conflict between the two groups.  
7.3.1 Diffusion driven by dissemination of technical standards 
For specialists inside the Inland Revenue, the major causal effect of tax treaties was not, 
despite their formal title of “for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal 
evasion,” the elimination of double taxation (fiscal evasion rarely seems to get a mention, 
either). The reason for this was that the UK, in common with many other countries, had 
taken unilateral steps to prevent double taxation of its firms operating overseas, by giving 
them a credit against their UK tax bill for any taxes paid overseas. 
Recognition of this dates back at least to 1957, when an Inland Revenue civil servant wrote 
that with regard to one treaty, “the United Kingdom taxpayer gets very little benefit out of it: 
he will get credit for the tax paid in Colombia against the tax due on the same income in this 
country whether we have an agreement or not.”10 Two decades later, in 1976, a cross-
department review of the UK’s approach to international double taxation, led by the Inland 
Revenue, made the case even more boldly: “in the absence of an agreement there is no 
question of United Kingdom investors being doubly taxed.” 11 
                                                     
10 Letter from DG Daymond, Inland Revenue, 21 January 1957. File ref FCO 371/126504. 
11 “Double taxation relief.” Report to the Paymaster General, 25 February 1976. File ref FCO 59/1459. 
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What then was the purpose of a tax treaty for the Inland Revenue? That same note from 
1957 records that, for a board of Directors in the UK, “the advantages of a double taxation 
[agreement] need no stressing.”12 It goes on to argue that a tax treaty 
at once assures the directors that they will be taxed according to internationally 
accepted rules and they will not be subject to discrimination. From the contacts we 
have with businessmen we believe that these considerations do, in fact, weigh heavily 
with them in deciding whether to invest or not, and the conclusion of a double taxation 
agreement goes a long way towards establishing a suitable climate for foreign 
investment.13 
These are often referred to as ‘intangible benefits’, and they are mentioned by government 
officials throughout the period under consideration. According to the 1976 review, “these 
include protection against fiscal discrimination, the establishment of a framework within 
which the two tax administrations can operate, and the expectation that an overseas authority 
which has negotiated a treaty will at least try to apply it reasonably.” 
“Above all,” wrote the Deputy Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue in 1976, treaties 
“impose acceptable standards for allocating profits to branches and subsidiaries and for 
dealing with transfer pricing in countries (some of them within the EEC) where such 
standards would otherwise be absent.”14 
For the specialists, tax treaties were tools through which the UK, which had always taken a 
prominent role in the development of the international tax system, ensured the participation 
of other countries in it. This would be especially beneficial for British businesses in the case 
of developing countries, including those newly independent, where, as one official wrote, 
“protection against fiscal discrimination is generally worth more…because they are more 
likely to include deliberately discriminatory fiscal practices in their general law than are 
developed countries.”15 
But that 1957 view that a treaty would influence a firm’s decision “whether to invest or not” 
is an anomalous one in the files. Much more commonly, treaties were understood as means 
to ensure that British firms could be competitive when they decided to invest, rather than to 
make investment in the treaty partner more attractive in the first place. This would mean that 
                                                     
12 Letter from DG Daymond, Inland Revenue, 21 January 1957. File ref FCO 371/126504. 
13 There are, of course, exceptions. Businesses that incurred taxes on gross fees, for example withholding taxes 
on management fees paid out from clients in developing countries would find that, absent a treaty, these tax 
payments would not qualify for a credit against UK tax, because the UK considered them to be levied on gross 
income, not profit. In the opposite direction, staff of foreign airlines working in the UK in some instances found 
themselves taxed by the UK and by their home country. 
14 Memo from Alan J Lord, Inland Revenue, 1 March 1967. File ref FCO 59/1459. 
15 Memo from A Wilkinson, Inland Revenue, 8 April 1976. File ref IR 40/18941. 
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treaties increased investment from the UK to the treaty partner, but not by influencing 
business decisions; rather, they gave British investors a helping hand. 
The effect of treaties on outward investment from the UK was not a trivial matter during the 
1970s, but an important policy question.  Treasury policy was to limit the impact of outward 
FDI on the balance of payments by encouraging it to be done out of retained earnings, 
investment currency or foreign currency borrowing. In 1973, at a meeting of the cross-
Whitehall Tax Reform Committee handling changes to corporation tax, a Treasury official 
argued against measures that would prioritise overseas investment, because of the effect on 
the balance of payments. The concern was both about foreign exchange reserves, which 
could be protected more through income from exports than from direct investment; 
furthermore, the likely shift in manufacturing abroad as a result of overseas investment 
would increase imports.16 
Discussing this point, the 1976 review concluded that the treaty network at that point 
“neither encourages nor discourages overseas investment in fiscal terms compared with 
domestic investment, except where matching credit is provided.”17 At around this time the 
Inland Revenue was arguing against conceding Brazil’s demands for more comprehensive 
concessions in a tax treaty on the grounds that the concessions, “would mean that we were 
according outward investment a higher priority than hitherto with all that that implied for the 
balance of payments and the domestic economy.”18 
The epistemic community of tax specialists who shared this analysis and these objectives 
was not limited to the Revenue itself, in at least one respect: it extended into the private 
sector. In December 1971, Alan Davies of Rio Tinto Zinc (RTZ), chair of the CBI’s tax 
committee, wrote to Alan Lord, Deputy Chairman of the Board of the Inland Revenue. The 
letter outlined the limitations of the Revenue’s current approach to consultation, which was 
to solicit comments from industry by letter once negotiations were initiated. Davies cited “a 
peeved feeling on our side that some more confidence would be justified,” and argued for 
more informal discussion about the progress of negotiations.19 
The result was a system of regular quarterly meetings between tax specialists from industry 
groups (the CBI, British Insurance Association and Chamber of British Shipping) at which 
detailed information on the “state of play” in negotiations was divulged, and comments 
                                                     
16 Memo from D Hopkins, Inland Revenue, 9 November 1973, referring to remarks by “Mr Wass representing 
the Treasury” at a meeting of 23 July 1973. File ref IR 40/17190. 
17 “Double taxation relief.” Report to the Paymaster General, 25 February 1976. File ref FCO 59/1459. 
18 Memo from C Hubbard, Inland Revenue, 22 December 1974. File ref IR 40/19025. 
19 Letter from AC Davies, Rio Tinto Zinc, 15 December 1971. File ref IR 40/18109. 
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sought on specific topics.20 The first such meeting took place in March 1972, and they 
continued for at least the next decade. At each meeting, the Inland Revenue participants 
were supplied with a status report on current and planned negotiations, which they shared 
verbally with the business representatives on condition that the information was not shared 
outside of the small, expert group. When negotiations reached a difficult point, illustrated in 
Section 7.4.2, the matters of contention would often be discussed in this forum. 
7.3.2 Diffusion driven by competition for outward investment opportunities 
Here I consider the preferences of non-specialists, for whom tax treaties were also tools to 
increase the competitiveness of British firms abroad. A lack of detailed taxation knowledge, 
frequently lamented both by them and by the specialists, left them to rely on their own ideas, 
which were not necessarily grounded in facts. This would lead to conflicts, during which the 
Revenue would sometimes try to persuade them that their faith in the effect of tax treaties 
was misplaced. “There can be little doubt that tax treaties are a means of stimulating trade 
and investment between the treaty partner countries,” wrote the private secretary to the 
Treasury minister responsible for tax policy in 1976. “On the other hand their importance is 
sometimes exaggerated.”21  The UK’s lead negotiator noted in 1974, referring to Brazil, that, 
we should not over emphasise the importance of a DTA. It generally only affects 
income flowing from one country to another whereas in the short term a company will 
not remit much in the way of profits and will not be too bothered in the absence of an 
agreement.22 
Most civil service non-specialists who engaged with tax treaty matters during the 1970s 
wanted British firms that were eligible for investment-promoting tax relief in developing 
countries to receive a corresponding credit (often referred to as ‘tax sparing’ credit) against 
UK tax, to ensure that they could retain the benefit of the tax relief when they repatriated 
their profits. As the 1976 review notes, in outlining the priorities of different departments, 
“the main cash benefit for the investor [from a tax treaty] is matching credit for pioneer 
reliefs.”23 The difficulty was that this was not the Inland Revenue’s priority from tax treaties, 
and at times (as in the case of Brazil, below) the two priorities even came into conflict. 
The Inland Revenue sought to keep input from other departments limited and 
compartmentalised, and did not welcome their attempts to influence its priorities. The 
Treasury, Departments of Trade and Industry, and Foreign Office would each be consulted 
                                                     
20 File refs IR 40/18109-18111.  
21 Memo from A. Wilkinson, Inland Revenue, 5 May 1976. File ref IR 40/19025. 
22 Remarks by A Hopkins recorded in note of a meeting on 7 June 1974. File ref IR 40/18969. Emphasis in 
original. 
23 “Double taxation relief.” Report to the Paymaster General, 25 February 1976. File ref FCO 59/1459. 
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on treaties once negotiations were opened, and on specific questions concerning their 
content, but the Revenue would often rebuff their requests to be able to influence its 
priorities. 
During late 1972 and 1973, an extraordinary correspondence opened up between the FCO 
and the Board of Trade on one hand, and the Inland Revenue on the other. The former were 
frustrated by their inability to influence the latter’s negotiating priorities. At a cross-
Whitehall meeting in April 1972, the Revenue had merely invited them to submit ‘shopping 
lists’ for treaties they would like it to negotiate.24 “We have already forfeited opportunities 
for investment in Brazil, notably to the Germans and Japan and, as a matter of commercial 
policy, it is important that we should not place our traders at a disadvantage when seeking 
out investment opportunities in the future,” argued one official from the Board of Trade in 
February 1973.25 He continued that: 
As you know, we have been concerned that the corporation tax system should not so 
limit the scope for tax sparing as to damage the UK’s ability to export to and invest in 
developing (and highly competitive) overseas markets. For this reason, we place great 
importance on the conclusion, as quickly as possible, of double tax agreements with 
our developing trading partners which allow for tax sparing. 
The Revenue rebuffed this pressure, refusing even to share a list of current negotiating 
priorities or negotiations that were underway, because “a high degree of confidentiality 
attaches to our negotiations with particular countries.”26 The reference to confidentiality is 
revealing, because this correspondence took place at the same time as the Revenue had 
begun quarterly meetings with tax specialists from businesses, at which exactly this 
information was disclosed. 
“I find the Inland Revenue’s attitude and behaviour quite extraordinary,” wrote an official in 
the FCO’s financial relations department, as part of correspondence that passed between 
these other departments. “I cannot imagine that any other department in Whitehall would 
behave in this way. Nor would we have allowed any other Department to get away with 
behaviour like this for quite so long. I am quite clear we must call a halt now.”27 Another 
lamented “a dispiriting and unfruitful confrontation with the Inland Revenue.”28 The 
problem for the FCO, in particular, was that it lacked a coherent position within itself, and 
the technical expertise to develop one. “The subject is difficult and mastering it is 
undoubtedly time-consuming” mused one FCO official.29 
                                                     
24 Note of meeting on 20 February 1972. File ref IR 40/17190. 
25 Letter from J Gill, Board of Trade, 15 February 1973. File ref FCO 63/1126. 
26 Letter from A Smallwood, Inland Revenue, 15 March 1973. File ref FCO 59/973. 
27 Memo from D Kerr, FCO, 27 March 1973. File ref FCO 59/973. 
28 Memos from AT Baillie, FCO, 1 November 1972 and 4 April 1973. File ref FCO 59/973. 
29 Memo from D Kerr, FCO, 25 April 1973. File ref FCO 59/973. 
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It was not only officials from other departments who had trouble influencing Inland Revenue 
officials: their own ministers faced the same problem. In general, politicians had little 
involvement in tax treaties at all. At the start of the 1970s, negotiators worked within 
enabling powers set by parliament, and would only seek ministerial guidance when making a 
concession that had not previously been given in negotiations. There seems to have been no 
political involvement in the decision with whom to negotiate, and the minister in charge, the 
Financial Secretary to the Treasury, did not usually have sight of a treaty until bringing it 
before parliament for ratification. 
The technical complexity of tax treaties was inevitably a barrier to effective political 
scrutiny, but this must surely have been combined with the short tenure of Financial 
Secretaries:  eleven different people occupied the position during the 1960s and 1970s, with 
an average tenure of two years.30 As a civil service memo from 1975 notes: 
It is however a long time since the agreements took their present form and the Treasury 
Ministers of today have had no experience in this field outside government.31 
The longest serving Financial Secretary, Robert Sheldon, in post from February 1975 to 
April 1979, was also the only one for whom the Treasury archives record any attempt to 
scrutinise the activities of his civil servants on their treaty making activities. In December 
1975, Sheldon was being briefed ahead of a parliamentary debate at which he was to 
propose the ratification of several tax treaties. He expressed concern that he was expected to 
propose an agreement in parliament that he had not seen beforehand. He suggested that 
parliamentary approval be dropped, and replaced with greater ministerial oversight.32 At a 
subsequent meeting in May 1976, Sheldon wanted “to reassure himself in the absence of 
quantifiable data that when he is asked to recommend a double taxation agreement to the 
House as a reasonably balanced deal he can happily do this.”33 
During the December 1975 debate, Sheldon undertook to look into the costs and benefits of 
tax treaties. This commitment provoked lengthy exchanges within the civil service, both to 
examine costing methodologies and to explain what officials saw as the problem with this 
approach. “What might be a reasonably balanced agreement as a whole,” Sheldon’s private 
secretary wrote to him, “might appear otherwise if the disadvantages were more easily 
quantifiable than the advantages.” Furthermore, such costing information might undermine 
                                                     
30 According to biographies on the UK parliament website, tenure during the period covered by this chapter was 
as follows: Dick Taverne, 1968-1970; Bernard Jenkin,1970-1972; Terence Higgins, 1972-1973; John Gilbert, 
1974-1975; Robert Sheldon, 1975-1979; Nigel Lawson, 1979-1981. 
31 Memo from A Smallwood, Inland Revenue, 5 December 1975. File ref IR 40/18941. 
32 Memo from unnamed author, c. 3 December 1975. File ref IR 40/18941. 
33 Note of meeting on 3 May 1976. File ref IR 40/18941. 
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negotiations. Demonstrating that the UK had obtained a good deal might provoke the other 
country to seek to change it, while a bad deal would set a precedent.34 
These notes indicate the difficulty faced by a minister trying to exert some influence over a 
policy area with which he was unfamiliar. During the mid-1970s, the UK had been seeking 
to amend its treaties to reflect changes to its corporation tax system. The civil servant who 
first briefed Sheldon commented that:  
I got the impression that he does not realise – or did not until I pointed it out to him – 
that double taxation agreements also deal with other matters than dividends…. he 
seemed surprised when I told him we had sixty plus agreements in operation.35 
This lack of understanding is also apparent in the minute of the May 1976 meeting. Sheldon 
questioned “what the OECD Model was and what we would do if it turned out not to provide 
an advantageous pattern for the UK.”36  This question illustrates a lack of basic familiarity 
with the area, and is all the more surprising because Sheldon’s brief would also have 
included ministerial responsibility for the UK’s input into the OECD model tax treaty. To 
make matters worse, Sheldon cut the meeting short before officials could give a full 
explanation. 
A third category of non-specialist stakeholder was those within business, who were 
evidently very keen to influence UK policy. At the non-specialist level, businesses were able 
to influence the positions of other parts of government including the FCO and DTI, but this 
rarely translated into treaties. Geographic departments in the FCO, in particular, were often 
persuaded by businesses, which lobbied British embassies, to advocate new British tax 
treaties. For example, “UK finance houses and business interests are adamant that we are 
losing a significant amount of business in Spain because there is no double taxation 
agreement,” wrote an official in the FCO’s Southern Europe department.37 These positions 
fed into the central FCO departments, in particular the economists’ department and financial 
relations department, which as we have seen were furious that the Inland Revenue would not 
heed their concerns about the competitiveness of British businesses. Meanwhile, the Inland 
Revenue seemed content to divide and rule the geographical departments. 
Business lobbying via these departments met with limited success, partly because those 
other parts of government had limited influence on the Revenue, but also because one part of 
the private sector undermined the other, a fault line that sometimes ran within, rather than 
between, businesses. As the Brazil case study, below, will illustrate, private sector tax 
                                                     
34 Memo from Private Secretary to Financial Secretary, c. October 1974. File ref IR 40/18941. 
35 Memo from unnamed author, c. 3 December 1975. File ref IR 40/18941. 
36 Note of meeting on 3 May 1976. File ref IR 40/18941. 
37 Memo from AT Baillie, FCO, 4 April 1973. File ref FCO 59/973. 
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specialists sometimes directly contradicted their non-specialist colleagues when in 
discussion with the Inland Revenue. While some of these specialists evidently felt it 
necessary to sacrifice the intellectual purity and consensus of the epistemic project for the 
sectional interests of their own firm, in many cases the business-Revenue consultations were 
more a strategic discussion of how to manage their respective non-specialist constituencies.38 
A memo from the CBI to the Department of Trade and Industry, covering a wide range of 
policy and not written by tax specialists, states that tax treaty “negotiations should not be left 
exclusively to the Inland Revenue (whose main concern is naturally the minimisation of 
losses to the Exchequer).”39 But a covering note from the chair of the CBI’s tax committee 
to the Inland Revenue accompanying a copy of the CBI’s submission to the UK-Egypt joint 
economic commission in 1975 argued the opposite. “We were intending to discuss this 
question with you before we let the Department of Trade have any comments,” it said, but 
short notice had prevented it.40 The letter continued:  
Our overseas Department receives such requests from the Department of Trade from 
time to time and we are now trying to ensure that any answer is given by the tax experts 
who attend the join CBI/ICC Working Group meetings at Somerset House [the Inland 
Revenue office] rather than by those who are not too familiar with the technical 
implications. This should avoid any future complications over such representations. 
For businesses, as for the civil service, it appears that technical knowledge was the main 
dividing line between actors with different ideas about the role of tax treaties. 
7.4 Case studies 
The previous section demonstrated two different motivations among different stakeholders 
for the UK pursuit of tax treaties. It also illustrated that a tax competition mechanism driven 
by non-specialists faced a potential ‘firewall’ if it met opposition from specialists.41 In this 
section I outline three sets of two case studies, selected using the same quantitative 
methodology outlined in section 2, to test when and how these different variables were at 
work in shaping the observed outcome of treaty signature. 
I identify three kinds of case studies (Table 7.2). Predicted signatures, in which high a low 
predicted survival is combined with an actual treaty signature, allow me to study the 
                                                     
38 For example, As the UK and Brazil reopened negotiations in the early 1970s, a tax manager of Rio Tinto Zinc, 
who were preparing major investments in the country, lobbied officials at the Inland Revenue in London and at 
the British Embassy in Brazil. Letter from DP Harlow, 13 October 1971 and note of meeting on 7 February 1972. 
File ref IR 40/17189. 
39 CBI memo, 16 September 1974. File ref OD 42/104 
40 Letter from PE Moran, 24 November 1975. File ref IR 40/19097. 
41 The term “firewall” is introduced in Solingen, “Of Dominoes and Firewalls: The Domestic, Regional, and 
Global Politics of International Diffusion.” 
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causative mechanism underlying the apparent diffusion of tax treaties through competition.42 
Comparing these with unexplained non-signatures, where the explanatory variables appear 
to be the same, but the value of the dependent variable differs, allows me to look for 
‘firewalls’ that might have blocked the causal mechanism.43 Finally, comparing predicted 
and unpredicted signatures, which have different values of the explanatory variable but the 
same values of the dependent variable, should allow me to supplement the model of treaty 
diffusion with additional explanatory variables. 
Table 7.2 shows the predicted survival values for each dyad during the decade, comparing 
them with the average for the whole of the UK. During the decade the predicted survival fell 
below the UK average for Thailand and Egypt, the two predicted signatures, and for Brazil 
and Nigeria, the two unexplained non-signatures. As the appearance of all these countries in 
Table 7.1 indicates, the UK opened negotiations with all of them, but it didn’t conclude an 
agreement with Brazil or Nigeria. In contrast, for the two unpredicted signatures, Zambia 
and Bangladesh, the predicted survival never strayed much below average, which means that 
the model did not predict that these countries would sign an agreement with the UK. 
Table 7.2: Predicted survival for within-UK case comparison 
Dyad 
Predicted 
survival 
Average for all UK dyads 0.878 
Predicted signatures 
(minimum) 
Thailand 0.407 
Egypt 0.369 
Unexplained non-signatures 
(minimum) 
Brazil 0.724 
Nigeria 0.785 
Unpredicted signatures 
(minimum) 
Zambia 0.911 
Bangladesh 0.862 
Source: author’s own, based on Barthel and Neumayer and supplemental data44 
7.4.1 Predicted signatures: Thailand and Egypt 
These are cases in which the presence of explanatory variables (including competitive 
pressure) leads to a prediction of signature, and the dependent variable (treaty formation) is 
                                                     
42 Dyads have been categorised as ‘signatures’ if an agreement was signed by 1981, two years after the end of the 
sample period, if agreement was reached in principle by 1979. This is to take into account time for the logistics of 
signature to be arranged. 
43 Choosing case studies is potentially biased because for practical purposes I can only use countries with which 
some communication with the UK took place, in order to for a file to exist. This means that I cannot consider 
treaties where there is no record of any interest from either side, such as Paraguay, Trinidad and Algeria. 
44 Barthel and Neumayer, “Competing for Scarce Foreign Capital: Spatial Dependence in the Diffusion of Double 
Taxation Treaties.” 
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indeed present. Studying these cases qualitatively allows me to find the causal mechanism 
underpinning the quantitative result. The conventional causal hypothesis is that the diffusion 
of tax treaties is driven by competition between developing countries for inward investment, 
while my alternative interpretation is that it is driven by competition among developed 
countries (that is, between the UK and its competitors) for outward investment 
opportunities. 
Thailand 
The 1930s to the 1960s saw a series of false starts to negotiations between the UK and 
Thailand. The British Inland Revenue came under pressure from shipping firms, who faced 
double taxation because of the form of Thailand’s tax on foreign shipping firms.45 It resisted 
this pressure, because it knew that the only terms on which an agreement could be reached 
would be to permit Thailand some taxing rights over British shipping firms, which 
contravened longstanding UK policy.46 By 1961, Thailand had begun to negotiate tax 
treaties with other countries, but there was no interest from British businesses (including 
shipping, whose concerns had been resolved) in a treaty. Speculatively, the UK sent a draft 
treaty, but there was no response, and no follow-up from the UK side. 47 
In the early 1970s, the UK government had started to receive a handful of requests from 
companies, mainly on the grounds that Thailand had by that point concluded tax treaties 
with many competitor countries. After a meeting in 1972 with “the only one who is able to 
talk about Double Taxation Agreements” in Thailand’s revenue department, a British 
Foreign Office official concluded that, “in principle they would be interested but it was not 
likely that Thailand would take the initiative.”48 But he added, “there does not seem to be 
any particular desire on the part of anyone here [among British businesses] to take the 
initiative in asking me to suggest that the UK should have a Double Taxation Agreement 
with Thailand.” A memo from October 1973 notes that “Thailand does not seem to be very 
interested in a DTA with the United Kingdom.”49 
Later that year, negotiations finally kicked off, following a request from the Thai 
government which was based on a desire for a tax treaty with Hong Kong, a British 
dependency.50 Thai officials quickly lost interest on hearing that this was not something the 
UK could negotiate, and the British Foreign office asked the Inland Revenue not to pursue 
                                                     
45 Thailand taxed them on a gross basis, for which they were not eligible for credit in the UK. File ref IR 
40/17358. 
46 Handwritten note, “Relations with Thailand”. File ref FCO 15/972. 
47 Handwritten note, “Relations with Thailand”. File ref FCO 15/972. 
48 Letter from D Montgomery, British Embassy, Bangkok, 5 June 1972. File ref FCO 15/1645. 
49 Untitled note addressed to a Mr Stewart. File ref IR 40/18109 
50 Letter from PR Spendlove. FCO, 12 November 1973. File ref IR 40/18456 
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the matter, as it feared negotiations might interfere with parallel discussions on an 
investment promotion agreement.51 But by this point, having consulted with its contacts in 
industry, the Inland Revenue had become convinced that there was pressure from 
businesses. The Chamber of British Mines attached “special importance” to an agreement 
with Thailand, while the CBI and British Insurance Association had expressed a “strong 
interest.”52 In 1976, following repeated requests by the British, negotiations finally opened 
and an agreement was reached fairly easily after two rounds. 
Notably, the longstanding difference of opinion over shipping proved easy to resolve once 
the UK was set on a treaty. Before finalising the treaty, the Inland Revenue consulted with 
its tax contacts in the shipping industry, who were concerned about the precedent the 
agreement would set. A briefing note for the second round of negotiations stated that: 
The question is one of principle, and as the amount of money involved is small, we 
have decided, after consultation with the General Council of British Shipping, to have 
no Shipping Article in the Convention to avoid providing a precedent with other, and 
more important, countries.53 
With an agreement to differ on shipping, the treaty was agreed in 1977, although not signed 
until 1981 owing to the need to take into account changes to the Thai tax system. 
Egypt 
As with Thailand, Egypt and the UK exchanged correspondence about tax treaties 
sporadically during the 1950s and 1960s, without ever concluding an agreement. The 
initiative seems to have come from different sides at different times, broken off due to 
changes in civil service staff or government, reforms to tax policy, or at one point the Suez 
crisis.54 By the late 1960s a strong preference emerged from the two national airlines, both 
of which were state-owned, for a treaty.55 In March 1969, the Egyptian embassy in London 
formally requested a limited double taxation agreement, which would exempt each country’s 
national airlines from taxation in the other.56 But later that year, when an embassy official 
spoke with Egyptian tax authority officials, they denied all knowledge or interest in this 
proposal, and talks never went ahead.57 The only party to seem aggrieved by this was the 
British Overseas Airways Company (BOAC), which declared itself “bitterly disappointed” 
                                                     
51 Letter from PB Cormack, British Embassy, Bangkok, 4 August 1975. File ref IR 40/18456 
52 Letter from IP Gunn, Inland Revenue, 25 September 1974. File ref IR 40/18456. 
53 “Double taxation convention talks with Thailand.” c. October 1976. File ref IR 40/18456. 
54 “History of Double Taxation Negotiations with Egypt/UAR” in a memo by MJ Powell, Inland Revenue, 1 
November 1968. File ref IR 40/17378. See also correspondence in file ref FO 371/80437. 
55 Correspondence in file IR 40/17378 
56 Letter from the Egyptian ambassador dated 18 March 1969. File ref IR 40/17378 
57 Letters from AJCE Baillie, British Embassy, Cairo, 25 Noevmber and 1 December 1969. File ref IR 40/17378 
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that talks had failed, because Egyptian demands for taxation on it were “unreasonable” and 
“impossible.”58 
The following year, a letter from the British embassy stated that, “I have twice heard 
suggestions that a general double taxation agreement would be both welcome and useful” 
because some UK firms had faced “harsh tax assessments.”59  In February 1971, the UK 
formally requested negotiations on a comprehensive tax treaty, noting that “interest has been 
expressed by a number of British companies.”60 
However, the request does not seem to have had the support of the Inland Revenue, whose 
officials observed in an internal memo: 
The importance of a comprehensive agreement with Egypt is not clear. We have not 
called for representations [from industry] as such and neither have any requests been 
made to us from outside concerns apart from BOAC to take the initiative.61 
The request appears to have met with a similar fate in Egypt. According to a report from the 
embassy: 
a tax official, on discovering that such an agreement would benefit Britain rather than 
Egypt because EgyptAir succeeds in never declaring a profit in London for tax 
purposes, whereas BOAC usually faces a stiff tax bill in Cairo, had decided to sit on 
the notes and do nothing.62 
The logjam was finally broken four years later, when a joint UK-Egypt economic 
commission was underway, managed by the Department of Trade, covering a variety of 
areas of economic cooperation. The CBI’s position document on the economic commission 
recorded “a wide expression of interest in a double taxation treaty with Egypt and there 
would seem to be little doubt that if a satisfactory agreement can be reached there would be 
substantial interest among those members we have consulted, in investment in Egypt.”63 The 
tax treaty was negotiated in one two-week meeting in May 1976. An Inland Revenue note 
indicates that the Egyptians “were willing to be led by us most of the time in the drafting” 
and “for the most part the Egyptians were content” with the British positions.64 
Egypt’s interest in the treaty, however, appears to have been quite weak. The ratification 
process in Egypt dragged on for years after 1976, during which time it became apparent that 
the treaty’s real immediate impact was in increasing British firms’ competitive position. A 
                                                     
58 Letter from JL Sayer, BOAC, 2 December 1969. File ref IR 40/17378. 
59 Letter from MJ Wilmshurst, British Embassy, Cairo, 16 October 1970. File ref IR 40/17378 
60 Letter from British Embassy, 12 February 1971. File ref IR 40/17378. 
61 Memo from J Johnson, Inland Revenue, 9 March 1972. File ref IR 40/17378. 
62 Letter from MJ Wilmshurst, British Embassy, Cairo, 2 November 1972. File ref FCO 39/1280. 
63 CBI Representations on an Egyptian Double Taxation Agreement. Attached to letter from Paul Moran, CBI, 19 
January 1976. File ref IR 40/19097. 
64 Note on UK/Egypt Double taxation talks, May 1976. File ref IR 40/19097. 
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meeting with a construction firm in 1976 records their frustration that competitor firms from 
treaty countries benefited from ‘tax sparing’ provisions. “They were worried that the 
absence of a treaty would mean them losing an order and not getting a foothold in Egypt.”65 
A letter from BOAC, now British Airways (BA), in 1978 complains that “BA are now the 
only major airline in Cairo not exempted from Egyptian tax.”66 By early 1979, an Inland 
Revenue document notes that, in the light of delays at the Egyptian end: 
We are under some pressure from United Kingdom companies with interests in Egypt 
to push the convention through Parliament and into force as quickly as possible.67 
The agreement was ratified by Egypt the same year, and by the UK in early 1980. 
Observations 
In both these cases, discussions that had continued sporadically for some time only became 
earnest negotiations once the Inland Revenue in the UK was convinced that British 
businesses, and specifically its fellow tax experts in the private sector, were interested. This 
interest seems to have been based more on the competitiveness of British firms than on 
stimulating new investment plans, although some opinion on the latter lines was expressed. 
In both cases, the Inland Revenue position was at times out of step with that of the FCO: in 
the Thai case, the FCO was against negotiations, but the Inland Revenue proceeded 
nonetheless; in the Egyptian case, negotiations did not get off the ground at first because the 
Inland Revenue and its Egyptian counterparts did not share their foreign ministries’ 
enthusiasm. 
In any event, while each side expressed interest at different times, the successful 
negotiations were not initiated or driven in either case by Thailand or Egypt, but by the UK. 
This seems to support the view that competitive diffusion of tax treaties is driven by 
competition between developed countries. We cannot see from this evidence what motivated 
the developing countries’ acceptance of British overtures, but we can observe that the 
negotiations came about, and continued to fruition, because of efforts made on the British 
side. 
In the Thai case, Inland Revenue policy on shipping taxation was at first the obstacle 
preventing the Inland Revenue from acquiescing to pressure from British firms. By the 
1970s, tax experts within the shipping firms were allied with the Revenue in seeking to 
uphold this policy, which was why the Revenue sought their opinion before agreeing to a 
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compromise with Thailand. Would tax experts in the Revenue and shipping industry have 
blocked the signature if Thailand hadn’t agreed to the compromise? The answer can be seen 
in a parallel negotiation with Tanzania, which broke down over the shipping question after 
discussions among the same group of experts.68 The context to this firm line with Thailand 
and Tanzania is the creation of a precedent ahead of anticipated negotiations with India, 
where the sums at stake were much larger. 
7.4.2 Unexplained non-signatures: Brazil and Nigeria 
These are cases in which the competitive pressure model predicts the conclusion of a treaty, 
but no treaty was signed. These examples, in comparison with the predicted signatures 
discussed above, illustrate that opposition from the tax specialist community can act as a 
‘firewall’, blocking diffusion through competition.69 
Brazil 
The UK devoted far more time and effort to negotiations with Brazil during the 70s than 
almost any other developing country. Talks in 1967 had failed, but they were taken up again 
from 1972, now in the context of Brazil’s ‘economic miracle’, which British businesses 
wanted to be a part of.70 Brazil adopted a ‘take it or leave it’ approach to certain 
unconventional demands. A particularly difficult issue for the UK was Brazil’s insistence 
that the UK grant extensive tax sparing concessions. In common with many UK treaties, this 
would mean crediting the value of a Brazilian tax exemption against the UK company’s tax 
bill as if it had paid full Brazilian tax, but unusually it would also mean doing the same for 
the reductions in withholding taxes on cross-border payments that Brazil would be able to 
levy on British investors as a consequence of a treaty. In the words of a Brazilian negotiator, 
“whilst Brazil does not want the United Kingdom to lose tax, she cannot allow the United 
Kingdom to collect more tax as a result of the convention.”71 Such a concession required an 
                                                     
68 File ref IR 40/17624 
69 Aside from these examples, there is one other developing country where the data suggest a high competitive 
pressure and the model predicts a low likelihood of survival, but no treaty was signed, and for which a 
negotiation file exists. This is Tunisia, which cannot be used as a full case study because the file stops midway 
through the negotiations, without any explanation for why the countries did not progress to signature until 1982.  
The Tunisia files do, however, give some indication as to why the discussions took so long. They began in 1974 
with a remark by the Tunisian Minister of National Economy that the absence of a treaty “had an inhibiting effect 
on trade between our two countries.” Tunisia’s motivation appears to have been tax sparing credits, but an Inland 
Revenue memo mid-negotiations in 1977, states that, “we doubt whether, in fact, the agreement will be of 
substantial benefit to either side…Tunisia is a small country with no great resources or potential to attract United 
Kingdom investment and it is unlikely that a double taxation agreement will basically alter this.” A letter from 
the CBI concurs that “there is very little interest from our members.” While there may have been competitive 
pressure in Tunisia that is reflected in the data, there evidently was not in the UK. File ref IR 40/19055 
70 Negotiating history summarised in “Brazil Brief 16: Double Taxation Relief Agreement”, 25 August 1974. File 
ref IR 40/19025. The recommencement of negotiations is recorded in file ref IR 40/17189. The civil service files 
include a clipping from the Financial Times discussing Brazil’s “economic miracle”. 
71 F Dornelles, recorded in a note of talks in Brazilia, October 1974. File ref IR 40/19025 
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amendment to section 497(3) of the Income and Corporate Taxes Act 1970 in the UK, the 
provision that gave effect to tax treaties, and this was passed in 1976. There was also 
concern, however, at Brazil’s proposed treatment of royalty payments to the UK, which 
would have seen them taxed as foreign payments, but without (as was normal) allowing 
companies to deduct the value of the royalty payments from the profits against which they 
paid tax.72 
Several European countries, including France and Germany, had reached agreement with 
Brazil, which both increased the pressure on the Inland Revenue and reduced their leverage 
in negotiations. British companies “are undoubtedly at a competitive disadvantage as 
compared with companies from other countries,” noted a background brief in August 1974.73 
“Pressure for an agreement with Brazil comes from the DTI, ODA, our Embassy in Brazil 
and, although perhaps to a lesser extent, from the CBI, in particular RTZ,” wrote an Inland 
Revenue official in November 1973.74 In October 1974, a memo from the Department of 
Industry to the Inland Revenue pressed the case for a treaty, citing “specific evidence of 
orders being lost by British companies apparently because of their relatively lower post-tax 
returns forcing them to quote higher prices in compensation.”75 With no movement by 
December, the Department of Trade weighed in, beginning a correspondence between its 
Secretary of State, Peter Shore, and Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis Healey.76 
The pressure from businesses, then, did not come directly on the Inland Revenue, but via 
other ministries. In fact, tax specialists within British businesses reassured the Revenue that 
they were broadly in agreement with its view that the Brazilian terms were unacceptable.77 
At one point, an internal Inland Revenue note contrasted the position of “the non-fiscal 
voices” within the CBI with that of “the CBI’s Tax Committee, as a Committee of tax 
experts.”78 
As the pressure ratcheted up, the Inland Revenue called a special meeting with its regular 
interlocutors, tax specialists within British multinationals. The latter group agreed with the 
Revenue that Brazil’s terms on royalties would be detrimental in the long term, in view of 
the precedent that would be set: 
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the CBI Secretariat (but not the Overseas Tax Panel) are well aware of the powerful 
trade and political pressures in favour of having an agreement (apparently any 
agreement) with Brazil which he [Mr Morant of the CBI] thought could lead to an 
explosion in the autumn.  His personal view was that the Revenue and Treasury 
Ministers could be under pressures from other Ministers which might lead to an 
agreement, in spite of the unsatisfactory features that had been discussed. Much of the 
pressure is based on ignorance of the effects of unilateral relief and of the likely terms 
of a treaty, and it appears that much of it is generated in Brazil and by companies 
whose only overseas operations are, or are likely to be, in Brazil and which operate 
on the basis of official handouts.79 
Minutes of the meeting and a follow-up letter from the CBI record the industry tax experts’ 
frustration at being unable to correct their colleagues’ “ignorance” because of the 
confidential nature of their meetings with the Inland Revenue.80 
In 1976, British negotiators were able to travel to Brasilia with their new legislative mandate 
on tax sparing, but with instructions “to refrain from agreeing to the unacceptable features of 
Brazilian law which they wish to enshrine in the treaty, but to avoid a breakdown in the 
talks.”81 While the negotiations didn’t create any further progress, the visit was illuminating 
for revenue officials. In negotiations, the head Brazilian negotiator (as reported by British 
negotiators) “frankly admitted that the treatment of royalties was unsound tax practice but 
made it clear his hands were tied,” because of what the minutes describe as “a political 
decision.”82 
The Brazilian officials’ frustration at political constraints preventing an agreement is 
revealed more sharply still by a note of comments made by another negotiator over dinner: 
Dornelles’ No2 (Noqueira) at a dinner given for us last night by the Ministry of 
Finance told me that they are extremely anxious to get a treaty with the U.K. because 
their chances of getting one with the U.S.A, Switzerland or the Netherlands are ranked 
as nil. Switzerland is now second largest investor and will not even discuss a treaty on 
‘German package’ lines. The U.S.A. have an annual meeting with the Brazilians for 
window dressing purposes only. The Netherlands merely write once a year to enquire 
whether there has been any change in Brazil’s policy.83 
After the negotiations, British officials held several meetings with business representatives 
in Rio de Janeiro. Following this meeting, they reached the conclusion that, with one small 
exception that could probably be resolved unilaterally, there was no genuine problem with 
double taxation for most firms, despite the idiosyncrasies of the Brazilian tax system. “The 
impression all three of us got,” wrote the chief negotiator, “was that the business community 
in Brazil were doing very well indeed and that a tax treaty would be a bonus rather than a 
matter of life or death to them…They would not be at all impressed with [a treaty] which 
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served only to confirm the undesirable features of Brazilian law.”84 He concluded that the 
FCO’s picture of British businesses’ views may have been distorted by the Consul General 
in Rio de Janeiro, who had become “positively paranoiac about the whole question of a tax 
treaty with Brazil and has got past the stage, if he was ever there, of being able to consider 
objectively the arguments against accepting the Brazilians’ terms.”85 
The Brazil files stop at the turn of the 1980s, but the same debate continues. In 1992, in a 
separate file, an Inland Revenue official wrote that “Brazil continues to be the big prize: but 
it is not ripe for an immediate approach and what indications there are suggest that it will be 
a difficult nut to crack.”86 The absence of a treaty with Brazil is still raised by British 
business lobby groups today, and was mentioned in parliament in 2014, when the UK-
Zambia treaty was ratified: according to the Minister responsible, the UK and Brazil still 
cannot agree on terms.87 
Nigeria 
The story of the UK-Nigeria tax treaty runs for 25 years, from Nigeria’s original request to 
renegotiate a colonial-era agreement in 1963, through to the final signature of a treaty in 
1987. The original request related to Nigeria’s desire that inward investors from the UK be 
eligible for tax sparing credits in the UK.88 The UK proposed a draft agreement, and 
comments were exchanged during the early 1960s. In 1969, the Inland Revenue decided not 
to press for renegotiation “since the UK would only stand to lose by a new agreement which 
was bound to be less favourable than the old.”89 This came against opposition from the High 
Commission and Foreign Office, which favoured renegotiation to include tax sparing 
credits.90 Negotiations only began in earnest when Nigeria announced the abrogation of all 
its colonial era tax treaties in 1978, and the concurrent imposition of new taxes on air and 
shipping companies.91 
A telegram from the Inland Revenue to the British embassy in Lagos noted that the 
government “is very concerned at serious implications of termination of Double Taxation 
Agreement for British airline and shipping companies,” and asked the embassy to request 
immediate renegotiations “in view of the strength of representation already being made here 
                                                     
84 Memo from B Pollard, Inland Revenue, 4 June 1976. File ref IR 40/19025. 
85 Memo from B Pollard, Inland Revenue, 4 June 1976. File ref IR 40/19025. 
86 Memo from JB Shepherd, Inland Revenue, 14 July 1992. File ref IR 40/17808. 
87 Delegated Legislation Committee, 30 June 2014 
88 Note addressed to the British High Commission, 21 January 1963. File ref IR 40/14909. 
89 “Historical background to talks”, 13 September 1978. File ref IR 40/17629. 
90 Correspondence in file ref FCO 65/1231 
91 The note terminating the Nigeria-UK treaty is dated 29 June 1978. File ref IR 40/17629. 
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at senior official level and the probability of escalation to Ministerial level in the near 
future.”92 
The Nigerian government was willing to sign a new treaty, but according to an Inland 
Revenue official, its proposed draft “would require us to make concessions which are far in 
advance of the terms which other developing countries have accepted in treaties with us.”93 
Progress was made in the first round of talks, including an agreement limited to air and 
shipping that relieved some of the immediate pressure on negotiators, but at the second 
round soon after February 1979 it became apparent to British negotiators that “an agreement 
on the terms offered would have been unattractive in itself and would have served as an 
unfortunate precedent for future agreements.”94 
The main concern was the rate of tax that could be imposed on fees for technical 
consultancy and management services, on which Nigeria had declared what one negotiator 
explained was a “total war.”95 The British economic arguments against taxation of these 
management fees carried little weight because Nigeria’s position was to use tax to 
discourage their payment at all. The Revenue discussed the situation in confidence with tax 
experts within the CBI, who “share our reluctance to reach an agreement until the Nigerians 
make concessions.”96 
The UK position did not change after 1980, but Nigeria did moderate its position, and a new 
treaty was initialled in 1982. However, the treaty was not actually signed – the variable used 
in the data – until 1987. The problem seems to have been with the Nigerian treaty approval 
process, which, unusually, required parliamentary ratification before signature. Although the 
negotiators on both sides were happy with the treaty, Nigerian officials in other ministries 
did not take any action to progress the treaty, according to correspondence in the files.97 
Observations 
The starting point for both Nigeria and Brazil, as with the previous two cases, is competitive 
pressure felt by the UK to sign a treaty with the partner country, because of the need for tax 
sparing credits. In each case, British businesses were pushing for a treaty. The cases indicate 
                                                     
92 Draft telegram, Inland Revenue, 27 July 1978. File ref IR 40/17629. 
93 “Taxation brief for Mr Barratt’s visit to Nigeria and meeting with the Director of Inland Revenue: December 
1978.” File ref IR 40/17629. 
94 Letter from AP Beauchamp, Inland Revenue, 18 May 1979. File ref IR 40/17630. 
95 Letter from DO Olorunlake, Nigerian Federal Inland Revenue Services Department, 17 April 1979. File ref IR 
40/17630. 
96 “Extract from briefing for Chancellor re meeting with Sir David Steel on Tuesday 10/7/79.” File ref IR 
40/17630. 
97 File ref IR 40/17631 
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that, on the UK side at least, this diffusion was driven by non-specialists, and blocked 
because specialists had a veto over treaty negotiations. 
The difference between these non-signatures and the previous two predicted signatures is 
whether or not the Inland Revenue was willing to agree to the compromise available. In both 
unexplained non-signatures, as it had when reaching an accommodation with Thailand, the 
Revenue consulted with fellow specialists in businesses before deciding to reject the other 
side’s demands. The views of non-specialists who wanted the UK to accept Brazil’s terms 
were dismissed as ‘ignorant’ by specialists in the civil service and the private sector, who 
worked together to counter the pressure on the Revenue, because this particular treaty would 
undermine their collective policy enterprise of the dissemination of ‘acceptable’ fiscal 
policy. 
The difference between these two non-signatures is that Nigeria eventually responded to the 
UK digging in its heels by capitulating, while Brazil continued to resist. Why? Drawing 
conclusions from the UK files is difficult, but we can at least speculate. The Brazilian 
officials claimed they wanted to accept the UK’s terms, and that they accepted the rationale 
behind the British position, but that they were constrained by political factors preventing 
them from accommodating the UK. There were ‘firewalls’ on both sides: the British 
specialists and the Brazilian non-specialists. 
Nigeria’s cancellation of a treaty and five-year delay between initialling and signature 
indicates that it too was more concerned with maximising tax revenues than with any urgent 
need to sign a tax treaty. So why did it make the concessions? The files don’t contain an 
answer, other than that the climb-down came after Nigeria had negotiated with a clutch of 
OECD countries, opening up the possibility that its negotiators had learned what developed 
countries considered ‘acceptable’ tax practices during earlier negotiations. An internal 
British note describes the original draft proposed by Nigeria as “an opening bid from a 
country which has had little recent experience in negotiating double tax conventions.”98 
7.4.3 Unpredicted signatures: Zambia and Bangladesh 
These are examples of treaties signed despite an absence of competitive pressure. By 
contrasting them with cases where the competitive pressure did produce a treaty, I can look 
for alternative explanatory variables not captured by the model. 
                                                     
98 “Taxation brief for Mr Barratt’s visit to Nigeria and meeting with the Director of Inland Revenue: December 
1978.” File ref IR 40/17629. 
Chapter 7 The United Kingdom 
175 
 
Zambia 
Negotiations with Zambia moved much more quickly than any of those discussed above. An 
approach by Zambia in 1969 was followed by a single round of negotiations in 1971, at 
which the treaty was initialled, and signature a year later. Zambia’s letter requesting a 
renegotiation placed an emphasis on the inclusion of tax sparing credits, which is likely to 
have been the motivation for the renegotiation, since a treaty already existed.99 In 
negotiations, however, Zambia gave up the tax sparing credits offered by the UK when it 
was told it must choose between this and a withholding tax on royalty payments of 10 
percent.100 Zambian officials made clear that the royalty rate was of crucial importance, 
despite the fact that royalty flows were according to British data, ‘negligible’.101 That 
Zambia caved in when faced with this ultimatum, rather than holding on for British 
concessions in a second round of talks, might be indicative of pressure on negotiators, but it 
is inconsistent with the original request for negotiations. It seems that on Zambia’s side the 
negotiations were not characterised by a clear government policy based on a rational 
expectation that certain features of a tax treaty would attract investment (see chapter 8). 
As the Brazil case study illustrated, however, tax sparing credits were often a priority for 
British businesses, as well as for developing countries. Indeed, such a request had been made 
for the treaty with Zambia during the Inland Revenue’s pre-negotiation consultations with 
industry.102 The British negotiators wrote to their Zambian counterparts soon after the 
conclusion of negotiations to offer the tax sparing credit that they had previously withheld, 
claiming that they had subsequently been pushed by another country to offer similar 
terms.103 Another explanation would be that the UK had been using Zambia’s desire for tax 
sparing credits to try to obtain a lower royalty tax rate, only to have its bluff called. 
Bangladesh 
The UK approached Bangladesh about a treaty in 1976. A background note in the file states 
that “there is not much pressure in the United Kingdom for a treaty with Bangladesh,”104 and 
yet not only were the negotiations initiated by the UK, but pressure for talks was exerted at 
head of state level (“we had earlier made the running and it had required intervention with 
General Zia personally to get things moving,” according to a memo).105 According to the 
background note, the UK’s initiation of the treaty was “partly because other countries had 
                                                     
99 Communication from the Zambian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 September 1969. File ref IR 40/16974 
100 Minutes of negotiation between UK and Zambia, London, 24-27 May 1971. File ref IR 40/16974 
101 Pro forma sheet dated 5 May 1971. File ref IR 40/16974 
102 Letter from EL Gomeche, CBI, 26 June 1970. File ref IR 40/16974 
103 Letter from JA Johnstone, Inland Revenue, 2 July 1971. File ref IR 40/16974 
104 Memo from A Wilkinson, Inland Revenue, 9 September 1977. File ref IR 40/18445 
105 Telegram from O’Neill, FCO, 5 November 1976. File ref IR 40/18445 
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opened negotiations with Bangladesh.”106 Bangladeshi negotiators subsequently indicated 
that they were very keen to initial a treaty with the UK, and to do so before they reached 
agreement with other countries with which they were negotiating.107 During the second 
round of negotiations in Dhaka, the head of state General Zia was given daily updates on 
progress.108 
The main points of contention were shipping, where different positions were resolved by 
leaving this out of the treaty, as had been done with Thailand, and withholding tax rates.109 
On the latter, the discussion was quite difficult, with a Bangladeshi negotiator arguing that 
the UK should break precedent because it was “practically the poorest of the world’s 
underdeveloped countries,” to which his UK counterpart responded that “the United 
Kingdom did not regard a double taxation convention as a vehicle for giving financial aid, 
no matter how deserving the partner country.”110 Despite this, agreement was eventually 
reached, and the treaty was signed in 1979. 
Observations 
As anticipated in the data, neither negotiation resulted from serious competition for inward 
or outward investment, in the sense that there was no anticipation that British firms were in 
need of either treaty to maintain their competitive position, nor that they would commit more 
investment to the developing countries as a result of the treaty. The qualitative evidence thus 
supports the quantitative. This finding is supported by a comparison with the predicted 
signatures, and indeed the unexplained non-signatures, where the quantitative and qualitative 
data indicate much stronger competitive pressure. 
Nonetheless, a competition mentality does seem to have played a part in the initiation of 
negotiations between the UK and Zambia and Bangladesh, suggesting that these countries’ 
approach to identifying treaty partners was not consistent with the rational model of 
competition on which case selection is based. This was a boundedly rational approach by 
which the UK, Zambia and Bangladesh all seemed to develop a preference for signing a 
treaty even though one was unlikely to have a significant positive effect, but would have a 
cost for the developing country (and indeed for the UK if it agreed to a ‘tax sparing’ clause). 
In the Bangladesh case, this applied on both sides, with the UK seeking to open negotiations 
because competitor countries had signed treaties, even though there was no expectation of an 
                                                     
106 The other main reason was requests from businesses who were having trouble remitting income from 
Bangladesh that had been generated before independence, rather than for tax reasons. 
107 Briefing note for “Double Taxation Talks with Bangladesh”, 27-29 July 1977. File ref IR 40/18445 
108 Briefing note for “Double Taxation Talks with Bangladesh”, 27-29 July 1977. File ref IR 40/18445 
109 Minutes of negotiation between Bangladesh and UK, 27-29 July 1977. File ref IR 40/18445 
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increase in investment. Zambia’s request for renegotiations with the UK came at the same 
time as it negotiated with several others, seemingly with the aim of securing tax sparing 
credits: from 1970 to 1984, Zambia concluded 12 treaties, all of which provided for tax 
sparing credits.111 As chapter 8 will illustrate, this negotiating frenzy did not depart from a 
rational or comprehensive assessment of costs and benefits. 
It is interesting that in both these cases, where competitive pressure seems to have been 
relatively weak, agreement was reached more quickly and easily than in the cases described 
earlier, where pressure was stronger.  Although in both cases the sides differed on matters of 
principle, they were quickly willing to make concessions. This is counterintuitive, since the 
absence of competitive pressure to reach agreement would be more likely to encourage 
negotiators to stick to positions that maximised tax revenue. One possibility is that the small 
amount of competitive pressure in these cases corresponded to small amounts of investment, 
which meant that the stakes for both sides from making concessions were lower. Another is 
that the developing country’s interest in negotiations in spite of the lack of competitive 
pressure is indicative of poor policymaking capability, which translated into a weaker 
negotiating stance.  
7.5 Conclusion 
The UK in the 1970s is a quintessential example of a country whose tax treaty network 
appears from the quantitative data to have been driven by tax competition. This is usually 
assumed in policy discourse and in the academic literature to have been competition among 
developing countries to attract British investment. By examining civil service documents I 
have demonstrated that this interpretation is incomplete. In the predicted signatures as well 
as the unexplained non-signatures, the data actually seem to have captured competition by 
the UK for outward investment opportunities. The case in which successful negotiations 
followed a request from the developing country (Zambia) was actually an outlier not 
predicted by the model. 
A further disaggregation into different stakeholders allows us to see the scope conditions 
under which this competition effect worked. The difference between the signatures and non-
signatures was whether or not the terms on which agreement could be reached constituted 
‘acceptable fiscal standards’, the export of which was the policy project pursued by tax 
specialists in the UK (and, the files suggest, their colleagues in other OECD countries). For 
these specialists, the aim was to bring order to international fiscal anarchy by ensuring that 
                                                     
111 Two exempted dividends paid to direct investors from tax in the home country entirely, which had the same 
effect. 
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multinational firms were taxed according to rules that they had formulated through the 
OECD. Competition and business pressure were only effective in so far as the specialists 
could be persuaded that the terms of an agreement were consistent with this aim, because the 
UK treaty-making apparatus gave them a veto, and they were further insulated by the 
technical obscurity of tax treaties that prevented other stakeholders from influencing their 
activities. 
Importantly, the ‘in group’ for decision making within the UK was not defined by 
occupation, but by specialism. Private sector officials who had a tax specialism were brought 
inside the tent, and their views were influential in decisions made by the Inland Revenue in 
the Brazil, Nigeria and Thailand cases. Information readily supplied to the business tax 
experts was at the same time withheld from government officials from other departments on 
the grounds of confidentiality, and their views dismissed as ‘ignorant’. Even the government 
ministers supervising tax officials were unable to exert influence because they lacked the 
technical understanding. 
The difference between the correct and incorrect predictions of signature, as expected, was 
whether or not there was substantial pressure from British businesses to sign a treaty, as 
anticipated by the data.  In each case, the developing country seems to have been interested 
in concluding an agreement, but less clear about how it would attract investment, and yet 
more willing to make concessions. This illustrates that few developing countries at this point 
in time had clearly defined negotiating positions or analyses of the likely impact of tax 
treaties. Instead, boundedly rational competition for inward investment appears to have 
driven their negotiating stances, a suggestion that the next two chapters will explore more 
fully.
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8 Zambia 
They ask for an arm and a leg and you give them both legs. 
- Zambian government official1 
 
This chapter complements the previous one by considering the other end of negotiations, in a 
developing country.2 One of the few negotiations between the UK and a developing country 
during the 1970s that was initiated by the developing country itself was the 1972 treaty with 
Zambia. In comparison with other agreements signed by the UK at the time, this was an easy 
negotiation for the UK, in which Zambia did not gain an outcome that protected many of its 
source taxing rights. The surprising thing about Zambia’s actions towards the UK, which 
were typical of its broader approach to tax treaties, is that the competitive pressure on the 
Zambia-UK dyad, and on Zambia in general, was small, compared to other dyads where 
treaties were signed during this period. 
Zambia is a moderate outlier, which had a higher than expected propensity to sign tax 
treaties during 1970-9, and a lower than expected propensity during 2003-12.  During the 
1970s, it signed ten tax treaties, with countries of Western Europe and Japan. No other sub-
Saharan country signed so many: Kenya and Tanzania, the next closest by number of 
signatures, signed six each.3 In contrast, from 2003-12, a period when sub-Saharan countries 
signed 72 treaties between them, Zambia signed just three, with China, Mauritius and the 
Seychelles. All of them were signed late in the decade, despite evidence that negotiations 
began much earlier. 
The selection of a positive outlier is consistent with my model building strategy, whereby I 
identify cases that seem to be explained by something other than rational competition for 
investment. In Zambia in the 1970s, a context where nobody in the bureaucracy had a 
detailed knowledge of international tax, the idea that treaties would attract investment took 
hold, but the sacrifice of taxing rights made by Zambian negotiators was much greater than 
was necessary to secure treaties. The large tax revenue from Zambia’s mining industry 
during the early 1970s made information about the costs of the treaties Zambia was 
negotiating less important to those driving the negotiations.  
                                                     
1 Interview 44 
2 Some of the evidence and analysis in this chapter has been published in another form. See Hearson, Tax 
Treaties in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Critical Review. 
3 IBFD, “IBFD Tax Research Platform.” 
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Zambia was also an outlier during the 2000s, but this time in the other direction, signing a 
much smaller number of treaties than predicted. Examining this period enables me to 
identify scope conditions for diffusion that were not fulfilled. I conclude that ministers and 
senior officials, who were veto players in the ratification process, were concerned about the 
fiscal costs of tax treaties, since Zambia’s tax/GDP ratio had declined since the 1970s, and 
multinational corporate tax was becoming increasingly politicised. Tax treaty officials, 
exposed to external advice and socialising environments, came to adopt the ideas about tax 
treaties that had disseminated through the international expert community. This led to 
support for the policy project of a network of tax treaties promulgating standards formulated 
by that community, regardless of any effect on investment. But this mechanism was blocked 
by the non-specialists, whose main concern was protecting tax revenues. 
Table 8.1: Phases of treaty negotiation in Zambia 
Dates Main mechanism Scope condition Outcome 
1970-79 2. Competition for 
inward investment 
Fiscal costs not 
salient 
Present Rush to 
negotiation 
2003-12 3. Dissemination of 
standards 
Specialist control 
of veto points 
Absent Negotiations 
blocked 
Source: Author’s own 
8.1 1970-9 
This first time period was studied primarily using historical documentary sources. These 
include negotiation correspondence and meeting minutes from Zambia’s negotiation with 
the UK, obtained from the British national archives, and informal intelligence on Zambia’s 
broader treaty negotiation programme, from the same files and from US diplomatic cables.4 I 
also use written accounts from individuals involved in economic policymaking in Zambia at 
the time, and official documents published by the Zambian government, in particular the 
annual reports of its Commissioner of Taxes, which include sections on tax treaty 
negotiations. Telephone and email interviews were also conducted with two former advisers 
to the Zambian government during the 1970s who have published work about their 
experiences, Charles Irish and Andrew Sardanis.5 
While the first tax agreement signed by Zambia after independence was with regional 
neighbours in the East African Community, in 1968, Zambia soon sought to obtain new 
                                                     
4 Wikileaks, “Public Library of US Diplomacy.” 
5 Irish, “International Double Taxation Agreements and Income Taxation At Source:”; Irish, “Transfer Pricing 
Abuses and Less Developed Countries”; Sardanis, Zambia: The First Fifty Years. 
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agreements with developed countries, focusing first on countries with which it had not 
inherited an agreement from colonial times. This first wave of negotiations included Japan, 
Ireland, Italy, Germany, Denmark and (unsuccessfully) India and Pakistan (Table 8.2). 
These negotiating priorities follow quite closely the pattern of Zambia’s main sources of 
foreign investment at the time (Table 8.3). While the signatures came in the early 1970s, 
many of the negotiations appear, technically, to have taken place before this date, as the 
detailed timeline of treaty negotiations in Table 8.2 shows. 
Table 8.2: Zambian negotiations during 1970-1979 
Partner Colonial 
agreement 
inherited? 
Negotiations 
opened 
Agreement 
reached 
Signed In force 
Japan No 1967 1968 1970 1971 
Ireland No 1967 1968 1971 1972 
Italy No 1968 1971 1973 * 
Germany No 1968 1971 1974 1976 
Denmark No 1971 1972 1974 1975 
Norway Yes 1971 1971 1971 1973 
United Kingdom Yes 1971 1972 1972 1973 
France Yes 1971 * * * 
Sweden Yes 1971 1971 1974 1976 
United States Yes 1972 * * * 
Netherlands Yes 1978 1978 1978 1982 
Switzerland Yes * * * * 
Finland No 1979 1979 1979 1986 
India No 1968 * * * 
Source: Reports of Zambia Commissioner of Taxes, 1967-1974; IBFD6 
In his 1968 report, the Commissioner of Taxes also announced a plan to review and 
renegotiate the country’s colonial-era agreements.7 At independence in 1964, Zambia had, 
like other former British colonies, inherited a set of tax treaties signed on its behalf by 
Britain. There were six treaties with European countries, one with the United States, and a 
collective one with Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda - the East African Community countries. 
Colonial era agreements between developed and developing countries tended to restrict the 
latter’s right to tax quite considerably, in a manner that was inconsistent with the newly 
founded states’ need to finance themselves, a state of affairs that provoked many developing 
countries to cancel or renegotiate these treaties.8 
                                                     
6 IBFD, “IBFD Tax Research Platform.” 
7 Knoetze, Report of the Commissioner of Taxes, 1966/7. 
8 Irish, “International Double Taxation Agreements and Income Taxation At Source:” 
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Table 8.3: Foreign investors in Zambia's state-owned enterprises, 1974 
Country Colonial 
agreement 
inherited? 
Industry 
Canada No Mining, brewing 
Germany No Chemicals 
Italy No Road transport, Oil & gas, Manufacturing, Engineering 
Japan No Chemicals 
Liechtenstein No Manufacturing 
Romania No Mining 
South Africa Yes Mining 
Sweden Yes Manufacturing 
Tanzania (government) Yes Road transport, Oil & gas 
UK Yes Mining, Import/export houses, Oil & gas, Brewing, 
Sugar, Chemicals, Manufacturing, Building supplies, 
Milling 
US Yes Mining, Manufacturing 
Source: Shaw9 
The Zambian review seems to have taken several years to get off the ground, and most of the 
renegotiations took place in around 1971-2.10 Not every one of Zambia’s treaty partners 
agreed to reopen its existing treaty with Zambia: it did try with France, in particular, but 
unsuccessfully.  Some recently independent countries, such as Kenya, Uganda, and later 
Nigeria, chose to abrogate their treaties in such circumstances, to force countries to the table 
and secure a better deal; others, such as Malawi, concluded that renegotiation was not a 
priority at all.11 Zambia, on the other hand, opted for a piecemeal approach, renegotiating 
individual treaties to replace old agreements where it could. As a result, its colonial era 
agreements with France and Switzerland remain in force to this day. 
8.1.1 Diffusion driven by competition for inward investment 
What were Zambian negotiators trying to achieve? It is clear that investment promotion was 
a priority. One of the first Acts passed by the new Government of Zambia was the 1965 
Pioneer Industries (Relief from Income Tax) Act, which granted tax incentives to encourage 
investment in sectors outside of the dominant mining sector, and in the non-mining areas of 
the country.12 Many foreign investors were unable to secure the full benefits of these tax 
incentives, however, because their lower tax bill in Zambia simply led to a higher tax bill in 
their home country. 
                                                     
9 Shaw, “The Foreign Policy System of Zambia,” 44–46. 
10 Luhanga, Report of the Commissioner of Taxes, 1970/1; Chiwenda, Report of the Commissioner of Taxes, 
1971/2. 
11 Irish, “International Double Taxation Agreements and Income Taxation At Source:” contrasts Kenya and 
Malawi, while Nigeria is discussed in Chapter 7 of this thesis 
12 Saasa, “Zambia’s Policies towards Foreign Investment: The Case of the Mining and Non-Mining Sectors,” 30. 
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Zambia thought that the inclusion of a ‘tax sparing’ provision in a tax treaty would resolve 
this issue, giving full effect to the incentives outlined in the 1965 Pioneer Industries Act. All 
of the 11 treaties concluded between Zambia and OECD member countries during the 1970s 
and 1980s provided explicitly for tax sparing credits, or else contained provisions that had 
the same effect.13 The priority accorded to the tax sparing clause is illustrated in the formal 
letter from Zambia to the UK, requesting that negotiations be opened: 
In recently negotiated Agreements, Zambia has followed substantially the O.E.C.D. 
Draft Convention and it is suggested that any new Agreement should substantially 
follow this Draft Convention. Zambia would, in particular, wish to discuss matters 
arising from the operation of the Zambian Pioneer Industries (Relief from Income 
Tax) Act.14 
While the treaties may have improved the effectiveness of Zambia’s investment promotion 
measures, by the time that they were concluded they also undermined some of its newer 
policies towards foreign investors. From 1968 onwards, Zambia attempted to balance 
investment promotion with other concerns: preventing the repatriation of capital by 
investors, increasing the participation of Zambian entrepreneurs in the country’s economic 
development, and a rebalancing of the government’s tax base away from large but volatile 
mining revenues. The reform agenda began with President Kaunda’s 1968 ‘Mulungushi’ and 
‘Matero’ declarations, which announced the partial nationalisation of the non-mining and 
mining industry respectively.15 
According to Andrew Sardanis, an expatriate civil servant who helped design them, the 
Mulungushi reforms were designed “to give space to African businessmen to develop away 
from competition from better financed and more experienced foreign-owned enterprises.”16 
Financial Times journalist Antony Martin argues that the reforms were inspired in part by “a 
growing awareness that it would be futile for Zambia to rely primarily on foreign investment 
for its development.”17 
As the copper price began to fall in 1971-2, the government tightened exchange controls and 
imposed import licensing restrictions to tackle its declining balance-of-payments deficit.18 
There was growing concern that, as Ann Seidman explains: 
an increasing portion of the after-tax surpluses in the private sector was removed from 
the country - even after the economic reforms of 1968 and I969 -largely in the way of 
profits, interest, dividends, compensation for government acquisition of shares in 
                                                     
13 Two exempted dividends paid to direct investors from tax in the home country entirely. 
14 Communication from the Zambian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 September 1969. File ref IR 40/16974 
15 Kaunda, Zambia’s Economic Revolution : Address at Mulungushi, 19th April, 1968. 
16 Sardanis, Zambia: The First Fifty Years, 67. 
17 Martin, Minding Their Own Business : Zambia. 
18Seidman, “The Distorted Growth of Import-Substitution Industry: The Zambian Case,” 620. 
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industries, and salaries for expatriates. Together these totalled almost K200 million in 
1971…about a third of Zambia’s investible surpluses19 
Kaunda delivered a speech in 1973 criticising the mining companies, complaining among 
other things that, “in the last three and a half years…they have taken out of Zambia every 
ngwee [penny] that was due to them.”20 As well as dividend repatriation, Kaunda 
complained that agreements with the mining companies permitted them to “provide sales 
and marketing services for a large fee. Although most of this work is performed in Zambia 
the minority shareholders have entered into separate arrangements with non-resident 
companies for reasons best known to themselves.”21 
8.1.2 Positive scope condition: low salience of the tax/GDP ratio 
At the turn of the 1970s, Zambia’s tax-to-GDP ratio was a phenomenal 34 percent.22 This is 
comparable with the rate in OECD countries today, and more than double the average for 
sub-Saharan countries.23 It is no surprise, therefore, that Zambia’s treaty negotiations at the 
turn of the 1970s were not driven by a technical analysis of the actual effects of these 
treaties’ negotiated content, and that negotiators had made no attempt to cost them. The 
report of Zambia’s Inspector of Taxes in 1972/3 quotes the cost of the reduced withholding 
tax rates in treaties in force at that time, expressed as refunds to taxpayers from the domestic 
law rate. “An increase in claims for refunds is expected,” it notes, “but no estimate of the 
total refunds can be made.”24 
The withholding taxes on interest, royalty, technical fee and dividend payments made to 
overseas recipients had been introduced in 1971 and 1972, after agreement was reached on 
the new tax treaties, but before they were signed. They were primarily concluded as part of 
efforts to limit the repatriation of capital and support diversification of the economy in the 
context of falling copper prices, but the government also recognised that:  
Only with a significant increase of the fiscal revenues from sources outside the mining 
sector will it be possible to maintain the share of fiscal revenue in the GDP at a level 
of about 34 percent.25 
Despite difficulties in administrating them effectively, the new withholding taxes were also 
significant in revenue terms. By 1974, they were already raising 17 million kwatcha, out of 
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total government revenue of 628 million.26 They could have raised more, but the newly 
implemented agreements with Ireland, Japan, Norway and the UK were already costing 
Zambia ten percent of its potential revenue from the dividend withholding tax.27 All the 
treaties prevented Zambia from imposing withholding taxes on technical and management 
fees, and capped the taxes it could levy on the other types of payment. But the first two 
agreements to be reached, with Japan and Ireland, also ruled out any withholding taxes on 
dividends and (in the Irish case) interest and royalties altogether. Because most of Zambia’s 
foreign investment came from treaty partner countries, these agreements significantly 
blunted the effectiveness of withholding taxes, as both revenue-raising and exchange control 
policies. It appears that, with such a high tax-to-GDP ratio, nobody was looking closely at 
the impact of tax treaties, especially in the earliest negotiations. 
8.1.3 Low technical knowledge enabled diffusion 
In late 1972, Charles Irish, a three years-qualified American lawyer, arrived as a lecturer at 
Zambia University and an adviser to Zambia’s finance ministry. Irish was aghast at what he 
regarded as the unfair nature of the tax agreements signed by Zambia with developed 
countries (he referred to it as a ‘bias for residence’ taxation). He described the agreement 
with Germany as ‘horribly inequitable’, while negotiators from the United States, “were 
putting forward a treaty that was so one-sided it should have made them blush.”28 
In 1974, Irish published a paper castigating the system, singling out the withholding tax 
revenue lost by Zambia through its treaties with the UK, US, Germany and Japan. He wrote: 
The practical effect of the present network of double taxation agreements between 
developed and developing countries is to shift substantial amounts of income tax 
revenues to which developing countries have a strong legitimate and equitable claim 
from their treasuries to those of developed countries. Concomitantly, these double 
taxation agreements result in a very considerable and unnecessary loss of badly needed 
foreign exchange reserves for developing countries. In other words, the present system 
of tax agreements creates the anomaly of aid in reverse - from poor to rich countries.29 
According to Irish, negotiations at this time were pushed by a finance minister and his 
permanent secretary seeking to send a signal to investors, with little regard to the content. 
Interviewed in 2014, Irish stated that Zambia’s negotiating strategy was not based on an 
analysis of the technical detail of treaties: 
My impression of that time was that the revenue concerns were of less importance 
than the prestige concerns, and if you were able to conclude a tax treaty with the UK 
or the US then that was seen at the time in the minds of policymakers as opening the 
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door to the possibility of foreign investment from those countries. There wasn’t a very 
good awareness of the revenue consequences of the treaties, not very much at all.30 
In his paper, he concluded that developing countries “feel compelled to accept any double 
taxation agreement in order to remove impediments to foreign investment contained in the 
internal tax systems of developed countries and to provide assurances of stability to foreign 
investors” and were “unaware of the adverse nature of tax agreements with a bias for 
residence.”31 
Andrew Sardanis, an expatriate who was permanent secretary to the finance ministry in 
1970-1, concurs. Zambia’s treaty with Ireland remains a stand-out example of a one-sided 
treaty, leaving Zambia with very few taxing rights at all. According to Sardanis: 
The fact is that most of the times, we let the other side write the agreements…We 
were all very raw in those days and we also had our likes and dislikes.  We liked 
Ireland because of its history of conflict with the UK and because many Irish in 
Northern Rhodesia were sympathetic to us during the period of apartheid.32 
Three organisational factors are likely to have exacerbated the failure to fully appreciate the 
consequences of treaty negotiations. First, there was the ongoing problem of, in Irish’s 
words, a civil service “dominated by people who didn’t have very much formal education” 
lacked technically adept bureaucrats who might have scrutinised the content of treaties.33 
This difficulty is corroborated by annual tax commissioners’ reports, which outline the 
department’s ongoing struggle to recruit, train and maintain skilled staff. Successive 
commissioners complained of poor facilities, lack of sufficient budget, and failure to fill 
more senior posts with competent staff.34 Little wonder then that, in Charles Irish’s words 
based on his experience in Zambia, “the income tax departments of developing countries are 
woefully undertrained and understaffed and are barely able to cope with the administration 
of domestic tax laws, much less give serious consideration to complex international tax 
matters.”35 For the Ministry of Finance it was the same, according to a study of mineral 
taxation reforms, which notes that “Zambia did not have the needed cadre of technically-
trained public officials and professional economists to contest the companies' claims.”36 
This was compounded by a second factor, President Kaunda’s predilection for moving 
minsters and senior officials between posts on an almost annual basis. Dennis Dresang and 
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Ralph Young describe a “merry-go-round” in ministerial posts, the product of political and 
later economic instability within the government.37 From 1965 to 1975, ministerial 
reshuffles or organisational changes that shifted ministerial responsibilities took place every 
ten months,38 while the average period of a permanent secretary in post was 18-24 months.39 
The post of tax commissioner, with responsibility for tax treaty negotiation, was occupied by 
a different person each year from 1970 to 1974. The Ministry of Finance changed Permanent 
Secretaries at least four times in six years between 1967 and 1974.40 
The negotiation minutes and correspondence from Zambia’s negotiations with the UK bear 
out Irish’s assertion that this state of affairs led to tax treaties “too often the product of 
unquestioned acceptance of the developed country's position after little or no substantive 
negotiation.”41 Zambia’s negotiations with the UK in 1971 were carried out personally by 
the newly-appointed EC Chibwe, on a whistlestop tour of European capitals, flanked by two 
officials from other departments who did not appear to speak in the negotiations.42 The 
Zambia-UK treaty was initialled in less than four days, an unusually easy negotiation. 
Notably, having emphasised the tax sparing clause in its letter requesting an agreement 
(written under a previous tax commissioner), Zambia’s negotiators dropped this demand – 
apparently the main original motivating factor for the treaty – when forced to choose 
between it and a retaining the right to levy a higher withholding tax on royalty fees.43 
Furthermore, the competitive pressure model does not predict a treaty with the UK at all, and 
UK investors did not consider it to be valuable. It seems hard to sustain the view that 
Zambian negotiators had a clear idea of why they wanted a treaty with the UK, what they 
needed to concede to get one, nor that they understood the aspects of the treaty most likely 
to bring the most costs or benefits. 
A third factor was the role that appointments to senior positions played in political 
patronage, especially during the period when treaty negotiations were underway. Until the 
institution of the one-party state in 1972, senior posts in the Zambian government were used 
to balance the representation of different factions in the ruling coalition.44 The finance brief 
came with substantial prestige and was allocated accordingly: it changed hands in 1967 as 
part of the balancing act, then twice in 1969, when it was first added to the portfolio of Vice 
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President Emmanuel Kapepwe, and then moved to a new post of Minister of Development 
and Finance.45 Zambia’s lead tax treaty negotiators, its tax commissioners, were thus 
operating without any specialist technical support below them, and without any focused 
scrutiny above them.  
Figure 8.1, below, illustrates that the settlements obtained by Zambia in its initial spate of 
tax treaty negotiations were at the lower bound of the outcomes obtained by other sub-
Saharan countries.46 It is based on an index of tax treaty content that codes provisions in the 
treaty based on whether they give taxing rights to the host or home country of an investor. A 
higher number means the treaty better protects the taxing rights of the host country (i.e., the 
developing country). 
During the late 1970s and 1980s, Zambia’s position towards inward investors became, if 
anything, more favourable, with a relaxation of exchange controls in 1976 and a new 
package of tax incentives in 1977.47  Yet Zambia became a more cautious, better tax treaty 
negotiator. The agreements signed between 1978 and 1985, with Finland, India and Canada, 
still follow the pattern of countries with some investment in Zambia (Table 8.3), but these 
agreements were reached at a much slower pace, and Figure 8.1 shows much improved 
negotiating outcomes.  
By his own account, the presence of an expatriate international tax specialist – Charles Irish 
– had made a difference.48 This is corroborated in US diplomatic cables that record Zambia’s 
negotiations with the US. In October 1973, the US embassy in Lusaka informed the US 
Treasury that Zambia’s ministry of finance “had decided [to] seek [an] agreement more 
favorable to GRZ [Government of Zambia] in revenue terms than past agreements.”49  
Instead of just one round of negotiations, the cables indicate that at least three took place. 
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Zambia’s delegation was led by a less senior official, its Deputy Commissioner of Tax, and 
also included Irish.50 The agreement was never signed. 
Figure 8.1: Negotiated content of tax treaties signed by sub-Saharan countries, 1970-1985 
 
Source: The ActionAid Tax Treaties Dataset51 
8.1.4 1970-1979: conclusion 
In summary, the late 1960s and early 1970s saw Zambia rush into negotiating a number of 
tax treaties with the aim of attracting inward investment through ‘prestige’ and tax sparing 
clauses, producing nine treaty signatures during the time period under consideration. The 
decision to negotiate, with whom and on what basis, was made in the first half of the 1970s 
without any detailed knowledge of the specifics of tax treaties. As a result, Zambia displayed 
an almost reckless disregard for the treaties’ implications, making concessions that 
undermined policies it was simultaneously trying to implement to raise more revenue and 
keep capital in the country. Zambia also lacked a clear sense of the concessions that it might 
have been able to extract from treaty partners, as illustrated by the better results obtained by 
other African countries in negotiations with the same countries, and the better results 
Zambia itself obtained once it had the support of an external specialist adviser. 
In the absence of their own specialist knowledge or that of any specialists within their 
bureaucracy, Zambia’s inexperienced negotiators relied on cognitive shortcuts that derived 
from ideas about the likely impact of tax treaties, and ignored the detail. The country’s high 
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tax-to-GDP ratio at this time reduced the attention paid by ministers and finance ministry 
officials to the revenue losses they were incurring, even though they were far from 
immaterial to the country’s overall tax position.  
8.2 2003-12 
From 1997 onwards, Zambian bureaucrats had been participating extensively in international 
training and conferences on tax treaties. In the early 2000s, Zambia was even among 25 
countries represented on the UN Committee of Experts dealing with tax treaties. Interview 
evidence indicates that a number of negotiations and renegotiations took place during this 
time, but no treaties came to signature until 2010, when agreements with China, Mauritius 
and the Seychelles were signed, followed by Botswana in 2013. Mauritius and the 
Seychelles, of course, are tax havens, and these treaties open Zambia up to the risk of tax 
avoidance structures.  
The data for this second time period are drawn from 15 semi-structured interviews. 
Fieldwork conducted in Lusaka in September 2014 followed a snowball sampling approach, 
beginning from contacts made through NGOs and at international meetings. Interviews were 
conducted with a total of three current and two former officials drawn from the finance 
ministry and tax authority, including those with responsibility for treaty negotiations in these 
two institutions during the most recent waves of negotiations. These were triangulated 
through interviews with three tax advisers in the private sector, two British officials familiar 
with the recent Zambia-UK renegotiation, two expatriate technical assistance providers, and 
several other stakeholders from NGOs and academia in Zambia. These interviews have all 
been anonymised, at the request of some government interviewees.  
8.2.1 Diffusion driven by dissemination of technical standards 
The reintroduction of multiparty democracy in 1991 saw the election of only Zambia’s 
second government since independence. As part of a classic structural adjustment 
programme, the new Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) government 
immediately began to implement an aggressive suite of Washington Consensus policies, 
eliminating tariffs and exchange rate controls, privatising much of the state-owned industry, 
and introducing a VAT.52 Within two years, it had passed an act creating a new semi-
autonomous Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA), a reform that swept through Anglophone 
Africa during the 1990s as a means of increasing the efficacy of revenue collection.53 Semi-
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autonomous revenue authorities are governed at arm’s length from the government, free to 
set their own employment practices to reduce the extent of patronage in their staffing, and to 
improve staff retention.54 
The creation of a specialist organisation dealing with tax administration, combined with an 
influx of technical assistance on tax issues from donors such as the UK, Germany and Japan, 
quickly brought senior Zambian officials into contact with an international network of tax 
treaty negotiators. A review document prepared by the OECD secretariat and the 
government of Zambia in 2011 describes the extent of this interaction: 
Officials from the Ministry of Finance and National Planning together with the ZRA 
are working closely with their counterparts in other jurisdictions through double 
taxation agreements and organisations such as: the African Union; OECD; African 
Tax Forum; World Customs Organisation; SADC; COMESA Technical Committees 
on Customs; etc. Zambian Officials are often invited to attend discussions on issues 
pertaining to tax administration and customs border control organised by international 
organisations. An example of the outcomes of networking on tax treaties are the 
double taxation agreements that Zambia has signed with a number of countries.55 
As one negotiator, who was senior within the ZRA at this time, explained, “from about 
1997, the ZRA having been formed in 1994, there was a lot of interest from the OECD to get 
non-OECD countries to appreciate the issue of [tax treaties].”56 Zambia went ‘religiously’ to 
OECD tax treaties meetings in Paris, and participated in numerous OECD trainings.57 
Throughout the 2000s, it was represented almost every year at either the OECD’s Global 
Forum on Tax Treaties in Paris, or the annual session of the United Nations Committee of 
Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters in Geneva. Its representatives were 
generally top-ranking officials from within the revenue authority.58 At these meetings, 
according to an analysis of OECD documents by Lynne Latulippe: 
The OECD's activities created and maintained non-members' perception that tax 
treaties were necessary to attract FDI, although it did not produce any direct evidence 
of the consequences or the influence of tax treaties.59 
Several examples illustrate the prevailing direction of discussions in these forums. In 2002, 
members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) signed a memorandum 
on tax cooperation, which committed them to “strive to ensure the speedy negotiation, 
conclusion, ratification and effective implementation of tax treaties” and “establish amongst 
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themselves a comprehensive treaty network.”60 COMESA entered into a similar project in 
2009.61 Zambia’s decision to accede to requests from Mauritius and the Seychelles for tax 
treaties, despite the risks originating from their position as tax havens, was linked by many 
interviewees to the SADC protocol. As one government interviewee explained: 
First of all there’s the issue of expanding the network. Being part of SADC, SADC 
protocol says you’re going to have treaties with each other. There’s this thing that says 
you’re in this together. If you just look at tax on its own you’re never going to sign 
any treaties.62 
In 2006, UNCTAD, in a project funded by the Japan Bank of International Cooperation, 
produced the “Blue Book” for Zambia, which included the following among its ten 
recommendations for capacity building assistance: 
Carry out a [tax treaty] negotiation round with China, the Republic of Korea and three 
other South-East Asian countries with strong investment interests in Zambia. This can 
be facilitated by UNCTAD. The participants will consist of teams of DTT negotiators 
mandated by their country to negotiate and conclude such agreements. The round will 
last five days. UNCTAD's secretariat will provide assistance for the facilitation and 
the organization of the round (preparatory work, invitations, exchange of drafts and 
comments, preparation of the negotiating matrix, secretarial backstopping during the 
round).63 
Zambia’s specialist international tax officials at the time saw tax treaties as intimately linked 
with investment, but not as drivers of new inward investment. As they saw it, investors from 
countries without tax treaties might face double taxation, and this was a problem that should 
be resolved. According to a senior Zambia Revenue Authority official at the time: 
We wanted to expand the network. It was about the time we had opened up, and there 
was a lot of interest in terms of FDI coming into the country. It was about the time 
investors were coming in, and we wanted to have treaties there to avoid double 
taxation.64 
His counterpart from the Ministry of Finance also explained that treaties “come from the 
investors’ influence. It’s when they need to repatriate income.”65 One of the former 
negotiators even expressed quite a cynical view about the political reality of his position: 
I know there’s empirical evidence that it has no effect on investment, but the reality 
country-to-country is that there’s a bluff goes on, and countries don’t want to take the 
risk of losing big investments… China you know is a powerhouse. They come and 
say, ‘for us to further this investment, we need a treaty.’ That’s what it’s about: 
bluffing.66 
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8.2.2 Negative scope conditions: political veto players and high fiscal cost 
salience 
Despite devoting so much energy to tax treaty negotiations throughout the 1990s and 2000s, 
Zambia had only actually concluded four tax treaties by 2014, with China (as recommended 
in the ‘Blue Book’) and the Seychelles, Mauritius and Botswana (all SADC members).  
Negotiators at the time indicated that many renegotiations, including with South Africa, 
Tanzania and the UK, were stalled once officials had reached agreement, while others failed 
to get off the ground due to slow ministerial approval.67 No treaties were actually signed 
until 2010, and it is common knowledge among negotiators and advisers in the private sector 
that these – as well as several that have not been signed – had been negotiated some years 
before.68 
Treaty negotiators and private sector tax advisers all explained in interviews how officials 
were unable to secure ministerial approval for signature and ratification. “Government was 
not sure what were the benefits,” said one former negotiator. “Some people had read that 
DTAs give away revenue. Somehow it never got past cabinet. The revenue authority was 
finding it a bit frustrating.”69 Another concurred: “you send it to the minister for permission, 
and it just sits there.”70 One factor appears to have been changes in government, with 
presidential elections taking place in 2002, 2008, 2011 and 2012. “When you have a change 
in government, you have to go back to the drawing board,” explained a negotiator.71 
Zambia’s tax performance, which had declined by more than half since the early 1970s, 
stood at just 16 percent of GDP in 2003.72 As copper prices rose, the lack of tax revenue 
from foreign investors became a politicised topic. In early 2008, the government attempted 
(ultimately unsuccessfully) to introduce a windfall tax of up to 75 percent on mining 
companies, which required cancelling agreements reached with mining companies at 
privatisation.73 Corporate taxation, particularly of the mines, became controversial during a 
presidential election later that year won by former Vice President Rupiah Banda following 
the death of incumbent Levy Mwanawasa.74 In 2011, Banda lost to opposition leader 
Michael Sata, whose party had stood on an explicit platform of tackling tax avoidance by 
multinational mining firms.75 According to one official, “the whole tax regime had an 
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injection in 2010, because we were trying to get rid of [tax] incentives, and we started to 
[re]negotiate.”76 Another seemed to agree. “There was no specific policy change, it was 
simply that the minister and cabinet decided to handle this issue. Okay, I suppose you can 
call that a change in policy.”77 
The specialists’ efforts to negotiate and renegotiate tax treaties were obstructed in this 
context because political decision-makers, who were concerned to be seen to increase tax 
revenues, did not support the tax treaty project. While a political impetus to conclude new 
treaties with China and SADC neighbours meant that the negotiators were eventually able to 
secure signature and ratification of these agreements, longstanding ambitions for new and 
renegotiated older treaties never saw the light of day, even when negotiations had been 
completed. Even the official version of the 2002 SADC protocol does not have a Zambian 
ministerial signature.78 As one official lamented, “if it is new and they are saying ‘go for it’ 
it is ratified. If it is old, nobody is interested.”79According to a prominent tax adviser in a 
professional services firm, “the treaty with South Africa is very old, it can’t be implemented 
in places. It’s 15 years since they renegotiated that treaty...we think cabinet has been lazy, 
they have not given it a lot of thought.”80 An expatriate technical adviser to the Ministry of 
Finance stated that “Ministers of Finance have been reasonably competent, but somewhere 
in the political system it all disappears.”81 
8.2.3 2011 onwards: a new attitude to international tax? 
After the 2011 election, a new cohort of senior civil servants came into post at the Treasury, 
and those who took over the remit for tax treaties did not have the same history of 
participation in international tax organisations. According to these officials themselves, this 
fresh perspective and new political impetus, combined with civil society campaigns that 
drew specific attention to tax treaties, has led to a new approach. Renegotiations have been 
undertaken with the UK, India, South Africa, Ireland, and the Netherlands (the latter three 
treaties regarded as substantially problematic), and an out-of-date treaty with Switzerland is 
slated for termination since a renegotiation request was rejected.82 
“In 2012, with the change of government, this government came in with a different view, 
they were ready to terminate treaties,” said a junior official with experience in both 
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administrations. “We are close to happy [with the renegotiations]. The first thing we did was 
to repair the damage.”83 The finance ministry official now responsible for tax treaties 
appears sceptical, stating that, “there is currently no evidence to show that tax treaties have 
helped to attract investment into Zambia…So the important advice to third world countries 
like Zambia will be to demonstrate really how double taxation avoidance can be achieved 
without signing tax treaties.”84 
The process of renegotiation undertaken by Zambia is intended to stem some of the losses 
due to abuse of existing tax treaties, and to maximise the administrative benefits that Zambia 
can obtain from the information exchange and mutual assistance provisions of tax treaties.85 
But there is evidence here of a degree of path dependency. Despite the clearly sceptical 
attitude from inside the finance ministry, it is much harder for Zambia to renegotiate or 
cancel an existing agreement than it would have been to agree to it in the first place. For 
example, a tentative attempt by the ZRA to disregard the colonial-era agreement with France 
failed after the threat of a legal challenge from French businesses in Zambia and from the 
French government.86 The newly renegotiated treaty with the UK is a more useful tool for 
the ZRA’s enforcement work, and it includes a broader definition of permanent 
establishment, but in return Zambia was forced to accept a substantially reduced maximum 
withholding tax rate on British firms, to bring the treaty into line with the concessions it had 
offered to China in the 2010 agreement. “It’s hard enough competing with Chinese 
businesses in Africa as it is,” a British diplomat explained.87 
There is a sense from government officials that if the present administration in Zambia were 
building its treaty network from scratch, it would not conclude many treaties at all. The 
recent agreements with the Seychelles and Mauritius, which had been negotiated and signed 
under the previous government, are not seen as good deals for Zambia. “The process of 
approval took too long such that by the time [these] agreements were signed, the agreements 
were 'out of tune' and therefore lacked the standards we now insist upon,” said a senior 
finance ministry official. He continued: 
I am not sure if Zambia would remain in good standing with the international 
community if it decided to annul the treaties (unilaterally or not) with either the UK, 
Germany, Japan or Canada, for instance. Perhaps we have sold our soul for [having] 
been aid recipients from countries such as the ones stated above.88 
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8.2.4 2003-12: Conclusion 
Zambia did not sign many treaties during this later period, and those it did sign came late. 
But this was not because of an absence of enthusiasm or negotiating activity on the part of 
its international tax specialists. Rather, it was a consequence of opposition to the tax treaty 
project from political actors, who were concerned to be seen to increase the amount of tax 
revenue raised from businesses, in a country where the tax-to-GDP ratio was almost half 
what it had been during the 1970s.  
8.3 Conclusion 
This chapter looked at a developing country that is an outlier, because its decisions to 
negotiate tax treaties do not fit the predictions of the quantitative, rational competition 
model. Zambia has gone through two eras of negotiation: in the 1970s it was a positive 
outlier, signing many more treaties than predicted, while in the 2000s it was a negative 
outlier, not signing as many as predicted.  
In the 1970s, Zambia did not have specialist bureaucrats to drive the process, and so the 
decision to negotiate was based on the idea that treaties would attract investment, without 
any clear analysis of the costs and benefits. The process was led by politically-appointed 
non-specialists, with little technical support and little experience themselves, in a context of 
high tax/GDP ratio that reduced the salience of the treaty’s costs. This meant that 
negotiation, signature and ratification were quick, but the quality of negotiation was poor, 
until an expatriate specialist arrived and caused Zambia to question its approach.  
In the 2000s, Zambia did have a specialist bureaucracy, which engaged frequently with the 
international tax community. These officials saw treaties as an important part of the enabling 
framework for inward investment - not as instruments that would directly attract investment, 
but as tools to eliminate double taxation as an end in itself, and also to increase Zambia’s 
capacity to enforce its tax laws. It was important that older treaties be brought into line with 
modern standards in order to achieve this. But these objectives were not shared by cabinet 
ministers, and as a consequence they were not signed or ratified, with the exception of 
treaties with SADC countries and with China, where specific political pressures existed. 
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9 Vietnam and Cambodia 
We didn’t even know who the Seychelles were. 
I had to Google it. 
- Cambodian treaty negotiators1 
 
This chapter considers two South-East Asian countries, Vietnam and Cambodia. In 
comparison to Zambia, both were late adopters of tax treaties: neither had a single bilateral 
tax treaty when they began to open up to foreign direct investment in the early 1990s. From 
that time, their attitudes to investment promotion were not radically different, as illustrated 
by the tax incentives offered to foreign investors and their active BIT negotiation 
programmes. Yet, while Vietnam has signed more tax treaties than almost any other 
developing country, Cambodia has not signed any to date. In contrast to conventional 
explanations of the origins of tax treaties, which view the capital importer as the active 
pursuer of tax treaties, Cambodia has been declining requests for tax treaty negotiations 
from capital exporting countries and tax havens for many years. 
These two countries illustrate the presence of the diffusion mechanisms proposed in this 
thesis, during the period 2003-2012, but with different levels of effectiveness. First, both 
countries were approached by numerous capital exporting countries seeking to enhance 
opportunities for their multinational investors: Vietnam generally accepted these requests, 
while Cambodia declined them. Second, policymakers in both Vietnam and Cambodia felt 
competitive pressure to sign tax treaties in order to attract inward investment. The 
Cambodian state desperately needed more tax revenue, which created a strong resistance to 
this pressure. In contrast, Vietnam had a large reservoir of state income from state-owned 
enterprises, which reduced the salience of tax treaties’ fiscal costs. In the 1990s, this resulted 
in the rapid conclusion of dozens of tax treaties containing provisions whose consequences 
Vietnamese negotiators did not appreciate, and which their successors now regret. 
Third, a new cohort of Vietnamese officials took over in the 2000s, who engaged out of 
preference with the OECD, rather than the UN. While they were more strategic in their 
negotiating stance, they were motivated by the idea that all investment, no matter how small, 
and regardless of the costs or the level of competitive pressure, should be covered by a tax 
treaty. Vietnam also took unilateral steps using its domestic tax system that negated the main 
supposed investment-promoting benefits of tax treaties. More recently, as Cambodia has 
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finally begun to negotiate, the technical knowledge imported from abroad has changed 
negotiators’ ideas, causing them to drop negotiating positions that were incompatible with 
‘international standards’. 
This chapter begins with a comparison of Vietnam and Cambodia’s approaches to 
international economic cooperation, including tax treaties. It then briefly demonstrates that 
both countries came under pressure from capital exporters to sign tax treaties, the first 
diffusion mechanism. After this, the mechanisms within Vietnam and Cambodia are 
considered separately. 
Table 9.1: Phases of treaty negotiation in Vietnam and Cambodia, 2003-2012 
Country Main mechanism Scope condition Outcome 
Cambodia 2. Competition for 
inward investment 
Fiscal costs not 
salient 
Absent Negotiations 
blocked  
Vietnam 3. Dissemination of 
standards 
Specialist control 
of veto points 
Present Rush to 
negotiation 
Source: Author’s own 
9.1 Comparative context 
Vietnam and Cambodia are neighbouring countries in south-east Asia, both of which had 
somewhat closed economies until the turn of the 1990s. They began to open up to foreign 
direct investment at around this point, and, as Table 9.2 shows, FDI flows on a per capita 
basis have only been slightly greater in Vietnam than in Cambodia since the mid-1990s. One 
major difference between the two is the large role of state-owned enterprises and state 
investment in Vietnam’s economy, in comparison to Cambodia, which has a much smaller 
state sector and relies much more on foreign enterprises for its economic growth. As a result, 
gross fixed capital formation from 1995 to 2014 was 2.5 times greater on a per capita basis 
in Vietnam than in Cambodia.2 
In terms of economic cooperation with other countries, by most measures Cambodia lags 
behind Vietnam, but the difference is only one of degree. For example, Cambodia joined 
ASEAN after Vietnam, but the WTO before it. Its first investment law and BIT were a few 
years later than those of Vietnam (Table 9.3). 
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Table 9.2: Inward FDI flows per capita (current US$) 
Year Cambodia Vietnam 
1995-1999 19.9 25.5 
2000-2004 10.4 17.8 
2005-2009 44.5 67.1 
2010-2014 81.5 94.4 
Total 156.3 204.8 
Source: World Bank3 
Table 9.3: Timing of some key milestones in economic integration 
Event Vietnam Cambodia 
First investment law 1987 1994 
First BIT 1990 1994 
First DTT 1992 - 
Joins ASEAN 1995 2000 
Joins WTO 2007 2004 
Source: IBFD, Slocomb, Sodhy, UNCTAD4 
While it is true that Cambodia has concluded fewer BITs than Vietnam, it has nonetheless 
signed 23, indicating that at least some of the mechanisms driving diffusion of BITs to 
Vietnam were also effective in influencing Cambodia.5 Yet Vietnam and Cambodia are polar 
opposites when it comes to their attitude to tax treaties. From 2003-12, Vietnam signed 28 
tax treaties, while Cambodia signed none at all, continuing a trend that had begun in the 
1990s. Table 9.4 compares the cumulative number of tax treaties that both countries have 
signed since 1990 with the number of BITs. The data examined in chapter 6 show that, while 
Vietnam was predicted by the quantitative model to sign more tax treaties than Cambodia, 
the prediction is not of such a stark difference as this.  
To explain why the number of tax treaties signed by these two countries varied from the 
quantitative model’s predictions, this chapter uses secondary literature and field visits to 
Vietnam and Cambodia undertaken during August and September 2015. Eleven semi-
structured interviews were conducted in Vietnam (in total four government officials, nine 
private sector stakeholders, and two others took part in interviews), and five in Cambodia 
(with two government officials and three private sector stakeholders). In both countries, the 
government officials responsible for tax treaty policy and negotiations were included in the 
                                                     
3 Ibid. 
4 IBFD, “IBFD Tax Research Platform”; Slocomb, An Economic History of Cambodia in the Twentieth Century, 
273–5; Sodhy, “Modernization and Cambodia,” 153; UNCTAD, “International Investment Agreements 
Navigator.” 
5 According to Lauge Poulsen, who interviewed a Cambodian BIT negotiator, these treaties were seen “as 
strategic instruments to comfort investors in post-war environments.” See Poulsen, “Sacrificing Sovereignty by 
Chance: Investment Treaties, Developing Countries, and Bounded Rationality,” 145–6. 
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sample. Sampling was largely purposive, with interviews arranged in advance through 
email. Government contacts were obtained through an OECD technical adviser who had 
been active in both countries, private sector contacts through the websites of private sector 
advisory firms, and other contacts through local NGOs. A small number of additional 
snowball-sampled interviews were arranged during field visits. In Vietnam, a government-
industry consultation meeting on tax treaty interpretation was also observed. In Cambodia, 
the lack of any tax treaties and the embryonic state of the country’s tax advisory sector 
reduced the number of potential interviewees available. 
Table 9.4: Treatymaking activity 
Year 
BITs signed  DTTs signed 
Cambodia Vietnam  Cambodia Vietnam 
1990-1994 1 25  0 11 
1995-1999 7 14  0 23 
2000-2004 8 9  0 8 
2005-2009 5 12  0 16 
2010-2014 2 3  0 12 
Total 23 63  0 70 
Source: UNCTAD & IBFD6 
9.2 Competition for outward investment opportunities in 
Cambodia and Vietnam 
The competitive pressure on Vietnam and Cambodia is reflected in the growing number of 
treaties signed by countries within the ASEAN region, with whom Cambodia and Vietnam 
compete for foreign investment and trade. Vietnam and the Philippines have used tax 
incentives to compete for high tech manufacturers, for example, while Cambodia, Laos and 
Myanmar compete in lower technology sectors.7 In both these case study countries, there 
was evidence of what appears to be a strategic interaction between developing countries, 
whereby one ASEAN country’s signature of tax treaties creates pressure on another. 
This is not, however, the only form of strategic interaction driving treaty diffusion. Since 
opening up, Cambodia has received multiple requests for tax treaties both from Asian and 
European countries; about ten, according to one government source. Among the countries 
that, as one official said, “have been writing many times in the past” are Malaysia, Thailand, 
Korea, China and Japan.8 At least two of these countries have made formal requests in 
                                                     
6 UNCTAD, “International Investment Agreements Navigator”; IBFD, “IBFD Tax Research Platform.” 
7 Charlton, Incentive Bidding for Mobile Investment: Economic Consequences and Potential Responses, 17. 
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person via their ambassadors.9 Requests have also been received from European countries 
and more than once from the Seychelles. “We don’t even know who they are,” said one 
official, referring to the latter. “I had to Google it,” said another.10 
Vietnam has already signed a treaty with the Seychelles, despite no investment flowing 
between the two. Its large network of treaties signals to other countries that they will receive 
a positive response if they request negotiations, and many treaties in recent years have been 
initiated from the other country. “Normally when we negotiate with other countries, they 
decide when we negotiate,” confirmed the country’s current chief treaty negotiator, Nguyen 
Duc Thinh, the head of the International Taxation Department of the General Department of 
Taxation (GDT).11 While this confirms that the phenomenon described in chapter 7 is still 
relevant to the present day, the rest of this chapter focuses on the variables shaping 
preferences in the developing countries, since it is in those countries that fieldwork took 
place. 
9.3 Vietnam 
Following the doi moi reforms of 1986, Vietnam’s government began to open the country to 
FDI, passing a liberal investment law that was unusual in that it protected investors from 
subsequent changes in laws, as well as from expropriation.12 Furthermore, the new 
investment regime offered inward investors a tax holiday of up to eight years and a reduced 
tax rate thereafter.13 Progress in expanding political and economic relations with the rest of 
the world was initially slow after 1987, but came to be felt more urgently within the 
Vietnamese communist party when the fall of the Soviet Union left it marginalised.14 This is 
thought to have been one of the drivers of Vietnam’s willingness to relinquish its military 
involvement in Cambodia through the Paris peace accords signed in 1991, which in turn led 
to some thawing of relations with members of the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), although it would take some time to establish trust.15 
Vietnam had been signing BITs from 1990 onwards at a ferocious pace of around six per 
year, with European and south-east Asian countries as partners in roughly equal numbers. It 
signed its first tax treaty in 1992, picking up the same faster pace as for BITs from 1994 
                                                     
9 Interview 65 
10 Interviews 64 & 65 
11 Interview 55 
12 Tran-Nam, “Economic Liberalization and Vietnam’s Long‐term Growth Prospects,” 248. 
13 Harvard Law Review, “Protection of Foreign Direct Investment in a New World Order: Vietnam. A Case 
Study,” 2004. 
14 Gainsborough, “Vietnam and ASEAN: The Road to Membership?” 
15 Ibid. 
Chapter 9 Vietnam and Cambodia 
202 
 
onwards (Table 9.4, above). A surge in FDI into Vietnam in 1996 can be attributed to the 
lifting of the United States trade embargo in 1994, which paved the way for Vietnam to 
finally join the ASEAN community in 1995, and eventually the WTO in 2007.16 The 
ASEAN and WTO logos still light up the main road from Hanoi’s Nội Bài International 
Airport to the city centre today. 
The 19 tax treaties signed by Vietnam between 1992 and 1995 already covered half of its 
inward investment, and by 1998 it had concluded a total of 34 treaties, now covering two-
thirds of all its inward investment.17  From 2000 to 2014, it signed the same number again, 
19 of which were during the sample period, 2003 to 2012. 
In 1997, Vietnam formally expressed positions on the provisions of the OECD model tax 
treaty for the first time, ‘reserving the right’ to include numerous beneficial clauses in its 
own treaties that are excluded from the OECD model.18 Figure 9.1 shows how the content of 
Vietnam’s tax treaties changed over time, by comparing them to this declared negotiating 
position. There appear to be two distinct periods of negotiation: treaties signed between 
1992 and 1998 were much more heterogeneous in their content, and generally less reflective 
of Vietnam’s own preferences. From 2000 onwards, most treaties included 70 to 80 percent 
of the clauses that Vietnam had indicated in its negotiating position. While treaties with 
OECD member counties since 2000 have tended to be less reflective of Vietnam’s 
negotiating position, the same structural break can be seen from 2000 onwards, suggesting 
stronger negotiating by Vietnam. Two specific examples of this structural break are as 
follows. 
• Vietnam’s position includes an additional paragraph 7 in article 5 of its tax treaties, 
giving it the right to tax companies that are ‘dependent agents’ of foreign 
multinationals. This provision had only appeared in half of Vietnam’s 1990s treaties, 
but it was included in all of those signed since 2000. 
• It also set out a position in favour of the right to levy a withholding tax on technical 
service fee payments to foreign contractors, which the model treaties do not permit. 
It was only included in one quarter of Vietnam’s 1990s treaties, but is in more than 
half those signed from 2000 onwards. 
                                                     
16 Pham, “FDI and Development in Vietnam : Policy Implications,” 24. 
17 These percentages are accurate whether using data on FDI stocks in 1998 or 2011. See Pham, “FDI and 
Development in Vietnam : Policy Implications”; General Statistic Office of Vietnam, “Foreign Direct Investment 
Projects Licensed by Main Counterparts (Accumulation of Projects Having Effect as of 31/12/2012).” From 1988 
to 1998, over half of the FDI into Vietnam had come from five nearby countries: Singapore, Taiwan, Japan, 
Hong Kong and Korea,  and these five countries still constituted 53 percent of investment stock in Vietnam in 
2011. 
18 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital. 
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Figure 9.1: Vietnam's tax treaties scored against its declared position in reservations to the 
OECD model treaty 
 
Source: The ActionAid Tax Treaties Dataset19 
9.3.1 Context in 2003: a treaty network driven by competition for inward 
investment 
This case study focuses on the period from 2003-12, and in any event it was not possible 
during the field visit to obtain access to people who had been directly involved in the 1990s 
negotiations. Yet it is quite clear from the GDT’s current actions that Vietnam’s decision to 
give away large amounts of its tax base at this time was not based on an assessment of the 
costs and benefits. Indeed, Vietnam was not aware of the content of some of the clauses it 
accepted in that early period. It signed many more treaties than is predicted by the model, 
and their content, especially in earlier years, more intensively reflected the interests of large 
capital exporters to Vietnam, leading to greater fiscal costs than necessary.  
Interviews with current and former Vietnamese officials indicate that an intense desire to 
attract inward investment explains many of these early decisions. According to Mr Thinh, 
three factors drove Vietnam’s prolific negotiation of tax treaties and its willingness to make 
big concessions in the 1990s.20 First, tax treaties and other economic agreements were ways 
of establishing political and economic relationships with other countries at a time when an 
economic embargo on Vietnam was still in place in the United States. This weakened 
Vietnam’s negotiating strength. Second, by ensuring that all foreign investment was covered 
by tax treaties, Vietnam aimed to shortcut the development of domestic corporate tax laws, 
which would take considerable time at a point when there was a pressing need for inward 
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investment. A third factor driving Vietnam’s enthusiasm for tax treaties was a desire to have 
‘tax sparing’ agreements with capital exporting countries. Like Zambia in the 1970s, 
Vietnam in the 1990s was using generous tax incentives to try to attract inward investment; 
‘tax sparing’ provisions in tax treaties ensured that foreign investors could benefit from the 
incentives in full. “This was our most vital condition for negotiating a DTA at this time…we 
had to step back [from other negotiating preferences] a lot because the tax sparing was so 
vital,” said Mr Thinh.  
Vietnam’s weak position, combined with its lack of experience negotiating, meant that it 
made concessions that it would not now make: 
During that time our negotiating partners were from the OECD and it was urgent to 
open our door and so we had to accept [OECD model treaty provisions]…When we 
were beginning to negotiate DTAs, we didn’t have so much experience. When the 
countries came to negotiate with us they forced us to use the OECD model.  
As Figure 9.1 indicates, however, it was not only with OECD members that Vietnam gave 
away large amounts of taxing rights. Among the pre-2000 treaties, aside from those with 
OECD countries, two are considerably less good deals than average for Vietnam. These are 
with Taiwan and Singapore, by far its two biggest sources of investment outside the OECD. 
9.3.2 Context in 2003: low fiscal cost salience 
Vietnamese officials paid little attention to the costs of treaties they negotiated at this time 
because raising corporate tax from foreign investors was not a priority. “In Vietnam they 
don’t care much about corporate income tax, it’s VAT,” one former civil servant explained 
to me.21 The country’s tax system in the early years of its economic liberalisation was 
complicated and discriminatory, incorporating taxes on turnover, profits and profit 
disbursements. It was also administered inefficiently and somewhat arbitrarily by 
inexperienced and corrupt tax administrators.22 While this frustrated foreign-owned 
companies, they benefited greatly because they were exempted from turnover tax, and taxed 
on their profits at a lower headline rate than domestic firms (25 percent compared to a 
maximum of 45 percent for domestic firms); furthermore, generous tax incentives in the 
Investment Law meant that most would not become liable for even this tax for some time, if 
at all.23 
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As a result of this tax system, revenue from FDI-related investments was relatively small, as 
low as 0.02 percent of GDP in 1991, rising with the stock of FDI to 1.2 percent in 1997.24 
But while tax revenue from foreign companies may have been low, Vietnam raised 
considerable revenue elsewhere.25 A paper co-authored by the Head of Tax Policy in the 
Ministry of Finance notes that, despite difficulties in the administration of the tax system, 
Vietnam’s tax-to-GDP ratio in the 1990s was much higher than other ASEAN countries that 
would have been expected to have greater ‘taxability’ because of higher per-capita income 
and a greater industrial share in the economy.26 
In part, this was because effective tax rates on domestic firms in Vietnam were much higher 
than these other countries, exceeding 60 percent once turnover and profit taxes were taken 
into account.27 In addition, structural economic differences provided more tax revenue, in 
particular the large share of state-owned enterprises in the economy, and the presence of the 
high-tax oil and gas sector (although revenue from the latter amounted to only around two to 
three percent of GDP).28 In 2000, tax revenue from foreign-owned firms still made up only 
five percent of total corporate income tax revenue, less than four times that from state-
owned enterprises.29 A new tax system promulgated in 1999 made the country’s tax structure 
simpler and less discriminatory.  Foreign-owned firms now paid 33 percent tax on their 
profits, the same as domestic firms, but they also still benefited from generous reductions 
lasting as long as ten years.30 
9.3.3 Diffusion driven by dissemination of technical standards 
The apparent structural break in Vietnam’s pattern of negotiation around the year 2000 
coincides with the appointment of Mr Thinh as Vietnam’s current treaty negotiator. In an 
interview, he specifically stated that there had not been a change in the policy or the quality 
of negotiation as a result of his appointment, attributing it instead to “changed economic, 
political and social conditions.”31 What is certain is that he and his colleagues came into 
close contact with the OECD. In the late 1990s, “some OECD experts came to Vietnam to 
talk about the DTAs,” he said.32 Vietnamese officials were a regular fixture at the OECD’s 
annual Global Forum on Tax Treaties and Transfer Pricing during the 2000s, sending a two 
                                                     
24 Pham, “FDI and Development in Vietnam : Policy Implications,” 59. 
25 Tran-Nam, “Taxation and Economic Development in Vietnam.” 
26 Quang and Dung, “Tax Reform in Vietnam,” 7. 
27 Figures cited in ibid., 9. 
28 Ibid., 4. 
29 Government figures cited in Rama, Mishra, and Pham, “Overview of the Tax System in Vietnam,” 19. 
30 Quang and Dung, “Tax Reform in Vietnam,” 11. 
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to four person-strong delegation usually consisting of Mr Thinh and his deputies.33 In 
contrast, Vietnam does not attend annual meetings of the United Nations tax committee.34 
While government officials outside the GDT still reproduce the view that tax treaties attract 
investment by alleviating double taxation,35 this is not the only logic at work within the GDT 
itself.  Rather, Vietnam has adopted the policy that all investors, no matter how small, 
should be covered by a tax treaty. “Even if it is a small amount of investment it is still worth 
it,” according to Mr Thinh. This contributes to the view of a business representative that 
“Vietnam’s negotiations have been on a 20-year roll.”36 But while Mr Thinh and his 
colleagues want all investors to be covered by a treaty, it is very clear, from interviews and 
from their approach to applying tax treaties, that this is because they want to apply an 
international standard to all existing inward investors, not merely to encourage new inward 
investment. 
A key reason for this is the decision in 2005 to abolish withholding tax on profits remitted 
by foreign investors as dividends, and reduce withholding taxes on interest, royalties and 
service fees to very low rates. 37 This dramatic move made Vietnam’s tax system much more 
attractive than its neighbours, but also undercut the main supposed investment-promotion 
tool of its tax treaties. As Vietnam also no longer prioritises tax sparing clauses within its 
treaties,38 the tax treaty provisions that might be expected to have the biggest investment-
promoting effect are of no longer of relevance to investors in Vietnam. 
Furthermore, Vietnam’s application of its tax treaties directly undermines the benefits that 
investors might hope to gain. We can see this by looking at the example of Vietnam’s 
approach to permanent establishment (PE). This is a threshold test that establishes when a 
foreign company operating in Vietnam becomes liable to pay income tax on its profits. In 
almost all tax treaties, a company must have a physical presence in a country for a certain 
period of time to meet this test, subject to some exceptions. In contrast, the criteria in 
Vietnamese law are much more broad, simply that most companies “who do business in 
Vietnam or earn income in Vietnam” are liable to income tax.39 In theory, therefore, any 
investors who are sensitive to their tax liability should regard a tax treaty with Vietnam as an 
important curb on what many regard as its aggressive approach to taxation. But Vietnam has 
chosen to interpret the PE provisions of its treaties in unconventional ways that, according to 
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37 Tran-Nam, “Taxation and Economic Development in Vietnam,” 132. 
38 Interview 55 
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a typical statement from the Vietnam Business Forum, which represents overseas investors, 
have “made the application of DTA[s] of foreign enterprises impossible, effectively it 
obliterate[s] the legitimate benefit of enterprises.”40 Vietnamese negotiators want to eat their 
cake and have it, simultaneously demonstrating their support for the policy project of 
disseminating OECD standards through tax treaties, and ignoring those standards where they 
prevent Vietnam from taxing as it would like. 
For example, a common difference between the two main models on which tax treaties are 
based is the provision for a ‘services PE’. Under the OECD model, which favours capital 
exporters more, a foreign company providing services in Vietnam must have a fixed place of 
business in the country, such as a registered office, to be taxable. Vietnam has expressed a 
position on the OECD model stating that in its treaties it will seek a provision from the UN 
model that lowers this threshold by permitting it to tax such a company simply if its 
employees are physically present for a certain period, even without a ‘fixed place of 
business’. Although more than two-thirds of Vietnam’s treaties in force include this service 
PE provision, it is omitted from many of its older treaties, and from treaties covering almost 
two-thirds of its inward FDI. Vietnam’s response to this unsatisfactory situation has been to 
take the position that, absent a service PE provision in a treaty, it is at liberty to tax service 
providers without any minimum threshold, the exact opposite of how tax treaties are usually 
interpreted.41 
The inconsistency between negotiation and administration priorities is not a result of 
inconsistency between parts of the bureaucracy, because decisions on both are made by the 
same person. Vietnam’s tax administration is decentralised, and according to tax advisers, its 
local offices do not have the knowledge to apply tax treaty provisions effectively.42 They 
rely on circulars issued by the Mr Thinh’s team at the GDT in Hanoi. Senior officials at a 
consultation meeting between VBF members and the Ministry of Finance in August repeated 
the line in these circulars.43 Investors’ lack of confidence in the independence of the courts 
means that no tax treaty case has ever been tried in a court, despite the clear frustration from 
many investors and their advisers.44 Administrative appeals, according to tax advisers, are 
always settled by the International Tax department, which drafts the circulars against which 
the appeals are directed. “The Deputy Director of the DGT signs off rulings,” said a tax 
adviser. “If there’s a dispute you can escalate it to the deputy Minister of Finance, but 
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ultimately it will just go back to Mr Thinh.”45 The result of this system is that companies do 
not avail themselves of benefits to which they are entitled according to the treaty. “A lot of 
companies could claim [reduced taxation] under treaties, but they don’t. It’s too much 
hassle,” stated one interviewee, while another went as far as to state that, “I am not aware of 
foreign investors obtaining treaty benefits.”46 
The consequence of Vietnam’s position is that investors paradoxically have less certainty 
under treaties than without them, and, worse, that Vietnam’s treaties actually create double 
taxation, rather than eliminating it. This latter effect comes about because treaty partners 
generally refuse to give their outward investors a credit against tax paid in Vietnam if, in 
their view, Vietnam should not have the right to levy tax under the treaty (in the absence of a 
treaty they would be likely to give a credit in the circumstances described here). Following 
the US$1 billion investment by Samsung in the country, businesses from Korea, covered by 
one of Vietnam’s earliest and most regretted (by the GDT) treaties, have now invoked a 
dispute settlement procedure in the treaty to try to challenge some of these interpretation 
issues, because they do not expect domestic remedies to make a difference.47 
9.3.4 Positive scope condition: specialist control of veto points 
Among private sector tax practitioners with experience dealing with the GDT, Mr Thinh is 
widely understood to be personally the driving force behind all decisions related to tax 
treaties.48 He also suffers from a lack of experienced support: according to a former 
employee within the International Tax Department, Thinh is the only member who has been 
in post for more than five years, out of a staff of twelve.49 According to one European tax 
lawyer who has worked in the region for over a decade, “it’s all about people. If Vietnam 
didn’t have Mr Thinh they wouldn’t have any tax treaties.”50 A former official from the 
Department of Trade stated, “The legacy of signing agreements all the time is set in 
momentum, and it keeps on going…Sometimes it just happens because someone gets in the 
routine.”51 
It is notable, however, that Thinh’s authority does not extend to being able to implement his 
desire to renegotiate treaties.  The country has recently accepted an offer from the 
Netherlands to renegotiate in order to add an anti-abuse clause into that treaty, but while 
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some developing countries have faced difficulties persuading developed countries to 
renegotiate treaties that are a good deal for the latter (see chapter 8), Vietnam does not 
appear to have tried. According to Mr Thinh, the main reason relates to internal bureaucratic 
politics: 
Nowadays…we would like to renegotiate. From our side, it’s not easy because there 
would be questions from the other ministries and agencies, they would ask why we 
should want to. For example, we really want to renegotiate with France, because we 
don’t have an interest article, but the other ministries would say ‘everything is fine, 
why do you want to do this?’ 
9.3.5 Vietnam: conclusion 
During the 1990s, Vietnam had sought tax treaties to bring in inward investment, 
establishing political and economic relations with countries following economic 
liberalisation and the fall of the Soviet Union, and making up for its lack of a domestic tax 
code. The tax costs they created were not anticipated by officials in this early period, 
creating problems later when companies expected to benefit from these treaty provisions. A 
main priority in this early period was ‘tax sparing’ clauses, but in other areas Vietnam was 
negotiating without a clear sense of the specific provisions that were important to retain its 
tax base, because raising tax revenue was not a priority. 
Since 2000, greater technical knowledge within the GDT means that Vietnam has negotiated 
on a much more consistent, assured basis, with a wide range of countries including many 
where there is neither competitive pressure nor a prospect of inward investment. With this 
technical knowledge has come the idea that all investment should be covered by a tax treaty, 
no matter how small. The office within the GDT that negotiates and applies tax treaties 
appears unwilling to reconcile this belief with the revenue costs that it entails, interpreting 
tax treaties in ways that render them largely ineffective.  As one tax lawyer put it, “they 
should be looking into the OECD interpretations if they’re serious. As it is, it’s [tax treaties] 
just window dressing.”52 
9.4 Cambodia 
Cambodia also underwent momentous change towards the turn of the 1990s, beginning with 
the end of the Khmer Rouge regime in 1985. Before this, private enterprises were not 
recognised by the Cambodian state, and private property rights were not restored until 
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1989.53 But Cambodia’s current political era begins with the Paris peace accord in 1991 that 
formally ended conflict between its warring factions, and the involvement of 18 other 
countries in its domestic affairs.54 On 21 September 1993, Cambodia’s new constitution was 
adopted by its newly elected Constituent Assembly, and an elected government took office. 
Policymaking in this era was predominantly dictated by outside experts, especially when 
Cambodia agreed to a Structural Adjustment package in 1994.55 
The new government in 1994 established for the first time a formal tax system based on self-
assessment, replacing what had previously been an ‘estimated’ regime in which tax officials 
calculated a firm’s estimated profit and then ‘negotiated’ with the taxpayer.56 But it was not 
until 1997 that a Western-style tax system was introduced, with taxes on profits and 
withholding taxes on certain types of payments. Before this, tax treaties may have made 
little difference.  
In August 1994, Cambodia signed its first Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), with Malaysia, 
and passed the Cambodian Investment Law, which offered investors in certain sectors 
generous incentives including an eight-year corporate income tax holiday (the same as 
Vietnam) and an exemption from tax on dividend payments.57 There was a setback in 
investment promotion in July 1997, when the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) instigated a 
coup. Combined with the Asian financial crisis, this temporarily slowed inward investment 
into Cambodia, but with successful elections in 1998 placing the CPP in power on a more 
legitimate basis, Cambodia’s integration into the global political economy continued.58 
In 2004, Cambodia began to seriously consider the idea of signing tax treaties, beginning 
work to develop a negotiating model.59 In 2008, an international tax bureau, tasked with 
treaty negotiations, was formed within the newly created General Department of Taxation 
(GDT). But it was not until 2014, after the end of the sample period, that Cambodia opened 
talks. At the time that fieldwork was conducted, it had completed the first round of 
negotiations with Vietnam and Thailand, and was in correspondence with Brunei, Laos and 
Singapore.60 
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9.4.1 Diffusion driven by competition for inward investment 
All the interviewees situated a recent shift by Cambodia into negotiating gear in the context 
of its historic reluctance to sign tax treaties. It is clear that Cambodia has felt under pressure 
to sign tax treaties for some time, not because investors face great obstacles created by 
double taxation, but because it has become increasingly isolated within the region as the 
only country without a double taxation treaty (Table 9.5). 
Table 9.5: Tax treaties signed by ASEAN member states 
Country 
Tax treaties signed 
1993 2003 2013 
Brunei 0 1 15 
Cambodia 0 0 0 
Indonesia 30 63 71 
Laos 0 4 10 
Malaysia 34 57 70 
Myanmar 1 7 9 
Philippines 27 40 43 
Singapore 30 51 78 
Thailand 26 53 63 
Vietnam 4 40 67 
Source: IBFD61 
In 2008, ASEAN members signed the ASEAN Economic Community blueprint, which 
states that members will “work towards establishing an effective network of bilateral 
agreements on avoidance of double taxation among ASEAN countries.”62 Though Cambodia 
is still reluctant, the momentum this has created among its neighbours – and direct 
competitors for investment – such as Laos and Myanmar, has been the final straw. “It’s an 
international tax trend, our neighbours are signing them,” said a government official.63 Tax 
advisers in the private sector concur. “The government had no intention of signing tax 
treaties. But now that Myanmar is open, they are considering if we have got behind,” said 
one.64 Another agreed: 
They’re under a lot of pressure from everywhere because they hesitated for a very 
long time. They have considered a lot and they don’t want to do it, but because of the 
pressure from the private sector and government - even Myanmar is doing it now - 
Cambodia is the only one left.65 
Cambodian officials emphasise that their own capacity development has been slow, and 
seem to believe that Laos and Myanmar have made a mistake by negotiating treaties at a 
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similar stage of capacity development, rather than forming a firm position based on more 
detailed technical knowledge first.66 
9.4.2 Negative scope condition: high fiscal cost salience 
A comparison of tax performance in Cambodia and Vietnam illustrates why Cambodian 
officials were so reluctant to make the revenue sacrifice entailed by tax treaties (Table 9.6). 
In 1995, the first year for which data are available, Cambodia raised tax revenue amounting 
to as little as 5.3 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP), and was highly aid-dependent, 
receiving twice as much government revenue through aid than through taxation.67 In 
contrast, Vietnam’s tax-to-GDP ratio was 18.5 percent.68 The situation with respect to taxes 
on businesses was much starker: while Vietnam raised 3.2 percent of GDP, and 20 percent 
of its total taxes, from businesses, Cambodia only raised 0.2 percent of GDP, and four 
percent of its total taxes, from this source.69  More than half of Cambodia’s government tax 
revenue came from trade taxes, a disproportionately high amount compared to other 
developing countries.70 
Cambodia’s corporate income tax rate at this time was 20 percent, low in comparison to 
other countries in the region, and in practice foreign investors could pay much less, as a 
result of eight-year tax holidays that were followed by a permanent nine percent preferential 
tax rate. They were also exempt from withholding taxes on certain dividend, interest and 
royalty payments. A World Bank report from 1998 notes that: 
Cambodia's current revenue-to-GDP ratio is very low by international standards…The 
Law on Investment is one of the most critical impediments to improved revenue 
mobilization…The combination of the Law and the [implementing] Regulations has 
eliminated any room for the business income tax to be a policy instrument in the 
revenue mobilization effort.71 
By 2003, the first year of the sample period, Cambodia had successfully targeted reforms to 
its business tax law and administration, increase its tax revenue from businesses much more 
than other taxes, to 0.6 percent of GDP, now 10 percent of the total. Any measures that 
reduced its tax take from businesses would significantly weaken government resources. By 
2012, taxes from businesses climbed further, to 15 percent of the total tax take, which had 
itself doubled compared to 2003.  
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Table 9.6: Selected tax statistics from Vietnam and Cambodia 
% of GDP 
1995  2003  2012 
Cambodia Vietnam  Cambodia Vietnam  Cambodia Vietnam 
Total government 
revenue excluding grants 
7.6 22.6 
 
9.1 24.5  13.1 22.3 
Total tax revenue 5.3 18.5 
 
6.4 19.3  11.6 19.0 
Corporations and other 
enterprises 
0.2 3.2 
 
0.6 7.7  1.7 No data 
Source: Prichard, Cobham, and Goodall72 
These figures explain why the revenue sacrifice from tax treaties has seemed much more 
significant to Cambodian policymakers than to their Vietnamese counterparts. Cambodia has 
proceeded to develop a treaty policy cautiously over a period of ten years before entering 
into negotiations, and has put in place plans to monitor the impact on revenue of its first few 
treaties. According to one interviewee, a GDT study estimated the impact of reduced 
withholding tax rates, were Cambodia to sign a treaty with Vietnam, at between US$ 5 
million and US$ 6 million.73 If correct, this would be around two percent of Cambodia’s tax 
revenue from businesses from one part of a single treaty. Edwin Vanderbruggen, a Dutch tax 
lawyer practicing across South East Asia who advised the GDT, also felt that concern about 
lost revenue was uppermost in the Cambodian officials’ minds. In contrast to BITs, he said, 
tax treaties have an immediate upfront cost: 
They had no understanding of how tax treaties worked, but they did understand that 
you can’t sign tax treaties and not lose anything. They had a very small tax base to 
begin with.74 
Tax advisers in the private sector also attribute the continued reticence, including the lack of 
allocation of human resources to tax treaties until recently, to an institutional preoccupation 
with their fiscal costs. “The GDT is the tax policymaker, execution and judge. When the 
government set their own revenue KPIs they don’t look into the long term, that’s why they 
don’t sign,” stated one.75 “They don’t want to move quick and incur a lot of loopholes,” said 
another.76  
9.4.3 Low technical knowledge enabled diffusion 
The final push leading to the negotiations being opened was created by the recent 
appointment of a new Director General (DG) at the GDT. “When the former DG Sin Yay 
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was replaced by Kong Vibol, this gave it a new impetus, he’s much more international,” said 
one.77 Another agreed, that “the previous DG was quite narrow-minded. After the change of 
DG they started looking into a lot of issues. They started quickly on DTAs but it took a lot 
of time for them to understand. I thought it was just a matter of time.”78 
But Cambodia’s international tax bureau still had only four people in 2011, one of whom 
was studying abroad, and one of whom was actually dedicated to other work. “We had very 
few human resources, and those human resources were not fit for the job,” said one of the 
civil servants interviewed, who is in a management position within the international tax 
bureau. He added that, “the very day I started, I didn’t know what a DTA was.”79 
In this context, external advisers had considerable influence. From the beginning, Cambodia 
has relied on outside experts with greater expertise than its own staff. Vanderbruggen was 
hired as a full time adviser in 2006, to develop a model treaty for use in negotiations.80 
Cambodia also received technical assistance from Australian and Japanese experts – the first 
a former treaty negotiator - as well as the OECD, Asian Development Bank and World 
Bank, and its officials have attended numerous external training courses.81   
Cambodian officials have identified several areas where treaties that use the conventional 
rules of international taxation were likely to have a significant impact on the country’s 
revenues, and where they wanted to pursue an unconventional approach. These include the 
taxation of foreign airlines and insurance companies.82 Cambodia currently levies a tax on 
half the gross value of tickets sold for flights to and from the country, and on the gross value 
of insurance premiums paid by Vietnamese residents, and officials wanted its treaties to 
permit this to continue. International treaty norms, however, state that businesses should 
only be taxed on their net profits, not gross income, in these circumstances. As a government 
official wryly observed, state subsidies mean that most airlines flying to Cambodia make a 
loss, and so there is no net profit for Cambodia to tax.83 
Cambodian officials, conscious of their limited technical knowledge, have been persuaded 
by their technical advisers that these unconventional positions cannot be included within 
their tax treaties. According to Vanderbruggen, who drafted Cambodia’s model tax treaty, “I 
said, ‘you cannot be the only country in the world that goes against the OECD, UN and 
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ASEAN model [treaties]’.”84 As for insurance, Vietnam has drafted alternative wording in 
its model treaty, but finds it hard to maintain in negotiations, because, said a negotiator, 
“your counterpart just tells you that this is not the international standard.”85 Thus, 
Cambodian negotiators have come to accept international standards out of deference to more 
experienced members of the community of negotiators and tax professionals, rather than 
because it is in Cambodia’s interests to do so. While still concerned about the fiscal costs, 
their views about acceptable approaches to international taxation have been circumscribed 
by those of members of the epistemic community, including their own advisers and more 
experience negotiators from other countries. 
9.4.4 Conclusion: Cambodia 
Cambodia has not failed to sign tax treaties because of a lack of competitive pressure. 
Rather, it has actively resisted this pressure both in terms of a comparing itself with 
competitor countries, and accepting requests from potential treaty partners to open 
negotiations. The lack of treaties is also not a result of a reticence to conclude economic 
agreements with other countries, as its 23 BITs to date indicate, or of an unwillingness to use 
its tax system to attract investment, something that international organisations suggested it 
did too much of. The reluctance to negotiate seems instead to have resulted from an acute 
awareness of the fiscal costs of tax treaties, at a time when government revenues from all 
types of tax were low. It is only now that all Cambodia’s direct competitors have concluded 
some tax treaties, and the country’s tax performance has improved, that government officials 
have reached the conclusion that the costs of not signing treaties exceed those of doing so. 
The basis on which this decision was made comes not from evidence, such as seeing a 
positive effect on investment among their competitors (who in fact the Cambodian 
negotiators believe have moved too quickly), but from a feeling that Cambodia cannot 
continue be an outlier. Furthermore, Cambodia’s negotiating position contravenes officials’ 
original view of what constitutes a fair balance of taxing rights. Instead, it is based on advice 
from technical experts who are part of an epistemic community which promotes tax treaties 
regardless of their costs and benefits for developing countries. 
9.5 Case comparison 
This chapter compared a positive and negative outlier to look for the reasons why one signed 
more tax treaties than predicted, giving away more taxing rights than necessary, while 
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another signed none at all, despite the presence of competitive pressure. Other economic 
competition variables were held largely constant between the cases, as illustrated by both 
countries’ signatures of BITs and preferential trade agreements. Ideas certainly played a role 
in diffusion in both countries, and it was the difference in tax effort in the two countries that 
caused those ideas to have a different level of effectiveness. 
Vietnam had moved quickly to sign tax treaties in the 1990s, making revenue sacrifices that 
it did not anticipate and would subsequently regret. Government officials were prioritising 
the use of tax treaties to overcome other deficiencies that might discourage inward 
investment, without first forming a complete understanding of the implications of the 
agreements they were signing. By 2003, the start of the sample period, a new team of 
negotiators had taken over, with a greater level of technical knowledge gained from 
international interactions, and they sought both to use their power over the administration of 
tax treaties to undo the decisions of their predecessors. But with their knowledge had come 
the idea that they should sign tax treaties with all investing countries, irrespective of the 
amount of investment or the effects of those treaties.  
In contrast, Cambodian officials, with a smaller government revenue base and less 
international training, were much more concerned about the fiscal costs of tax treaties. As a 
result, they refused to conclude any tax treaties, despite receiving requests from treaty 
partners and despite watching their competitors sign more treaties. The decision to begin 
work on negotiations in 2004 was a result of peer pressure: Cambodia could not be the only 
country in the region without any tax treaties, even if the costs of those treaties outweighed 
the benefits. Nonetheless, Cambodia moved slowly, in part because of a desire to build 
knowledge and competence first, to minimise the costs of signing the treaty. But the 
knowledge that officials gained, primarily through bringing in outside expertise, constrained 
their choices by pushing them into compliance with international standards in spite of their 
own concerns that these standards would have very specific negative impacts on their 
revenue base. Exactly how effectively Cambodia safeguards itself against these impacts 
during its negotiations will only be seen when its first treaties are concluded.
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10 Conclusion 
In my experience with legislative bodies I have found that you can accomplish 
more for equity and justice in taxation in the name of eliminating or preventing 
double taxation, than with any other slogan or appeal. 
- Thomas Adams, architect of the US international tax system1 
 
To explain the diffusion of tax treaties, we need to understand the different ideas held by 
relevant actors within a polity about what they are for. The term ‘Double Taxation 
Agreement’ conveys an idea which is powerful, but misleading: that tax treaties’ main 
purpose is to resolve a problem created by competing claims to tax inward cross-border 
investment, which will deter that investment. Tsilly Dagan argued that this logic was a myth, 
and many actors in the process, including negotiators themselves, agree with her. Most 
notably, the United Kingdom’s international tax officials in the 1970s, responsible for a huge 
programme of negotiations, shared this view. Members of the international tax community 
abhor double taxation, but recognise that even in the absence of a treaty it is unlikely to exist 
to a degree that will deter investment. Nonetheless, it is axiomatic to them that double 
taxation must be eliminated in all its forms, and that the conclusion of tax treaties is the 
appropriate way for a modern fiscal state to behave. 
As actors in developing countries – nascent fiscal states – have gained technical knowledge, 
they have taken this vision to heart. Vietnam, an unusually prolific negotiator, ensured that 
all its investors were covered by a tax treaty, even where there was little competitive 
pressure on it to do so. The way in which it applied those treaties, however, undermined any 
benefits that investors might have expected to gain from them. Zambia’s international tax 
specialists negotiated and renegotiated agreements, but struggled to convince political veto 
players to sign and ratify them. As Cambodia succumbed to the inevitable logic of 
competition through tax treaties, its officials allowed external technical advisers to teach 
them which treaty provisions were acceptable, and which were not. 
Meanwhile, the tax treaties myth prevails among actors who do not have this same technical 
knowledge. To them, signing tax treaties is one of the things that a country wishing to 
compete for investment does, even though there is not a solid evidence base to support this 
view. The choice of treaty partners illustrates this point: positive outliers such as Zambia and 
Vietnam, in negotiations during the 1970s and 1990s respectively, signed treaties with 
countries where there was low competitive pressure based on the idea that they would attract 
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investment. These countries’ high tax-to-GDP ratios insulated negotiators from more intense 
scrutiny of their choices, whereas Cambodia has been reluctant to enter negotiations because 
of its low tax-to-GDP ratio. 
Negotiations by countries with limited technical expertise and a competition-driven 
mentality also produced results in terms of the content of their agreements that illustrated the 
bounded rationality of their negotiating stance. When Zambia and Vietnam’s negotiations 
were motivated by competition, they also signed away taxing rights that their present 
negotiators regret, and that past negotiators could have known they should not give away, 
had they fully understood the agreements they were signing. 
The core argument of this thesis is that the mutually supporting ideas of fiscal anarchy and 
the tax treaties myth have played a causal role in the diffusion of tax treaties. This is not to 
say, however, that material factors did not also play a role, and clearly they did. Ideas 
constructed preferences that sometimes had their origins in material interests. In particular, 
the UK case and other anecdotal evidence supports the idea that developed countries actively 
pursue tax treaties with developing countries, because this improves the competitive position 
of their own multinationals. Yet, in the UK, two competing ideas about how treaties would 
achieve this shaped the country’s negotiating priorities. In some instances, the UK turned 
down an agreement in the face of strong competitive pressure, because tax specialists did not 
consider that it was consistent with their idea of acceptable fiscal standards, and believed 
those creating the pressure were ‘ignorant’. Furthermore, even if rational interests did 
explain the actions of capital exporters, we need also to explain the willingness of capital 
importers to negotiate. This brings us back to the ideational mechanisms discussed above. 
Another rationalist explanation might focus on the ‘intangible’ benefits of tax treaties to 
developing countries other than the relief of double taxation, such as the broader signals they 
convey to investors about investment climate and conformity to international norms. It 
would not be irrational to believe that these benefits might stimulate investment. But 
countries rarely adopted this view without reference to the double taxation problem, and the 
absence of a cost-benefit analysis based on the actual features of a country’s tax system, 
unfortunately the norm, indicates ‘bounded’ rationality. 
Finally, an exception to the tax treaty myth may be the ‘tax sparing’ clauses that were 
popular in tax treaties from the 1970s to the 1990s, which provided benefits directly to 
companies, rather than eliminating double taxation. There is some positive evidence to 
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suggest that they do stimulate investment into developing countries.2 But they are not part of 
the modern tax standards package, and tax specialists have an ambivalent relationship with 
them. The OECD, guardian of international tax standards, suggested in 1998 that there was 
“an emerging consensus on the need for a re-evaluation”, claiming that “the basic 
assumption underlying tax sparing is invalid.”3 Furthermore, while tax sparing clauses 
clearly motivated some of the particular negotiations considered in the case studies, they by 
no means explain all. Indeed, UK negotiators regarded tax sparing clauses as an adjunct to 
the main function of tax treaties, and fought off pressure to sign with Brazil that was largely 
motivated by the desire for tax sparing. Zambia, negotiating with the UK, and Vietnam, 
negotiating with the US, both dropped their demands for tax sparing in order to secure an 
agreement. 
These findings have implications in four areas. First, they help chart a path towards a more 
comprehensive international political economy of tax, that incorporates both the rationalist 
work on tax treaties and the constructivist work on offshore. Second, they suggest some 
ways in which diffusion studies can be strengthened and challenge certain assumptions in 
the design and interpretation of quantitative models. Third, they offer some specific 
evidence with which to calibrate the core methodologies used in diffusion studies. Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, they provide evidence for policymakers in developing 
countries to help inform their responses to the current groundswell of concern about the 
impact of tax treaties. 
10.1 Implications for IPE literature on tax 
It is not just policymakers who have been influenced by the seductive logic behind ‘Double 
Taxation Agreements’. The assumption in previous studies addressing this question, that tax 
treaties are primarily the product of states’ desire to eliminate double taxation in order to 
stimulate investment, demonstrably does not hold. Critical accounts in the legal literature 
that have dismantled the tax treaties myth on technical grounds have demonstrated this, but 
are unable to explain why developing countries agreed to sign them.4 It is by focusing on the 
causal role of the socially constructed problem itself that this gap can be filled. 
An account that instead recognises the role of ideas in shaping the preferences of developing 
fiscal states, and of the individuals behind their tax policy, begins by problematising the 
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double taxation problem itself. OECD states’ identities and preferences about corporate 
taxation were constructed intersubjectively in an international environment whose formative 
era was almost a hundred years ago, when their modern tax systems were themselves under 
construction. For developing countries, in contrast, their tax systems and bureaucratic 
capacities have developed within this system, which in many cases predated their existence 
as states. For a country starting to design an international tax system, the OECD offers a 
rationale, a template and a set of off-the-shelf tools, which it actively promotes to 
developing countries. The diffusion of tax treaties, based on an OECD model, is therefore 
underpinned by ideas about the treaties’ role that were also constructed by actors in OECD 
states. 
Constructivist accounts also dismantle the model of the state as a unitary actor, pointing to 
the role of tax expertise in the domestic and international policymaking environments. A 
defining feature of debates on tax policy, both within the specialist community and outside 
it, is a recognition of its complexity and obscurity: tax is boring. Yet this perception stands 
in sharp contrast to taxation’s existential role with respect to the state: it enables the state to 
do what it does, but it is also a part of the state’s socially constructed relationship with its 
citizens. In developing countries, which rely heavily on taxation from multinational 
companies, the revenue sacrifice from tax treaties does not only undermine the state’s ability 
to provide the public services expected by its citizens, it also threatens to undermine tax 
morale, and with it the nascent fiscal contract between citizens and the state. The current 
wave of publicisation and politicisation of corporate taxation, and – in some countries – of 
tax treaties themselves,5 is the result of decades of incremental decisions by individual actors 
within developing countries to hollow out the tax base, rather than taking a strategic decision 
in full view of stakeholders in the fiscal state. 
The other major contribution of the thesis to the study of international tax relations was to 
provide an innovative account of tax competition. Economics and international political 
economy have long focused on the ‘race to the bottom’ thought to result from competition 
between states for inward investment. The role of competition between capital exporting 
states, which seek to increase opportunities for their outward investors, has rarely been 
considered as a diffusion mechanism, although its effects on corporate behaviour have been 
studied by economists. As the headquarters of multinational companies have become more 
mobile, pitting capital exporting states in competition with each other to attract 
multinationals’ headquarters, such competition for outward investment has intensified, and 
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international organisations have raised concerns about the ‘spillover’ effects on developing 
countries.6 Tax treaties are just one example of an increasingly complex story of tax 
competition among capital exporters. To understand what capital exporters want when they 
negotiate a tax treaty, we need a more sophisticated model of their preferences that takes into 
account the use of international tax rules to provide financial advantages to mobile capital, 
rather than simply to maximise revenue. 
10.2 Implications for diffusion and socialisation literatures 
While the IR literature on BITs is more voluminous than that on tax treaties, they share a 
common problem structure: the conclusion of thousands of bilateral agreements by 
developing countries despite significant costs and a lack of evidence of corresponding 
benefits. I noted at the start that the diffusion of tax treaties is harder to explain through the 
‘bounded rationality’ framework popularised by Lauge Poulsen in the study of BITs, 
because that story rests on the initial invisibility of the treaties’ costs.7 One contribution of 
this thesis is to demonstrate that the bounded rationality argument still holds in this more 
difficult case, where the costs were much more immediate. 
The BIT and tax treaty literatures also share a common focus on the preferences of 
developing (capital importing) countries, while those of developed (capital exporting) 
countries are held to be constant across time and between countries. Elkins and colleagues, 
for example, in their classic study of BIT diffusion, note that diffusion is characterised by a 
clustering of signatures by a particular developing country in a short space of time. They 
deduce from this that, “while the major capital exporters stand ready with model treaties in 
hand, the decision whether and when to sign is left to the host,” a view that Poulsen 
concludes “appears to be correct.”8 Barthel and Neumayer test for the idea that tax treaties 
are ‘directed’ from OECD states outwards, but they model this by presuming that the timing 
of signature depends on the capital importing country.9 
The findings of this thesis suggest another possible explanation: the observed clustering 
reflects a host country-specific strategic interaction between capital exporters. While 
developing countries’ preferences certainly influence the timing of their tax treaty 
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negotiations, it is also clearly the case that, once a country crosses the Rubicon, capital 
exporting countries – and low-tax conduit countries – move quickly to request their own 
negotiations with it. This strategic interaction may be driven by two dynamics. First, a BIT 
or a tax treaty with a given host country confers a competitive advantage for firms from the 
capital exporting signatory: it raises their risk-adjusted rate of return, allowing them to 
undercut their competitors. Those competitors’ governments may respond by seeking a 
treaty with the same host country, as the UK did with Egypt and tried to do with Brazil. 
Second, the signature of a BIT or tax treaty between a developed and a developing country 
signals that the latter is now willing to sign such treaties, which may cause other developed 
countries to react by requesting negotiations themselves, as Cambodia and Vietnam both 
experienced, and the UK did in the case of Bangladesh. In many of the cases discussed here, 
the observed pattern of convergence in developing countries is certainly at least partly 
attributable to this diffusion mechanism acting on developed countries. 
There are good reasons for focusing on the preferences of the developed country signatory 
as well as those of its developing country partner. First, a capital exporter seeking to increase 
outward investment and enhance the competitive position of its multinational companies has 
a clear incentive to pursue tax treaties and BITs with countries that are important markets for 
outward investment, since treaties provide an advantage to multinationals without imposing 
many costs on the capital exporter.10 Second, if developing countries’ preferences are 
characterised by ‘bounded’ rationality, it seems logical that developed countries might 
critically examine the pattern of requests from developing countries, according a higher 
priority to some than others; developed countries might actively reach out to desirable 
potential partners from whom they have not received a request. Third, there is an observable 
variation between capital exporters in the number, distribution and content of bilateral 
treaties they have concluded, implying that their own preferences may also shape the pattern 
of diffusion.11 
If the findings in this thesis also apply to other forms of international agreement, the 
research agenda needs to shift focus towards explanations that better incorporate developed 
countries’ preferences as well as those of developing countries, perhaps modelled as an 
interaction between the two. The conclusion of a tax treaty or a BIT requires willingness on 
the part of two signatories, and it is no surprise that these preferences do not always align. A 
challenge for quantitative studies is to delineate mechanisms acting on capital exporters 
                                                     
10 Mark Manger makes the case for this with respect to preferential trade agreements. See Manger, Investing in 
Protection: The Politics of Preferential Trade Agreements between North and South. 
11 Allee and Peinhardt, “Evaluating Three Explanations for the Design of Bilateral Investment Treaties”; Wei, 
“Bilateral Investment Treaties: An Empirical Analysis of the Practices of Brazil and China.” 
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from those acting on capital importers, and indeed those mechanisms that fall within the 
concept of ‘coercion’, which operate from the former to the latter. Existing proxies for 
coercion, such as overseas aid or IMF disbursements, would not suffice for the explanation 
developed here. 
10.3 Methodological implications 
Authors writing in the policy diffusion and socialisation literature have highlighted that the 
methodological ‘state of the art’ is strong at identifying broad cross-national patterns, but 
weak at understanding regional and national variables that interact with these international 
mechanisms to produce concrete policy change, as well as weak in its coverage of 
developing countries in general.12 Commentators on diffusion have highlighted the need to 
supplement the quantitative evidence base with more qualitative studies, especially in 
developing countries.13 
The mixed methods approach used here identified unexplained variation in quantitative 
studies, but it also it tested the external validity of studies that apply established causal 
mechanisms to developing countries without testing this qualitatively. In doing so, it went 
some way towards identifying national-level scope conditions that vary across developing 
countries but that that may not do so across developed countries. First, policymaking 
capacity can vary from a situation in which there are no civil servants with the capacity to 
build up technical expertise at all, through to the existence of a small, focused and 
knowledgeable team. In contrast, the variation within OECD countries is much narrower. 
Second, there is a big difference between the level of political engagement with corporate 
taxation across all countries, with some bureaucrats operating entirely under-the-radar, while 
others face intense scrutiny from political actors. One determinant of this in developing 
countries is the state’s need for corporate tax revenue, which is much more heterogeneous 
than in developed countries, which have universally higher tax/GDP ratios, bolstered by 
large personal income tax and VAT bases. Finally, developing countries are characterised by 
less complex and more variable polities, which create wide variations across time and 
between countries in the veto power of different players with an interest in corporate 
taxation. 
The mixed methods test gives cause to question the interpretation of an existing quantitative 
study, clearly identifying a need to reinterpret the strong, significant competition effect that 
                                                     
12 Solingen, “Of Dominoes and Firewalls: The Domestic, Regional, and Global Politics of International 
Diffusion”; Meseguer and Gilardi, “What Is New in the Study of Policy Diffusion?”; Gilardi, “Transnational 
Diffusion: Norms, Ideas, and Policies.” 
13 Marsh and Sharman, “Policy Diffusion and Policy Transfer.” 
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it found. Specifically, the evidence suggests that competition at the capital exporting end of 
a dyad is an important driver of the pattern of treaty diffusion, questioning a causal 
hypothesis that focused solely on competition at the inward-investing end. Mixed methods is 
still relatively unusual in international relations research, but, especially where the focus is 
on the role of ideas in driving diffusion, it is essential to test the causal story underlying 
quantitative results. 
Finally, the focus on individual clauses and the use of an index of tax treaty content 
demonstrated that the use of a simple binary variable in studies of the causes and effects of 
tax treaties is inadequate. For this study, knowing the quality of negotiation helps to build 
the causal story behind the quantity of negotiations as well. Large-N studies that break down 
the content of treaties are time-consuming and innovative, but generally produce new and 
interesting findings about the power dynamics of negotiation.14 
10.4 Policy implications 
Ideas play a causal role in the diffusion of tax treaties. For specialist bureaucrats, steeped in 
the technical detail of tax treaties, the foundation of that discourse is the double taxation 
problem, a socially constructed fact. For politicians and civil servants for whom tax treaties 
are merely an obscure tool in the economic toolbox, it is the sense of an authoritative policy 
consensus around the investment-promoting effects of tax treaties that too often goes 
unquestioned. Yet the survey of the literature in this thesis illustrates that sufficient critical 
scholarship exists to call these ‘facts’ into question. The empirical evidence suggests that 
negotiators from developing countries sometimes do this, but sporadically, and often with 
some concern about the risks associated with challenging a prevailing consensus. 
Even if the double taxation problem itself is taken as read, it does not necessarily follow that 
the consensus across the OECD-derived model tax treaties, which systematically shift the 
burden of double tax relief onto developing countries, is the inevitable solution. Again, some 
tax officials, on gaining sufficient understanding of tax treaties to realise this, question the 
standard treaty articles. But there has not been a concerted push to challenge the hegemonic 
status of the de facto settlement between developed and developing countries that is 
embodied by the OECD model. 
                                                     
14 Allee and Peinhardt, “Evaluating Three Explanations for the Design of Bilateral Investment Treaties”; 
Simmons, “Bargaining over BITs, Arbitrating Awards: The Regime for Protection and Promotion of 
International Investment”; Büthe and Milner, “Foreign Direct Investment and Institutional Diversity in Trade 
Agreements: Credibility, Commitment, and Economic Flows in the Developing World, 1971–2007.” 
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The recent politicisation of international tax and – increasingly – tax treaties themselves has 
begun to create more interest in such anti-establishment questions. During the time that this 
thesis was researched, development NGO ActionAid published reports that contributed to 
Zambia’s decision to seek renegotiations of some of its most questionable tax treaties, and 
provoked debate in the Danish and British parliaments about the coherence of tax treaty 
negotiations with development policy.15 The IMF issued its own cautious statement 
questioning the wisdom of tax treaties for developing countries.16 At the UN tax committee, 
developing countries secured a new model treaty clause allowing them to tax gross service 
fee payments made to residents of the treaty partner.17 
This research will, hopefully, contribute to the battle of ideas over tax treaties, because 
historical perspectives on the origins of developing countries’ tax treaty networks are sorely 
lacking. During fieldwork in Uganda, civil servants were surprised that I knew much more 
about their country’s past negotiations with the UK than they did. After I presented chapter 7 
of this thesis to a group of African revenue officials, a revenue authority commissioner 
approached me afterwards to say how surprised he was to learn of the UK government’s 
own motivations for concluding tax treaties with developing countries. Stories of developing 
countries unable even to find the text of their older tax treaties circulate among NGOs. 
This lack of historical perspective needs to be addressed for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
many developing countries, including Zambia and Vietnam, signed treaties with their 
biggest sources of investment soon after independence or opening up. The result is that the 
taxation of much of their foreign investment is governed by agreements on terms reached by 
negotiators who may have had much less knowledge and experience than their current 
successors, reaching trade-offs that were specific to the economic and political climate of the 
day. Second, a negotiated tax treaty is sticky: the consequences for a country’s reputation of 
terminating a treaty may be more significant than not negotiating it in the first place, as a 
Zambian negotiator lamented.18 Developing countries are subject to ‘policy drift’, whereby 
domestic and international politics make it tough to alter their historically negotiated treaties, 
even as the economic context changes around them, potentially making them costly in ways 
that could not have been anticipated.19 Third, negotiating positions are determined by 
                                                     
15 Interview, anonymised; UK Parliament Fourth Delegated Legislation Committee, 21 October 2015; Fiscal 
Affairs committee of the Danish parliament, 29 April 2015. 
16 IMF, Spillovers in International Corporate Taxation. 
17 Observation, October 2015 
18 Interview 41 
19 Hacker, “Privatizing Risk without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of Social Policy 
Retrenchment in the United States.” 
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precedent, with subsequent negotiations starting from the terms that a country has offered in 
the past. 
Consider the 1973 UK-Kenya tax treaty, with which this thesis began. It was a Kenyan 
priority, as in many of the case studies in this thesis, to secure a ‘tax sparing’ clause so that 
British firms could benefit fully from Kenyan tax incentives. Such a clause is no longer 
necessary, as the UK has ceased taxing the foreign-source profits of British multinationals. 
The tough negotiation over the taxation of management and consultancy fees occurred 
before the internet age had revolutionised the tax planning possible using such fees. On this 
basis, it might be a sensible strategy for Kenya to go back to the drawing board on this 
treaty, as it had originally done in the 1970s. The treaties it tore up then were biased against 
it because they had been imposed on it under colonial rule. Today it is a hegemony of ideas, 
serving the interests of OECD member states and multinational firms, that is at the roots of 
an unfair tax treaty system. 
   
 
 
Annex 1: list of interviews 
Interview 
number 
Year Setting 
Number of 
interviewees 
Country income group Type of interviewee 
1 2013 Telephone^ 1 High International organisation/former civil servant 
2 2013 Field visit 1 Upper-middle Civil servant 
3 2013 Field visit 1 Upper-middle Civil servant 
4 2013 Int'l meeting 1 Upper-middle Civil servant 
5 2013 Int'l meeting 1 Upper-middle Civil servant 
6 2013 Int'l meeting^ 2 Lower-middle Civil servant 
7 2013 Int'l meeting* 1 Low Civil servant 
8 2013 Field visit 1 Lower-middle Civil servant 
9 2013 Field visit 1 High Private sector 
10 2013 Int'l meeting 1 Low Civil servant 
11 2013 Int'l meeting* 1 Low Civil servant 
12 2013 Int'l meeting* 1 High Private sector 
13 2013 Int'l meeting 1 High Civil servant 
14 2013 Int'l meeting 1 High Civil servant 
15 2013 Int'l meeting 1 Upper-middle Civil servant 
16 2013 Int'l meeting 1 Upper-middle Civil servant 
17 2013 Int'l meeting 1 Upper-middle Civil servant 
18 2013 Int'l meeting 1 High Civil servant 
19 2013 Int'l meeting* 1 High Civil servant 
20 2013 Int'l meeting 3 Low Civil servant 
21 2014 Field visit 1 High Civil servant 
22 2014 Int'l meeting 1 Low Technical adviser/former civil servant 
23 2014 Field visit 1 Lower-middle Civil servant 
24 2014 Field visit 1 Lower-middle Civil servant 
25 2014 Field visit 1 Low Civil servant 
26 2014 Field visit 1 Low Private sector 
27 2014 Field visit 2 Low Private sector 
28 2014 Field visit 3 Low Civil servant 
29 2014 Field visit 1 Low Academic/private sector 
   
 
 
Interview 
number 
Year Setting 
Number of 
interviewees 
Country income group Type of interviewee 
30 2014 Field visit 1 Low Private sector 
31 2014 Field visit 1 Low Civil servant 
32 2015 Field visit 2 International organisation International organisation/former civil servant 
33 2015 Field visit 1 International organisation International organisation/former civil servant 
34 2015 Field visit 2 High Civil servant 
35 2015 Field visit 2 High Civil servant 
36 2015 Int'l meeting 1 Upper-middle Civil servant 
37 2015 Field visit 1 Upper-middle Private sector 
38 2015 Field visit 2 High Private sector 
39 2015 Field visit 1 High Civil servant 
40 2015 Int'l meeting* 1 International organisation Academic/international organisation 
Zambia 
    
41 2014 Email 1 Lower-middle Civil servant 
42 2014 Telephone 1 Lower-middle Technical adviser/private sector 
43 2014 Field visit^ 1 Lower-middle Civil servant 
44 2014 Field visit 1 Lower-middle Civil servant 
45 2014 Field visit 1 Lower-middle Civil servant 
46 2014 Field visit 2 High Civil servant 
47 2014 Field visit 1 International organisation International organisation 
48 2014 Field visit 1 Lower-middle Private sector 
49 2014 Field visit 1 Lower-middle Civil servant 
50 2014 Field visit 2 Lower-middle Private sector 
51 2014 Field visit 1 Lower-middle Technical adviser 
52 2014 Email 1 Lower-middle Technical adviser/private sector 
Vietnam 
    
53 2014 Field visit 1 International organisation International organisation 
54 2015 Field visit 3 Lower-middle Private sector 
55 2015 Field visit 2 Lower-middle Civil servant 
56 2015 Field visit 1 Lower-middle Private sector 
57 2015 Field visit 1 Lower-middle Civil servant 
58 2015 Telephone 1 Lower-middle Private sector 
   
 
 
Interview 
number 
Year Setting 
Number of 
interviewees 
Country income group Type of interviewee 
59 2015 Field visit 1 Lower-middle Civil servant 
60 2015 Field visit 1 Lower-middle Private sector 
61 2015 Field visit 1 Lower-middle Private sector 
62 2015 Field visit 2 Lower-middle Private sector 
63 2015 Telephone 1 High Civil servant 
Cambodia 
   
64 2015 Field visit 1 Lower-middle Civil servant 
65 2015 Field visit 1 Lower-middle Civil servant 
66 2015 Telephone 1 Lower-middle Technical adviser/private sector 
67 2015 Field visit 1 Lower-middle Private sector 
68 2015 Field visit 1 Lower-middle Private sector 
*Informal conversation ^Subject interviewed more than once, but recorded here as one interview 
  
   
 
 
Annex 2: Descriptive statistics for quantitative analysis 
This table gives the results for both the original Barthel & Neumayer (B&N), and the extended dataset used in this thesis (H). 
   Observations   Mean   Std. Dev   Min   Max  
 B&N   H   B&N   H   B&N   H   B&N   H   B&N   H  
DTT 212,244 289,226 0.007 0.006 0.081 0.080 0 0 1 1 
Product of populations (ln) 212,244 289,226 31.592 31.523 2.363 2.421 22.276 21.898 41.534 41.534 
Product of GDPs per capita (ln) 212,244 289,226 14.765 15.126 2.079 2.155 9.374 9.374 21.072 22.342 
Bilateral trade (ln, t-1) 212,244 289,226 9.986 10.294 7.765 7.476 0.000 0.000 25.237 25.237 
Product of openness to trade* 212,244 289,226 5,296.2 6,244.9 4,604 5,457 65.342 65.342 94,121.9 108,337.6 
BIT 212,244 289,226 0.046 0.056 0.209 0.231 0 0 1 1 
RTA 212,244 289,226 0.079 0.093 0.269 0.291 0 0 1 1 
OFC^ 212,244 289,226 0.209 0.228 0.407 0.419 0 0 1 1 
Diplomatic representation~ 212,244 289,226 0.307 0.274 0.461 0.446 0 0 1 1 
Distance (ln)^ 212,244 289,226 8.782 8.792 0.705 0.696 4.535 4.535 9.896 9.896 
Product of Political Constraints 212,244 289,226 0.125 0.125 0.191 0.186 0 0 0.786 0.786 
OECD-OECD dyad^ 212,244 289,226 0.009 0.007 0.092 0.081 0 0 1 1 
OECD-nonOECD dyad^ 212,244 289,226 0.262 0.248 0.440 0.432 0 0 1 1 
Min. years of independence^ 212,244 289,226 36.718 39.709 17.10 17.59 2 2 81 87 
Max. number of DTT (t) 212,244 289,226 24.428 29.905 23.98 27.14 0 0 118 126 
Cumulative number of DTTs, country i (t-1) 212,244 289,226 12.993 17.620 19.52 24.04 0 0 120 126 
Cumulative number of DTTs, country j (t-1) 212,244 289,226 15.987 17.795 21.73 23.58 0 0 120 126 
Spatial lags       
 
  
 
  
 
    
  W: Common region (product) (t-1) 212,244 289,226 0.049 0.064 0.093 0.108 0 0 1 1 
  W: Export product similarity (sum) (t-1) 212,244 289,226 0.100 0.120 0.050 0.055 0.012 0.012 0.279 0.253 
* Unable to reproduce figures, so the most recent value in the B&N dataset has been extrapolated forward in the H dataset. 
^ Time invariant or generated from time-invariant data, so data taken directly from the B&N dataset. 
~ No data for more recent years are available, so the most recent value in the B&N dataset has been extrapolated forward in the H dataset.
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